Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the Next Decade by Pitt, Harvey L. & Shapiro, Karen L.
Securities Regulation By Enforcement:
A Look Ahead At the Next Decade
Harvey L Pittt
Karen L Shapiroti
I. The Predicates of an Effective Enforcement Program .... 159
A. Enforcement as Part of the Regulatory Process ...... 164
B. The Influence of Politics on the Enforcement Process . . 169
C. The Need for Efficiency, Visibility, and Success
in an Enforcement Program ...................... 171
1. Efficiency ............................ 171
a. Selection of Targets ................... 171
b. The Heightened Possibility of
Criminal Prosecution .................. 175
c. Settlements .... ........................ 179
d. Encouragement of Private Rights of Action . . . . 182
2. Visibility ..... ............................. 184
3. Litigation Success .... ....................... 189
II. Securities Law Enforcement During the 1980s ........ .191
A. Background of the 1970s ........................ 191
B. Enforcement Programs of the 197 0s .............. 192
1. Unconventional Securities .................. 192
2. Questionable Payments .................... 194
3. Corporate Accountability ................... 195
t Mr. Pitt is a partner of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C.
From 1968 to 1978. Mr. Pitt served in various capacities as an attorney with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. From 1975 to 1978, Mr. Pitt was the Commission's General
Counsel. Mr. Pitt has been Chairman of the American Bar Association's Subcommittee on
SEC Practice and Enforcement Matters since 1984.
tt Ms. Shapiro is an associate of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington,
D.C. From 1983 to 1986, Ms. Shapiro was an attorney with the Division of Enforcement
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the authors. Mr. Pitt, Ms. Shapiro, and/or their law firm, have been counsel in
many of the cases discussed herein.
The authors would like to express their appreciation to legal assistants Deborah L. Box,
Jeffrey A. Hartzell, Lucy I. losua, Randy G. Legg, Karen Livesey, Thomas G. Martinchek,
and Randolph A. Moore III, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
Copyright 0 1990 by the Yale Journal on Regulation
Yale Journal on Regulation
4. Novel Theories of Ancillary Relief ............. 196
Deregulation in the 1980s .................... 197
Insider Trading: Centerpiece of the Enforcement
Program of the 1980s ....................... 199
1. Back to Fundamentals ..................... 200
2. Inadequate Statutory Framework ............. 202
3. The Commission's Evolving Response to
Insider Trading ........................ 210
4. International Aspects of the SEC's Insider
Trading Program ....................... 212
5. Heightened Emphasis on the Criminal Components
of Insider Trading ....................... 217
6. Legislative Initiatives and Responses ........... 221
a. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ....... 223
b. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987 ..... 227
c. The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ........... 236
d. The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act
of 1989 .......... ..... ..... .. ...
e. The International Securities Enforce-
ment Cooperation Act of 1989 ...........
f. Congressional Oversight ...............
E. Other Enforcement Programs of the 1980s .......
1. Manipulation ........................
2. Delinquent Filing Program ...............
3. Expanded Ancillary Relief ...............
4. Financial Fraud ......................
5. Disclosure Issues-The MD&A Program .......
6. Attorneys ...........................
a. Attorneys' Ability to Counsel Clients .......
b. Commission Bootstrapping of Consent Orders
into Substantive Rules of Law ...........
7. Penny Stocks ........................
8. Corporate Governance Issues ..............


















III. Expectations for the SEC's Enforcement Program in
the 1990s ................................ 278
A. Preliminary Issues ......................... 278
1. Inherent Limitations Affecting the Predictability of
the Commission's Future Enforcement Initiatives . . . 278
2. Administrative Considerations ................. 281
150
Vol. 7: 149, 1990
Securities Regulation by Enforcement
B. General Attributes of the SEC's Enforcement Program
that can be Anticipated in the 1990s ............... 286
1. Modifying the Trend Toward Deregulation ....... 286
2. Using Enforcement Proceedings as a Substitute
for Regulation ......................... 288
3. Increased Publicity for the Enforcement Program ... 288
4. Increased Enforcement Authority .............. 289
5. Increased Development of Aggressive Enforce-
ment Remedies ............................. 290
6. Increased Criminalization of the Federal Securities
Laws Enforcement Process ................. 292
7. Increase in Private Rights of Action ............ 293
8. Decreased Flexibility in the Implementation of
the Commission's Enforcement Program .......... 294
C. Specific SEC Enforcement Initiatives Likely to Surface in
the 1990s .............................. 299
1. Insider Trading .... ........................ 299
2. Penny Stock Abuses .......................... 299
3. Market Manipulation Cases ................... 300
4. Disclosures in Change of Control Contexts ....... 300
5. International Enforcement Activities ............. 301
6. Stock Loan Activities ..................... 301
7. Thrift and Depository Institution Securities
Law Violations ......................... 301
8. Financial Accounting Cases ................. 301
9. Disclosure of Adverse Information and Adverse Trends 302
10.Failure to Supervise Cases ................. 302
Conclusion ..................................... 302
Slightly more than halfway through the past decade,' the effort
1. On May 12, 1986, federal prosecutors arrested Dennis Levine, a managing director
of the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., charging him with
insider trading activities allegedly dating back nearly to the beginning of the decade. SEC
v. Levine, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,717 (S.D.N.Y. May
12, 1986). Levine was, at that time, one of the highest ranking Wall Street professionals to
have succumbed to the temptation of insider trading. Thereafter, the numbers of
professionals caught up in this scandal increased exponentially, and their stature increased
commensurately. See, e.g., SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); SEC v. Siegel, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1987); United States v. Freeman, No. 89 Cr.
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of government regulators to enforce the arcane federal securities
laws left the business pages, and assumed a prominent position of
honor or ignominy (depending upon whether one was doing the
writing, or being written about)2 on the front pages of America's and
the World's newspapers.' For securities lawyers in particular, the
1980s were exciting and tumultuous.
Dubbed the "Roaring Eighties" by those with a cynical bent,4 and
marred by a disturbing departure from ethical norms (in the form
of a number of major corporate scandals, including a. frightening
increase in insider trading and defense contracting scandals'), this
past decade saw a renewed interest in securities law enforcement on
615 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1989). SEC charges related to Levine's trading were brought against
Robert Wilkis, Ira Sokolow, David Brown, Ilan Reich, and Randall Cecola for furnishing
Levine with some of the nonpublic information upon which his trades were based. SEC v.
Wilkis, No. 86-5182 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1986); United States v. Wilkis, No. 86 Cr. 1112
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1986); see In re Ira B. Sokolow, Exchange Act Release No. 23,386, 36
SEC Docket 6 (July 1, 1986); SEC v. Sokolow, No. 86-5193 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1986);
United States v. Sokolow, No. 86 Cr. 762 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4. 1986); see In re David S.
Brown, Exchange Act Release No. 23,698 36 SEC Docket 924 (Oct. 9, 1986); SECv. Brown,
Litigation Release No., 11,245, 36 SEC Docket 949 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986); United States
v. Brown, No. 86 Cr. 741 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1986); SEC v. Reich, Litigation Release
No. 11,246, 36 SEC Docket 949 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986); Urited States v. Reich, 661 F.
Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); SEC v. Cecola, Litigation Release No. 11,313, 37 SEC Docket
342 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1986); United States v. Cecola, No. 86 Cr. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
1986). All of these individuals settled with the government.
2. Three reporters for the Wall Street Journal make this point graphically.
Two-James Stewart and Daniel Hertzberg-received Pulitze r Prizes for their reportage of
the insider trading scandal. See Winners of Pulitzer Prizes in Journalism, Letters and the Arts,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1988, at B4, col. 1. The third-R. Foster Winans-received an eighteen
month jail term for his illegal insider trading activities. See Wall Street Journal Ex-Reprter
Sentenced to 1 1/2 Years in Stock Fraud, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1985, at AS, col. 3.
3. See The Predator's Ball, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1988, § 7, at 29, col. 1; See also Wall
Street Trader Admits He is Guilty in Stock Price Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 1;
Dreel Will Pay $673 Million in Fines, Penalties, Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 12, 1989, at Al;
Are RICO Seizures a Violation of Rights, as Critics Contend?, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1989, at Al,
col. 1; The Bulldogs in Uncle Sam's Garden, Fin. Times (U.K.), Aug. 8. 1987, § 1, at 1, col.
3; Setback for US Insider Trading Probe, Fin. Times (U.K.), May 14, 1987, § 1, at 1; Pitt &
Shapiro, The Revised Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1988: A Legislative Remedy for a Problem
that Persisu, 26 AM. CRim. L. REv. 7, 7 (1988) [hereinafter A Legislative Remedy].
The. public's preoccupation with securities law enforcement was not restricted to the
news media. One. highly, successful movie-Wall Street (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
1987), an internationally acclaimed play-Serious Money, written by Caryl Churchill-and a
series of Doonesbuiy cartoons by Gary Trudeau, transformed insider trading into a household
concept.
4. See Brill, The Roaring Eighties, Am. Law., May 1985.
5. For a general. description of these scandals, see Pitt & Groskauftoanis, Minimizing
Corporate Civil and Crminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J.
_ (1990) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Corporate Codes].
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the part of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or
the Commission) and various federal and state prosecutors.6
The decade commenced with a seemingly pedestrian declaration
of a return to the fundamentals of securities law enforcement, and
the disavowal of the pursuit of so-called securities enforcement
esoterica;7 it ended as a decade of vigorous securities law
enforcement, by federal and state prosecutors, the SEC, securities
industry self-regulators, and private plaintiffs. s Perhaps more
importantly, despite the agency's much publicized disavowal of
certain of the attributes of the SEC's enforcement program in the
1970s, in fact, by the end of the decade, the SEC was expanding its
authority, developing novel theories of law, enmeshing itself in
corporate governance, and seeking unusual and extraordinary
remedies in judicial proceedings.
6. While the Commission's enforcement of the federal securities laws receives the
most prominent attention, authorities at the state level also play a significant role in
regulating securities offerings. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS Or SECURITIEs RGULATION
8-14 (1988). The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) vests concurrent jurisdiction over
its provisions in the state and federal courts, 15 U.S.C. I 77v (1982), thus enabling state
regulators to enforce this Act's provisions in their own courts. The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act), by contrast, expressly specifies exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts. 15 U.S.C. I 78u(d)(1) (1982).
7. See, e.g.. Noble. The Dispute Over th S.E.C., N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 21, 1982, at DI, col.
3 ("Mr. Shad is focusing on [insider trading and manipulation] rather than on accounting
practices and broader corporate governance, and he is supported by many in the securities
community who have long argued that the enforcement division ... needed to be reined
in"). This perception remained, although one Shad-Fedders enforcement action raised fears
of a return to the emphasis of the 1970s: "The (Paradyne] suit could have broad
implications if it shows renewed SEC interest in management integrity--a concern that has
been dormant under current SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad." The SEC v. Padudme: More
at Stake than a Company's Reputation, Bus. WE., Dec. 5, 1983, at 172, col. 1. Curiously, at
the time the Paradyne suit was brought, Fedders already had asserted his intention to focus
the Commission's enforcement efforts on traditional, fundamental principles of securities law,
rather than the esoteric theories pursued during the 1970's. Id.
8. The Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been
the focus of unprecedented attention and publicity during the past three years, as a result
of the major insider trading cases brought by the Commission against a variety of leading
Wall Street professionals, including investment bankers, arbitrageurs, and lawyers. The
attention received by the Enforcement Division has not gone unnoticed by the Commission
itself, which has sought a $25.7 million budget increase for the 1989 fiscal year and a $26.1
million budget increase for the 1990 fiscal year, much of which will apparently be
channeled to the Enforcement Division. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Budget
Estimate Fiscal 1990, Jan. 9, 1989, at i. In addition, remedies through civil, criminal, and
administrative legal actions are sought as appropriate in the prevention and suppression of
ftaud. The number of investigations initiated, administrative proceedings opened, and
injunctive actions commenced have increased steadily over the past three years. See Budget
of the United States Govenmernt, FY 1989, at l-Z88 (1988).
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In the process, the SEC eschewed its traditional fear of
Congressional handiwork,9  and proposed substantial securities
legislation (largely but not exclusively devoted to the phenomenon
of insider trading)," which passed by a resounding margin." And,
fueled by the SEC or the media, relevant Congressional committees
proposed, considered, and (in one case) adopted additional pieces of
legislation, some of which have been revived in the current session
of Congress. 2
Although the onset of the Reagan Administration produced a
flurry of criticisms by outspoken Congressional and other
commentators regarding the future of securities regulation," by the
end of the decade most members of Congress were praising a
9. As a general proposition, the SEC has often feared to propose legislation when
it does not control the environment in which that legislation is considered. This is
particularly true when the relevant Congressional committees are controlled by a political
party other than that dominating the Commission.
10. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 represented the Commission's first
legislative assault on illegal insider trading. See Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)).
11. See Congress Talks Tough, But Fails to Speak Clearly on Insider Trading Issues,
Manhattan Law., Dec. 6-12, 1988, at 11 (Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988 passed by 410-0 vote in House, on a voice vote in Senate); Insider-Trading
Sanctions Bill Clears Congress, Wall St. J., July 26, 1984, at 4, col. 2 ("The House voted
unanimously to adopt the insider-trading sanctions bill").
12. Issues of insider trading and tipping regained the attention of Congress, resulting
in rapid passage of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(ITSFEA). See Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)). Another legislative proposal, the Insider Trading
Proscriptions Act of 1987, was introduced in June 1987 as S. 1380, a bill drafted by an ad
hoc committee of lawyers, chaired by Mr. Pitt, in response to a request by the Chairman
of the Senate Securities Subcommittee. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REG.
58247 (daily ed. June 17, 1987). On January 18, 1989, the Commission submitted to
Congress a legislative proposal to enhance its ability to enforce the provisions of the various
federal securities regulatory statutes. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Support of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, Jan. 18.
1989 (on file with authors). On March 1, 1989, the Commission submitted to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs a legislative proposal, introduced as
S. 646, to enhance its ability to secure from, and to provide to, foreign regulators
cooperation in international securities law enforcement matters. See Memorandum of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the International Securities Enforcement
Cooperation Act of 1989, Mar. 1. 1989 (on file with authors).
13. Some of this criticism may have been self-inflicted. When John S.R. Shad
assumed the Chairmanship of the Commission, he spent his first year touting the benefits
of deregulation, see. e.g., The SEC Under Shad: Can a Deregulator Protect the Public?, BUS. WK..
June 13, 1983, at 135; SEC Chairman Notes Efforts to Streamline 50 Years of Rules, Statutes,
Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA), Feb. 4, 1982, at A-I, and focusing his efforts on insider trading
enforcement actions to the exclusion of other types of enforcement proceedings. See articles
cited infra note 222. That did not play well in Congress. See SECs Shad, Fedders Deny
Commission is Overemphasizing Insider Trading, 14 Sec. Sec. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1785
(OcL 22, 1982).
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vigorous SEC enforcement program, and seeking ways to facilitate
the agency's law enforcement mission. 4 Emboldened by its successes
(particularly in the insider trading arena), favorable commentary
from the press 6 and academicians, " and a number of significant
litigation triumphs," the SEC's enforcement program shifted
dramatically over the course of the decade, as the agency once again
employed enforcement proceedings to develop new legal theories
and remedies. This change promises to influence the future course
of securities regulation during the next decade and beyond.
Unlike many of its sister agencies, the SEC consistently has
maintained a vigorous, highly-visible, and largely successful
enforcement profile.' Indeed, the agency's enforcement proclivities
have been so pronounced, that plaudits for the agency's effectiveness
have, from time-to-time, shared the limelight with accusations that
14. See, e.g., Reagan Asked to Name Vigorous Chief at S.E.C., N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1987.
at Dl, col. 1 (Congress urged President Reagan to appoint an SEC Chairman who would
continue the agency's tough enforcement program, following Chairman Shad's resignation).
By the end of his tenure, Mr. Shad had stopped speaking about deregulation, and started
focusing on ethics. See Shad, Business' Bottom Line: Ethics, N.Y. Tunes, July 27, 1987, at AI9,
col. 1; New Debate About Harvard Business School, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 1987. at 34; Case Study
in Caring, THE ECONOMiSr, Sept. 30, 1989, at 27 (reporting Mr. Shad's pledge to provide
$20 million to Harvard Business School to fund the teaching of business ethics). That
not-so-subtle shift in emphasis produced a host of favorable commentary by former critics,
see, e.g., They Who 'Delivered' Boesky are Perplexed, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 2, 1987, at B6, col. 3
("The Boesky case has indeed brought high praise to the S.E.C. from some of its most
persistent critics.. ."), and even generated the preparation of a book about Mr. Shad's
tenure as SEC Chairman. See Inside New York, Newsday, Feb. 6, 1989, at Al.
15. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 92,717 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986); SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); SEC v. Siegel, [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1987).
16. See New Chairman Expected to Name Insider as Wall Street's Top Cop, Reuter's Bus.
Rep., Oct. 11, 1989 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS libary, Wires file) (quoting favorable
commentary regarding Commission's three acting Directors of Enforcement); Futures Outrages
Coming Home to Roost, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1989, at E3, col. 1 (comparing SEC's superior
performance to recent CFTC actions); Nominee for S.E.C. Chairmanship Faces Heavy Sessions
with Senators, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1989, at A9, col. 1 (praising quality of Commission's
"highly skilled lawyers").
17. See Klein, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making and the Calculus of Investor Confidence,
16 Ho FsRA L Rzv. 665 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. First City Fin.
Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Pitt,
The Limits of Frau& An Analysis of the Winans Case, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1988, at 14.
19. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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it indiscriminately uses its enforcement powers as a substitute for
meaningful, orderly, and fair regulatory processes."
Depending upon the issues involved, and the timing of their
presentation, that criticism is not without a modicum of merit. The
SEC has, at times, resorted to ad hoc enforcement of the federal
securities laws in particular contexts, in the absence of meaningful
advance guidance (or warning) to those subject to the agency's
jurisdiction, in large measure because of the agency's institutional
fear that any specific regulations it might promulgate could prove
underindusive or susceptible of easy evasion.2
It is, understandably, far easier for SEC officials to defend and
pursue individual enforcement actions, particularly if they are highly
visible enforcement actions, than to attempt to develop and maintain
comprehensive regulatory responses to difficult and technical
industry and professional issues. To be sure, there are administrative
benefits to such an approach-that is, to the approach of securities
regulation by enforcement. Among other things,
(i) the agency is not required to identify emerging
issues before they actually arise;
(ii) the agency is not required to chart out, explicate,
maintain or perfect a comprehensive solution to
identified issues, taking into account those
circumstances where deviation from normative
standards might be appropriate;
(iii) the agency is able to react to specific facts, and
tailor its responses to each new situation;
(iv) the agency is not required to conform its actions to
procedures that can both delay the articulation of
new legal standards and can enable others to attack
either the premises or the conclusions drawn by the
agency; and
20. See, e.g., Corporate Codes, supra note 5, at 31 (quoting The Corporate Rush to Confess
All, BuS. WK., Feb. 23, 1976, at 22, col. 1 ("At some point ... we end up trying to enforce
everyone else's law, which is not our job to do") (statement of SEC Commissioner A. A.
Sommer, Jr.)).
21. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
Vol. 7: 149, 1990
Securities Regulation by Enforcement
(v) critics and overseers of the agency's activities are
less likely to be able to detect inconsistent
approaches by the agency to comparable problems,
or even to ascertain guiding principles or policies
employed by the agency to respond to certain types
of situations.
Throughout most of its history, the SEC has consistently relied on
this ad hoc enforcement approach to the development of certain
regulatory standards. But, the SEC substantially changed the
direction of its efforts with the advent of the 1980s. Turning away
from so-called esoteric securities cases--that is, cases involving novel
or unique investment instruments or activities whose connection to
traditional securities law enforcement efforts may appear
attenuated--the Commission embarked upon a dual program of
deregulation and increased, main-stream enforcement of the federal
securities laws. Despite a certain amount of initial cynicism and
skepticism, the SEC's enforcement program over the past decade is
now largely viewed as a success.22 In the course of this process,
discernible trends began to develop in the agency's enforcement
program.
Among other things, the SEC's focus on insider trading cases,
while salutary, threatens to leave neglected critical other areas of
securities enforcement that may be of less interest to the financial
media. Similarly, the SEC's success with insider trading cases
portends the likely expansion by the agency of the legal theories on
which it will rely in other cases, and the remedies it will request in
a variety of circumstances, in many instances beyond existing
statutory provisions."
Finally, the development and maturation of the SEC's
enforcement program during the past decade have brought with it
the concomitant public scrutiny that ineluctably follows highly-visible
government activities. Public scrutiny can enhance a regulatory
agency's performance, and often does. Much of the criticism
afflicting the Commission, however, has been directed toward
22. The agency (i) uncovered a massive insider trading scandal, which has prompted
renewed self-policing by securities professionals, and the passage of significant and extensive
new legislative powers for the agency; (ii) captured significant amounts in fines and
penalties for the U.S. Treasury; (iii) scored some impressive litigation victories; and (iv)
escaped the ravages of budget-cutting legislation.
23. While the SEC has done an admirable job in the area of law enforcement, this
latter approach can take on some of the characteristics of "the ends justify the means."
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questions of whether the agency is sufficiently aggressive, whether its
sanctions are sufficient to deter future wrongdoing, and whether its
settlement and litigation strategies are sufficiently rigorous and
uncompromising. Scrutiny of this kind threatens to make the
agency's enforcement staff more self-conscious about their judgments,
and less self-confident about the wisdom of their choices.
In concrete terms, the same types of cases that are being brought
today will likely continue to be brought over the course of the next
decade. But the process by which those cases are resolved may well
differ as a result of the Commission's activities and successes this
past decade. Expansive theories of law, increased statutory authority,
and novel theories of the remedies to which the agency is entitled,
threaten to deprive the agency of some measure of its historical
effectiveness. That effectiveness has been the product of an enforce-
ment program that is perceived by lawyers, judges, and, perhaps
most importantly, defendants, as both fair and credible. To the
extent the agency strays from its traditional moorings, it runs a
significant risk that more of its cases will be litigated and that, as a
result, fewer cases can be brought.
Despite the difficulty that inheres in attempting to weave
individual enforcement judgments into a cohesive and principled
framework, 4 this Article attempts to chart the major themes of SEC
regulation through enforcement during the 1980s, and to assess
their implications for the next decade. 5
In particular, Part I assesses the predicates for an effective and
meaningful SEC enforcement program, including an analysis of its
limitations and its past origins. Through this analysis, we explicate
the major facets of the SEC's approach to enforcement, and analyze
the extent to which the actual attributes of the SEC's enforcement
programs have conformed to the agency's ideals.
Part II discusses several of the major trends of the past decade,
and the SEC's approach to enforcement throughout that period.
24. To a large extent, securities enforcement is serendipitous. First someone has to
violate the law, and then someone in the government has to become aware of that violation.
It is very difficult for the government to create a law enforcement program out of whole
cloth and then "stock" it with cases brought in the ordinary course of its enforcement
efforts. Rather, enforcement requires flexibility and responsiveness.
25. Scholars and practitioners who assess this Article undoubtedly will criticize its
selectivity. It is, however, simply not possible to identify every significant enforcement
development over the past decade, and it is even more difficult to discuss every significant
enforcement development we are capable of identifying. We do not purport to do so.
Instead, we attempt to identify a number of enforcement trends, and discuss those trends
in the context of instances of enforcement initiatives.
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These trends evidence concrete directions and patterns assumed by
the agency which are most likely to influence future enforcement
initiatives. Given some of the responses to the agency's enforcement
program, future institutional decisions may be easier to predict.
Finally, Part III identifies those aspects of the current
enforcement program that are apt to have significant implications for
future SEC enforcement initiatives, recognizing that any analysis, no
matter how cogent, is circumscribed by the fact that the Commission
itself is in the process of undergoing substantial changes in person-
nel. 6
I. The Predicates of an Effective Enforcement Program
The SEC has long (and consistently) been recognized as one of
the most effective prototypes of federal enforcement powers."
26. The Commission has a relatively new Chairman, Richard C. Breeden. While
Chairman Breeden has occupied this position for only a few months, some insight into his
possible priorities may be gleaned from his responses to questions posed by members of the
Senate Banking Committee, in connection with his confirmation hearings. See Breeden,
Response to Questions from Senate Banking Committee in Connection with Confirmation Proceedings
for Richard C. Breeden as a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sept. 29, 1989
[hereinafter Breeden Responses]. In the Breeden Responses, Breeden identified as areas of
especial interest or concern to him the need for (i) greater oversight of the international
securities markets, see id. at 7-8, 35, 40, 82-3; (ii) increased use of criminal proceedings in
egregious cases, particularly in the area of penny stock fraud, see id. at 13, 15, 29; (iii) the
need for additional enforcement remedies, see id. at 37, 100; and (iv) a strong enforcement
presence, see id. at 1, 49, 86, 104-5, while not over-regulating to the point of harming a
competitive capital formation market, see id. at 93-4, 104.
In addition, as of this writing, the Commission's Director of Enforcement, William R.
McLucas, a twelve-year veteran of the Enforcement Division, was only recently appointed.
See McLucas Is Named SEC Enforcement Chief, Its Second-Most-Influential Post, Wall St. J., Dec
27, 1989, at AS, col. 2. Finally, additional vacancies on the Commission portend significant
changes in its composition over the next year. While this Nation prides itself on being a
government of laws, as opposed to a government of men, see J. Adams, Original Draft of
Mass. Const., (1779), the simple fact is that, with so much change, it is highly likely that the
current enforcement program will undergo significant changes as well. This was certainly
the case, for example, when the former Director of Enforcement, Stanley Sporkin (now
Judge Sporkin), left the Commission and John M. Fedders succeeded him. See infra notes
215-19 and accompanying text.
27. See A New Regulatory Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory
Agencies by the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization 102 (1971)
[hereinafter Ash Reort] ("The SEC is regarded as one of the ablest of the independent
regulatory commissions"). See also Howe Report Criticizes SEC for Slow Progress Toward National
Market System, But Also Praises Agency, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 372, at A-5 (Oct. 6,
1976); Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and Fchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119,
128-29 (1981) ("The SEC came to symbolize tue need for and the value of the concept of
the regulatory agency. Since the SEC was blessed not only by an admirable purpose, but
by a remarkable staff, its reputation soon was pre-eminent among the agencies of
government") (citing Ratner, SEC: Portrait of the Agency as a Thirty-Seven Year Old, 45 St.
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Largely because of the importance of its mi-sion,1s the complexity of
its tasks," and the dedication and competence of its staff, the SEC
has earned a significant level of respect and appreciation, even from
normally severe critics 0 Some observers have attributed this success
to the early personnel of the agency,"' who set a standard for
JOHN's L. REv. 583 (1971)).
28. The SEC was born out of the rubble of the Great Depression and the Market
Crash. See J. SELGmmN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 1-2 (1982) [hereinafter
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET]. It was anticipated that the effects of the October, 1929
market crash would never be repeated, and perhaps could be prevented, by virtue of the
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 2.
It has become dear, however, that market crashes of the sort that gave rise to the
Commission are not relics of the past, see, e.g., The Villain in Volatility, Newsweek, Nov. 6,
1989, at 58; Fed Seeks to Reassure Markets; US Central Bank Ready to Inject Cash-United Reaction
to Wall Street Losses, Fim. Times (U.K.), Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 3; Legacies of '29, Wash. Post,
Oct. 28, 1987, at A21, col. 1; Wall Street: The Wild Day After, LA Times, Oct. 21, 1987, at
1, col. 5, and may occur with greater frequency in the future. Ironically, the appointment
of the last two SEC chairmen, occurring in October 1987 and 1989, has coincided with
market crashes.
29. Unlike many federal administrative agencies, the SEC is a lawyer-dominated
organization. Final Report of SEC Transition Team, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 587, at
K-1. K-2 (Jan. 1. 1981) [hereinafter Transition Team Report]. It was not until some forty years
after its establishment that the Commission recognized the value of policy planning, and
increased the prominence of economic analysis in its regular operations. See Transition Team
Report, supra, at K-2, K-3.
30. Professor Seligman, in TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STRET, supra note 28,
observed that:
Even the critics of the SEC's mandated disclosure program paid homage to its
popularity. Professor George Stigler. for example, in 1964 wrote:
It is doubtful whether any other type of public regulation of economic
activity has been so widely admired as the regulation of the securities
markets by the Securities and Exchange Commission.... The Commission
has led a scandal-free life as federal regulatory bodies go. It has ...
enjoyed the friendship, or at least avoided the enmity, of both political
parties.
In a similar vein, Professor [Homer] Kripke conceded fifteen years later, The
Commission's approach to the content of disclosure has been accepted, with
comparatively few exceptions... by the practicing professionals....
Transformation Qf Wall Street, supra note 28, at 561 (citations omitted).
31. The SEC has always been a breeding ground for important contributors to good
government. Two senior SEC officials became Justices of the Supreme Court (William 0.
Douglas and Abe Fortas), at least two became federal appellate judges (Jerome Frank and
William Timbers), at least three became federal district judges (Gerhardt Gesell, Kevin
Duffy, and Stanley Sporkin), one is now serving as the senior Senator from Montana (Max
Baucus), and at least three have thereafter served as higher ranking government officials
(William Casey, John S.R. Shad, Stanley Sporkin). This is not intended to denigrate the
countless numbers of SEC officials and staff members who have gone on to additional (if
not greater) glory in the private sector. Indeed, the current Commissioner of Baseball is
a proud SEC alumnus (Francis T. (Fay) Vincent).
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excellence that has continued throughout the agency's existence,"
while others credit the fact that the agency has nothing to give
away, in the form of licensing power or monetary awards."
But, the mixture of enforcement and regulatory powers in a
single agency often creates conflicts as well as policy choices,
4
although the courts have dedined to upset this combination of
functions. 5 Should the law be developed primarily through regu-
lation or should it be developed primarily through enforcement?
8
How much regulatory specificity should precede enforcement
activity?37 How should the two functions complement one another?"8
Are they compatible? 9
32. See supra note 27.
33. The agency does, of course, have authority over securities professionals, such as
securities brokers and dealers, and investment advisers. But, unlike licensing agencies, the
SEC does not license such professionals; it merely registers them. Anyone with a minimal
amount of capital, and a relatively consistent record of law compliance, can (and, indeed,
must) be registered. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (1982).
34. See generally Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative Process, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
216 (1966).
35. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
36. This issue has preoccupied the SEC, in particular, for many years. Indeed, in
1977, the agency convened a Major Issues Conference, attended by distinguished
representatives of various private-sector organizations, to focus on four major issues
confronting the agency. The very first issue denominated was the tension between
regulation and enforcement. Not surprisingly, it was the consensus of the participants that
the agency should regulate through regulation and not through enforcement. See FINAL
REPORT OF THE SEC MAJOR ISSUES CONFERENCE 1-2 (1977) [hereinafter SEC MAJOR ISSUES
CONFERENCE].
37. Particularly in the area of fraud, the tension between regulation and enforcement
is significant. Long ago, the Commission asserted, and the courts recognized, that it was not
possible, and perhaps counter-productive, to afford too much specificity regarding the
content of fraud. See. e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) ("the broad
language of the anti-fraud provisions [should not be] circumscribed by fine distinctions and
rigid classifications"); Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.) ("[fraud ...
needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity"), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
By the same token, notions of due process require that an individual have fair warning
of precisely what conduct the law proscribes, before that individual can be sanctioned for
it. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980) (citing Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
38. The textual inquiry assumes that enforcement and regulation are not substitutes.
Some commentators have criticized the SEC for not recognizing that fact. See generally R.
KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 76 (1982) [hereinafter REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION].
39. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 51 (1975) ("Legislators ... have given much
attention to whether and to what extent distinctive administrative functions should be
performed by the same persons. No single answer has been reached. Indeed, the growth, variey,
and complexity of the administrative processes have made any one solution highly unlikely") (emphasis
supplied); Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir.) ("The APA
prohibits agency staff from combining prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the same
Yale Journal on Regulation
Although many, if not most, of these questions can be posed for
other administrative agencies that also perform a combination of
regulatory and enforcement powers, the issues raised by the SEC's
approach to these issues are not necessarily the same as those
confronted by other agencies. A recent glimpse at the enforcement
process of the now-defunct Federal Home Loan Bank Board serves
to underscore the point. In the unfolding story of that agency's
internecine disputes between its San Francisco Regional Bank
enforcers and its Home Office Enforcement staff1° arising out of the
Lincoln Savings Bank's financial difficulties, it has become apparent
that all federal enforcement agencies do not necessarily function
comparably in analogous situations.
Thus, for example, the SEC has long promoted a spirit of
cohesiveness and harmony between its home office staff and its
regional office enforcement staff.4' The Bank Board, on the other
hand, appears not to have enjoyed the same collegiality of spirit
between home and regional offices, resulting in something less than
appropriate aggressiveness in addressing questions about the legal
sufficiency of a claim against Lincoln Savings Bank and its
case. But it epressly exempts agmny members from this prohibition of combined functions' (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted), cert. denia, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
40. See Savings Executive Won't Testify and Blames Regulators For Woes, N.Y. Times, Nov.
22, 1989, at Al, col. 2, describing a bizarre exchange of accusations between regional and
headquarters officials of the Bank Board:
mhe bulk of the testimony amounted to finger-pointing by the Washington office
to failures by the San Francisco office, with Mr. Wall and others asserting that the
San Francisco office had not proved its case .... But the Washington officials did
not go unchallenged. The committee called two of Mr. Wall's chief opponents from
the San Francisco office....
Id. See also Lincoln Owner Refuses To Testify, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1989, at El, col. 2.
41. This does not mean, of course, that circumstances have not created the potential
for strained relations between the home and regional offices. Indeed, the former head of
the SEC's Atlanta Regional Office, Michael Wolensky, conducted an investigation of the
private practice activities of the former Enforcement Division Director, John Fedders, in
connection with Fedders' representation of Southland Corporation. See SEC Probe Ties
Southland to Kidbacks, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1984, at BI, col. 3 ("Wolensky ... was chosen
to conduct the probe because he does not work directly with Fedders. 'Wolensky was trying
to do a hatchet job [in describing Fedders's conduct in his report to the SEC],' [Fedders's
lawyer, Peter] Bleakly said"). The Commission's inquiry ultimately exonerated Fedders. See
Fedders Cleared by S.E.C. Staff, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at D7, col. 1. Significantly, this
episode did not generate media reports of strained relations within the agency similar to
those described as having prevailed at the Bank Board.
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Chairman, Charles Keating.4 While the existence of such questions
is not unusual, even at an aggressive agency such as the SEC, 5 the
two year hiatus during which these questions were pursued and
resolved by Bank Board officials is atypical for an
enforcement-minded agency like the SEC."
Equally atypical at the SEC is the degree to which other agencies
permit political pressures to affect their enforcement and regulatory
judgments. While the issues are still in the process of being sorted
out in connection with the Lincoln Savings Bank case, early press
and Congressional reports suggest that political influence may have
played a role. That type of influence is exceedingly rare at the
SEC.4
In order to chart the likely course of securities law enforcement
in the 1990s, it is essential to understand how the SEC's
enforcement program functions (and, perhaps more importantly,
how such a program should function), and what directions the SEC's
42. See S&L's Phone Bugged, Gonzales Says, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1989, at GI, col. 2
(former Regional Bank Board official "said the $2 billion debacle 'need not have happened
and would not have happened if the bank board had showed any backbone' "); Savings
Executive Won't Tesify and Blames Regulators For Woes, supra note 40, at Al (Senior Bank
Board officials "cited fear within the bank board's office that Mr. Keating could succeed in
a legal challenge to any action taken against Lincoln"); High Noon at S&L Hearings, Wash.
Post, Nov. 21, 1989, at Cl, col. 2 ("[Regional Bank Board officials] have portrayed bank
board officials in Washington as intimidated by Keating and unwilling to back up regional
officials in taking action against Lincoln").
43. Questions of this sort arose during the 1970s, particularly with respect to the
agency's vigorous pursuit of foreign and domestic questionable payments. See Involuntary
Disclosure, Chemical Wk., June 2, 1976, at 16 (reporting on two companies' disclosure of
questionable payments, publicized "over the objection of the [SEC], which claimed the
information was not material . . ."). Those questions did not interrupt a steady flow of
enforcement actions, however. Congress ultimately ratified much of the SEC's efforts by
enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
44. Again, the SEC is not immune from similar scrutiny. In connection with a
recommendation by the Enforcement Division staff to commence proceedings against
Citicorp for its alleged failure to disclose currency violations, the Commission itself rejected
the recommendation (with the support of Mr. Fedders who, in an unusual move, opposed
his own Division's recommendation). See S.E.C. Vote on Citicorp Questioned, N.Y. Times, Mar.
1, 1982, at D1, col. 3 ("[v]arious S.E.C. officials, including John M. Fedders... had argued
against the recommendation of the enforcement division staff"); see also S.E.C. Overruled Sta)
on Finding that Citicorp Had Foreign Profits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at Al, col. 5.
45. An exception was the effort by Martin Sweig, Chief Administrative Aide to then
House of Representatives Speaker John McCormack, to assist Nathan Voloshen in
intervening on behalf of the Parvin/Dohrmann Corporation at the SEC. The end result was
that Mr. Voloshen and a host of others were promptly sued by the SEC and federal
criminal prosecutors when the facts were uncovered. See United States v. Sweig and
Voloshen, 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Sweig and Voloshen indicted on 15 counts
of defrauding United States government by exerting undue pressure and influence); SEC
v. Parvin/Dohrmann, Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,500
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1969).
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enforcement program has pursued over the past years. In Part I, we
outline some of the critical attributes a successful SEC enforcement
program should exhibit; thereafter, we assess the SEC's adherence
to this model.
A. Enforcement as Part of the Regulatory Process
The combination of regulatory and enforcement powers in a
single agency, such as the SEC, is no longer novel;' preoccupation
with that combination, however, is of somewhat more recent
vintage.47 Administrative agencies were established largely to develop
and consolidate expertise in technical areas of societal interest.'
46. The first regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was created
in 1887. See generally J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). Thereafter, a host
of independent agencies was created during the New Deal. In the immediate aftermath of
the agencies' creation, an assessment of their performance, undertaken at President
Roosevelt's behest, asserted that these agencies properly and necessarily 'act through
exercise of a number of interrelated powers. These powers must be exercised consistently
and, therefore, by the same body, ... to realize the public purposes which the statutes are
designed to further ...." REGULATION BY PROSECUTION, supra note 38, at 93 (quoting
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMWITr-E ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 208 (Final Report 1941)).
47. The difficulties inherent in the combination of multiple functions led one court
to observe that "[ait the very least, quasi-judicial proceedings entail a fair trial. As the
Supreme Court observed in [an]other context: . .. 'Fair trials are too important a part of
our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer.' " Amos
Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136-137 (1955)).
One commentator has assessed at great length the combination of multiple functions
within the SEC, observing that:
[a]fter several years of activity on the part of the New Deal regulatory agencies,
there was considerable controversy about the problems inherent in the combination
of [prosecutorial, rulemaking and adjudicative] functions... American law has long
been opposed to letting anyone be a judge of his own cause, because this makes
him 'incapacitated to appraise fairly and objectively the arguments advanced against
the view espoused.'
See REGULATION BY PROSECUTION, supra note 38, at 92 (quoting W. GELLHORN, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY-A THREAT TO DEmOCRACY? (1941)).
48. To some extent, the textual description misstates the implicit assumption
underlying the creation of regulatory agencies; administrative agencies, at least in theory,
are not created to develop expertise, they are created to exercise it. Thus, by statute, if not
by reality, administrative agencies are imbued with "instant expertise" from Congress. This
can be seen through the development of administrative law concepts of deference to
administrative expertise. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When faced
with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration");
see also Skidnore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Similar presumptions of regularity
apply to judicial review of challenged agency actions. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 123
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Because Congress acts slowly at best, and lacks the necessary
expertise to craft narrow specifications of normative conduct, 9
administrative agencies were intended to fill a legislative gap.
Operating pursuant to broad, but reasonable, delegations of
Congressional authority,' administrative agencies fill the interstices
of Congressional pronouncements, at a level far beyond that which
Congress is willing or able to provide."
As part of this rubric, it is well-established that the adoption of
a rule by an agency, acting in accordance with established legal
standards,52 within its jurisdiction" and authority,5 4 will be given
virtually the same force and effect of law,55 as if Congress had
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
49. In passing the Maloney Over-the-Counter Market Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52
Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-3, 78cc, 78ff, 78q (1982)),
the accompanying Senate Report observed that:
The brevity and generality of this treatment [of regulation of over-the-counter
securities in the Exchange Act] arose from a realistic recognition of the great
difficlties of working out in any detail a suitable plan of regulation.... But, though the
Congress did not at that time have before it a sufficient record of data or
experience to enable it to determine upon a detailed plan of regulation, it dearly
set forth the objectives of and the standards for such regulation.
REGUlATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS, S. RFP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4
(1938).
50. Id. The lack of proper Congressional standards to guide administrative agencies
in the performance of their assigned, quasi-legislative, tasks is unconstitutional. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
51. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
52. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-703. was adopted in 1946,
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), twelve years after the establishment of the SEC,
to provide a uniform set of procedures for all agencies to follow in exercising their
regulatory powers, and for the courts to consider in effecting meaningful judicial review of
formal agency action. See generaUy Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
53. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-214 (1976) (SEC can
only enact a rule that complies with its statutory grant of authority and statutory mandate).
54. The determination whether an agency acted pursuant to an express or implied
delegation of rulemaking authority dictates the degree of deference courts will accord to
the resulting regulation. Thus,
[i]f Congress has [granted] .. . an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation[, s]uch legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.... [Where] the legislative delegation ... is
implicit rather than explicit ... a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation . .. of an agency.
Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
55. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), in which the Court
admonished:
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enacted the provision itself. 6 In this vein, administrative agencies
were perceived as stepchildren of the Congress, exercising
quasi-legislative powers. But the New Deal's administrative agencies
did not stop with quasi-legislative powers; most also were granted
significant enforcement powers to complement their regulatory
function.57 Although this meant that the new alphabet agencies were
vested with both quasi-legislative and quasi-executive authority,58 the
significance of the combination was apparently not readily manifest
when the SEC came into being.59
Since that time, however, a great deal of attention has been
focused on the proper role of regulation and enforcement. 6° Put
It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated,
substantive agency regulations have the 'fbrce and effect of law.' This doctrine is so
well established that agency regulations implementing federal statutes have been
held to pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause.
Id. at 295-96 (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977)); Paul v. United
States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); United States v. Mersky,
361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960).
56. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 295-96. Regulatory provisions promulgated
by the SEC are not quite on an absolute par with the statutory enactments pursuant to
which those rules are established. It is a hornbook principle of criminal law that ignorance
of the law is not a defense to a criminal charge. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 11 (2d ed. 1960). Thus, an individual who is unaware of a legal
requirement can still be convicted of a crime if he or she violates that requirement,
provided that the acts that constitute the violation were committed knowingly. See, e.g.,
United States v. Curier. 621 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 476 A.2d
1128 (D.C. 1984).
Congress chose to treat SEC rules somewhat differently; pursuant to Section 32 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982), any violation of any provision of the Exchange Act,
or the rules thereunder, is a felony subjecting the actor to incarceration. If a defendant can
show that he or she was unaware of the particular rule, however, a violation of that rule
may be punishable only by fine. See Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1982) ("no
person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or
regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation"); see also
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976) (although a person may be
convicted of a violation of a Commission rule of which he was unaware, he may not be
imprisoned).
57. The Supreme Court offered an extensive analysis of various government
instrumentalities, including the SEC, empowered to conduct investigations in combination
with legislative or quasi-legislative functions. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444-52,
454-85 (1960).
58. In our tri-partite system of government, it is the duty of the executive to make
certain that the laws are faithfully executed. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 3; L. TRIBE,
AMECiAN CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW § 4-2 (1978).
59. See, e.g., ILA. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446, 451-54 (2d Cir. 1966)
(questioning participation of Commissioner in deciding petition concerning denial of
broker-dealer registration, based upon Commissioner's earlier participation in matter at staff
level), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967).
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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succinctly, regulations prescribe, in advance of their application,
normative standards of conduct to which persons subject to agency
jurisdiction must adhere in the future.8 ' Enforcement powers apply
existing rules to past facts, to assure compliance with regulatory
standards, both by the entity subject to the standard (but accused of
noncompliance) and by other entities similarly situated. In a proper
context, an administrative agency should define normative standards
first, offer interpretive guidance second (to the extent feasible), and
compel obedience to those standards as a last resort, when it is clear
that those standards have been well publicized and comprehended,
but disregarded.'
Not every rule of law, of course, is susceptible of embodiment in
a formal regulation." It is a tenet of our common law system that
broad rules are laid down by legislatures and the courts may
reasonably interpret the standards embodied in those laws.
Nonetheless, it is equally a part of our legal system that notions of
due process require ample, advance notification of precisely what
types of conduct will be prohibited, before any person may be civilly
or criminally prosecuted for a violation of those standards. 5
Drawing the proper balance between regulation and enforcement
can be difficult for an administrative agency.' It is often easier for
an agency to attack a practice after the fact, in the context of a
concrete factual setting, the implications of which are relatively
clearly perceived, than to engage in the often burdensome endeavor
of quasi-legislative rulemaking (or standard setting)."7 And, it is
simply human nature that a wrong once perceived should be
redressed, if at all possible, rather than simply being utilized to
define the scope of future regulations."
61. See generaly United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1941).
62. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
63. See SEC MAJOR ISSUES CONFERENCE, supra note 36.
64. See supra note 37. Fraud is a good example of this phenomenon; the courts have
long recognized that attempts to define fraud with too much specificity would encourage
sharp characters with a venal bent to twist the law's specificity to their own advantage. See,
e.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d at 681.
65. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
66. See SEC MAJOR ISSUES CONFERENCE, supra note 36.
67. See generally Pitt, "The SEC and Corporate Governance," Commentaries on Corporate
Structure and Governance, 1977-78 ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS (Schwartz, ed.) 185 (1979) ("The
difficulties raised by ad hoc enforcement decrees, however, are that they obviate the need
for thinking problems through to their logical conclusion").
68. Agencies are often afraid that, by adopting a specific regulation, they may allow
certain misconduct, not presently perceived, to escape liability. The fact that regulations can
be amended to include new examples of improper behavior is not always a comforting
thought to government officials who take their mandate seriously.
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Moreover, procedurally, the commencement of an enforcement
action requires no delays, and imposes no obligations on an agency
to consider carefully the views of various commentators.s Nor does
the enforcement process permit political interference. 0 Those with
alternative points of view have had very little difficulty finding the
means to express them in the context of a quasi-legislative
proceeding; history has taught the same individuals to refrain from
such involvement in the context of a discrete adversarial enforce-
ment proceeding involving other parties.
7 1
Consequently, one of the dangers inherent in the administrative
process is that agencies will eschew formal rulemaking for ad hoc
enforcement actions, using discrete enforcement proceedings as a
vehicle for developing new legal standards as the need arises.7"
Particularly during the 1980s, when it became clear that government
had, in a number of instances, been guilty of overregulating certain
industries, 7 the balance between regulation and enforcement shifted
markedly.7 This shift occurred because deregulation inevitably brings
with it a concomitant increase in governmental
5  and private76
enforcement efforts.
69. Indeed, to the contrary, an agency is justified in shunning such input. See, e.g.,
Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963-65 (5th Cir. 1966).
70. See, e.g.. SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, (3d Cir. 1981)
(quoting Parnell, Congressional Interence in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 Yale
L.J. 1360, 1368 (1980)).
71. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981).
72. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1974); see also Remarks of
Harvey L. Pitt Before the Learned Hand Award Dinner (Mar. 31, 1988) [hereinafter Remarks of
Harvey L. Pitt] (on file with authors).
73. See Kahn, The Theoiy and Application of Regulation, 55 ANTriRUSr L.J. 177, 178
(1986).
74. See infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
75. Two reasons may explain this inverse, relationship between regulation and
enforcement. First, regulation often involves the setting of normative standards. See generally
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1941). Since most businessmen attempt to
comply with the law, the establishment of normative standards puts those individuals on
notice of the conduct to be followed, or avoided. Given normal success ratios, the greater
the number of normative standards that exist, the less likely it is that enforcement will be
required to produce adherence to those standards (unless the standards themselves are not
reasonable or are not dearly articulated). Second, excessive regulation usually requires
businesses to obtain advance governmental approvals or sanctions. If conduct cannot even
be undertaken without advance governmental approvals, the requirement of such approvals
will undoubtedly serve as a substitute for subsequent (or post hoc) government enforcement
to require adherence to those standards.
76. Cf. TSC Indus, v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976) (private actions
vindicate the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws and are an important adjunct
to the Commission's enforcement efforts); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
381-83 (1970); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964).
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In sum, an effective enforcement program is predicated upon a
proper balance between ex ante rulemaking and regulation, on the
one hand, and ad hoc enforcement actions, on the other. To the
extent that an agency's program is unduly weighted in one direction
or the other, it is apt to deviate from other standards of
effectiveness discussed below, most notably the standards of
perceived fairness" and ultimate success. 8
B. The Influence of Politics on the Enforcement Process
One of the difficulties confronted by an independent regulatory
agency, such as the SEC, is that it is something of a political
orphan.9 Because it is a collegial agency, with members serving
terms that exceed the four-year tenure of the Presidency, ° it has
been difficult, since the agency's initial creation and the years
immediately thereafter" for the Commission to be treated as
anything but a mere nuisance by past administrations. 2 Moreover,
with a majority of its membership potentially reflecting the political
party of the President," possibly a party different from that in
77. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
79. See Ash Report, supra note 27. at 103 (attributing the failure of the executive
branch to assure adequate SEC manpower and funding to fact that "a President is not
inclined to support an agency vigorously when he has little or no responsibility for its
direction. For the same reason, Congress has not consistently allocated enough time and
resources to help the SEC solve its complex problems").
80. See Exchange Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1982) (specifying five-year term for
Commissioners).
81. In its infancy, the SEC's appointees were close to President Roosevelt, during
whose administration the agency initially was created. See TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STRET, supra note 28, at 103-23. Thereafter, the agency drifted into its status as a friend
of no one and a part of no branch of government. See Ash Report, supra note 27, at 102-03.
The appointment of Richard C. Breeden as Chairman of the SEC, with acknowledged dose
ties to President Bush and the curirent White House administration could change this
situation. See Nominee for SEC Has Made Career as COP Loyalist, Newsday, Aug. 16, 1989, at
54, col. 4; President Bush Names Key Aide SEC Chairman" Richard C. Breeden Helped Formulate
White House's Plan to Bail Out S&Ls, LA Times, Aug. 15, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 5; Bush Picks
Savings Crisis Adviser to Succeed Ruder as S.E.C. Chief, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1989, at Al, col.
1.
82. See, e.g., Ash Report, supra note 27, at 14 ("[the independent commissions]
constitute a headless Tourth branch' of the [g]overnment, a haphazard deposit of
irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers") (citations omitted). See also Letter from
Elliot L. Richardson to Senator William Proxmire (June 11, 1976), reprinted in PLI, EIGHTH
ANNUAL INSnTrE ON SEcuarrlES REGULATION 343, 358 (1976) (questioning propriety of
SEC enforcement actions involving improper corporate payments).
83. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1982),
no more than three members of the Commission may be from the same political party.
Each commissioner serves for a five year term, or until his or her successor is appointed
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control of either the House of Representatives or the Senate, or
both, and particularly because its Chairman is perceived as an agent
of the President," the SEC also has often found itself without much
support from Congress. On other occasions, the Commission has
found itself with unsolicited congressional support for programs of
great interest to Capitol Hill.'
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that, from time to
time, members of various administrations, or members of Congress
(or their staffs), have sought to influence the results of administrative
agency deliberations. 6 As a general proposition, an enforcement
program must be seen as free from political influence.' To the
extent the courts have been confronted with the issue, they generally
have reacted negatively to administrative agency enforcement efforts
that have been, or even appear to have been, tainted by political
influence." The SEC has been remarkably free from such
controversy, and is widely respected for an enforcement program
that will not yield to political pressures and, indeed, may react to
the detriment of those seeking to apply such pressure.89
and confirmed by Congress. Id.
84. This perception probably arises, at least in part, from the power of the President
to designate the agency's chairman. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 901-913 (1982). See also articles cited supra note 81. Cf. Statement of Senator William
Proxmire, Nomination of William J. Casey, S. REP. No. 4, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Mar. 19,
1971) ("The President does not have the right to have 'his man' at the SEC any more than
does the Congress").
85. Compare Ash Report, supra note 27, at 102-03 ("Various studies have recommended
increasing the funding and manpower of the SEC, but neither the President nor Congress
has given full support to these proposals") with INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1988) ("The
[House] Committee strongly believes that the agencies with responsibility for enforcing the
laws against insider trading shotd be provided all the necessary resources to do their jobs")
(emphasis supplied).
86. See, e.g., SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981).
87. See, e.g., Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 1.
88. See, e.g.. SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981).
89. See supra note 45.
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C. The Need for Efficiency, Visibility, and Success in an Enforcement
Program
Since the government's enforcement resources are limited,"' it
cannot hope to ferret out every instance of wrongdoing.9 Moreover,
even if it could, the government lacks the necessary resources to
prosecute every such case. As a result, an effective governmental
enforcement program is, and must be, predicated upon a significant
deterrent effect. To that end, an effective enforcement program must
be efficient, visible, and successful.
1. Efficiency
One of the most important concepts in administrative law
enforcement is the notion of efficiency. Since, as noted, the SEC
cannot investigate every case of which it becomes aware, and since
it cannot litigate every case as to which it conducts an investigation,
the agency must pick its cases carefully. The SEC has employed
several devices quite successfully to promote its enforcement
efficiency.
a. Selection of Targets
An important way in which an agency can achieve enforcement
efficiency is through the careful selection of targets. The Commission
has always attempted to select its targets carefully, with a view
toward discouraging violations by others similarly situated.
For example, in the 1970s, the Commission's staff embarked upon
what it referred to as the "access" theory of securities law
enforcement." Cognizant of the agency's limited resources, and
desirous of achieving the maximum (or most efficient) enforcement
impact from its available resources, the Commission's staff served
notice on the public that the "keys" to the securities marketplace are
often controlled by a limited number of well-positioned
90. See generally Drexel Will be Fined $650 Million, But SEC Won't Get a Cent, Assoc.
Press, Feb. 2, 1989 (PM Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file) ("the Securities and
Exchange Commission-considered chronically understaffed and underfunded-isn't even
allowed to spend the money it raises through routine stock licensing fees, which amounted
to twice its budget last year").
91. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ('An agency generally
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing").
92. See Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants: Philosophy, Objectives and
Approach, 28 VAND. L. REv. 19 (1975).
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individuals-securities professionals, accountants, and lawyers." By
vigorously enforcing the federal securities laws against such
individuals, the Commission felt that it could prevent many more
violations of law than simply by proceeding against wrongdoing
principals.9"
Relying on concepts of secondary and vicarious liability,"5 the SEC
commenced a series of proceedings against securities professionals,"8
93. Id.
94. Id. at 19-20.
95. Vicarious, or secondary, liability has been described as the burden imposed by
law upon those persons who have not committed the principal wrongful act but who bear
responsibility for the act by virtue of either assistance to, or a relationship with, the primary
violator. See Kuehnle, Secondary Liabiliy Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statuto Scheme, J.
CoiP. L. 313, 318-320 (1988). See also Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, in Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U.
PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
A noted commentator has suggested that the principle of vicarious liability first emerged
in medieval times, when strict liability was imposed upon masters for the misdeeds of their
servants:
The modern notion started to develop at the end of the seventeenth century
because of the 'growth of England's industry and commerce'. . . . The streams of
doctrine that fed the new development [of vicarious liability] were 'firstly a Roman
influence which filtered through the court of Admiralty and mercantile custom, and
secondly an English influence derived from the medieval modifications of the
common law principle governing the master's liability.'
2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HisroRY OF ENGLISH LAw 46-47 (4th ed. 1936). Compare Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1894) (pointing to ancient German
origin of principle of vicarious liability).
96. See, e.g., In re Edward J. Blumenfeld, Exchange Act Release No. 16,437, [1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,396 (Dec. 19, 1979); In re Richard 0.
Bertoli, Exchange Act Release No. 16,220, 18 SEC Docket 486 (Sept. 25, 1979); In re
Robert A. Podesta, Exchange Act Release No. 16,209, 18 SEC Docket 404 (Sept. 18, 1979);
In re Robert T. O'Donnell, Exchange Act Release No. 15,869, 17 SEC Docket 743 (May 24,
1979); In re Thomson McKinnon See., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,768, 17 SEC
Docket 419 (May 3, 1979); In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,538,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,938 (Jan. 30, 1979); In re G.H.
Sheppard & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,179, 15 SEC Docket 1123 (Sept. 21, 1978);
In re Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,918, 15 SEC Docket 191
(July 3, 1978); In re FDI Securities, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,875, 15 SEC Docket
96 (June 22, 1978); In re First Georgetown Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,790, 14
SEC Docket 1165 (May 22, 1978); In re Powell Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,668,
13 SEC Docket 814 (Apr. 17, 1978); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 14,149, 14 SEC Docket 646 (Nov. 9, 1977); In re R.L. Whitney
Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,813, 12 SEC Docket 1419 (Aug. 1, 1977); In re
Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,768, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,241 (July 19, 1977); In re Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,307, 11 SEC Docket 1877 (Feb. 28, 1977); In re AmSwiss
International Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,011, 11 SEC Docket 1054 (Nov. 26,
1976); In re Brooks - Hamburger Sec. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,695, 10 SEC
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auditors, and attorneys," with a predictable outcry from
Docket 214 (Aug. 6, 1976); In re Stearns & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,405, 9 SEC
Docket 550 (May 3, 1976); In re Bache & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,957, 8 SEC
Docket 898 (Dec. 29, 1975); In re Pilgrim Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 11,730, 8
SEC Docket 71 (Oct. 14, 1975); In re Barrett & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,457, 7
SEC Docket 101 (June 4, 1975); In re Gilliam & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,171, 6
SEC Docket 53 (Jan. 9, 1975); In re Western Funding, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 11,126, 5 SEC Docket 669 (Dec. 9, 1974); In re Alessandrini & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 11,041, 5 SEC Docket 246 (Oct. 10, 1974); In re Midwestern Sec. Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 10,992, 5 SEC Docket 67 (Aug. 29, 1974); In re Edward F.
Henderson & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 10,727, 4 SEC Docket 80 (Apr. 10, 1974); In
re First Hudson Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 10,652, 3 SEC Docket 571 (Feb. 22,
1974); In re Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 10,565, 3 SEC Docket
255 (Dec. 19, 1973); In re Saunders, Stiver & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 10,341, 2 SEC
Docket 290 (Aug. 14, 1973); In re Sanford Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,225, 2
SEC Docket 6 (June 19, 1973).
97. See, e.g., In re Martin E. Davis, Acctg. Series Release No. 267, [1937-1982
Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,289 (July 2,
1979); In re Gerald J. Flannelly, Exchange Act Release No. 15,181, [1937-1982 Accounting
Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 72,277 (Sept. 22, 1978); In re
Ernst & Ernst, Acctg. Series Release No. 248, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,720 (May 31, 1978); In re Haskins & Sells,
Exchange Act Release No. 14,450, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,263 (Feb. 10, 1978); In re Paul N. Conner, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,382, 13 SEC Docket 1397 (Jan. 16, 1978); Litigation Involving Price
Waterhouse & Co., Acctg. Series Release No. 238, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,260 (Jan. 16, 1978); In re Norman A.
Weiner, C.PA, Exchange Act Release No. 14,249, [1937-1982 Accounting Releases Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,255 (Dec. 12, 1977); In 7e Phillip J. Wolfson,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,521, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,237 (May 9, 1977); In re S.D. Leidesdorf & Co., Exchange
Act Release No. 13,268, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,231 (Feb. 16, 1977); In re Touche Ross & Co., Exchange Act Release
No. 12,851, 10 SEC Docket 655 (Oct. 1, 1976); In re Seidman & Seidman, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,572, 10 SEC Docket 327 (Sept. 1, 1976, amended Dec. 3, 1976); In re Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,517, (1937-1982 Accounting Series
Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,195 (July 2, 1975); In re Touche
Ross & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 10,654, 3 SEC Docket 594 (Feb. 25, 1974); In re
Benjamin Botwinick & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,176, [1937-1982 Accounting Series
Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,190 (Jan. 13, 1975); In re
Westheimer, Fime, Berger & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,153, [1937-1982 Accounting
Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,190 (Dec. 24, 1974).
98. See, e.g., In re Paul H. Brumley, Esq., Exchange Act Release No. 16,558, 19 SEC
Docket 503 (Feb. 6, 1980); In re Bernard J. Coven, Exchange Act Release No. 16,448, 19
SEC Docket 12 (Dec. 21, 1979); In re Richard D. Hodgin, Exchange Act Release
No. 16,225, 18 SEC Docket 458 (Sept. 27, 1979); In re Stephen R. Gilliland, Esq., Exchange
Act Release No. 16,046, 17 SEC Docket 1381 (July 26, 1979); In re Melvan M. Jacobs,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,556, 16 SEC Docket 1029 (Feb. 8, 1979); In re Robert A.
Petrallia, Exchange Act Release No. 15,087, 15 SEC Docket 722 (Aug. 25, 1978); In re
Robert D. Nielsen, Exchange Act Release No. 14,803, 14 SEC Docket 1225 (May 26, 1978);
In re Mary Jane Melrose, Exchange Act Release No. 14,720, 14 SEC Docket 974 (May 1,
1978); In re Robert E. Porges, Exchange Act Release No. 13,975, 13 SEC Docket 118 (Sept.
20, 1977); In re Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner, Securities Act Release No. 5841, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,236 (July 5, 1977); In re C. Wayne
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commentators and representatives of the affected professional
groups." By the early 1980s, the Commission abandoned this
approach, particularly with respect to lawyers, as its General Counsel
announced a return to more fundamental, and somewhat less
aggressive, secondary liability concepts.'
Although the attack on securities professionals, accountants, and
attorneys may have abated, the underlying premises of the access
theory remained intact throughout the 1980s. The Commission and
its staff recognized that the agency's enforcement efficiency depends
on an expansive approach toward vicarious liability. In the form of
actions against corporations and other employing institutions,' as
Litchfield, Exchange Act Release No. 13,678, 12 SEC Docket 1016 (June 4, 1977, amended
Sept. 26, 1977) (permanently barred from practice before SEC as attorney or certified public
accountant); In re Edward C. Jaegerman, Exchange Act Release No. 13,513, 12 SEC Docket
372 (May 6, 1977); In re Donald R. Bernard, Exchange Act Release No. 13,283, 11 SEC
Docket 1778 (Feb. 22, 1977); In re William N. Levy, Exchange Act Release No. 13,124, 11
SEC Docket 1352 (Dec. 30, 1976); In re Alvin Lester Sitomer, Exchange Act Release
No. 12,501, 9 SEC Docket 784 (June 1, 1976); In re Morton Schimmel, Esq., Exchange Act
Release No. 12,254, 9 SEC Docket 262 (Mar. 25. 1976); In re Lloyd Feld, Exchange Act
Release No. 11,775, 8 SEC Docket 291 (Oct. 30, 1975); In re Stanley T. Traska, Exchange
Act Release No. 11,662, 7 SEC Docket 864 (Sept. 18, 1975); In re McLaughlin & Stem,
Ballen and Miller, Exchange Act Release No. 11,553, 7 SEC Docket 465 (July 25, 1975);
In re Gerald H. Cahill, Exchange Act Release No. 11,304, 6 SEC Docket 474 (Mar. 20,
1975); In re Donald R. Hunter, Exchange Act Release No. 11,253, 6 SEC Docket 304 (Feb.
18, 1975); In re John A. O'Toole, Exchange Act Release No. 11,169, 6 SEC Docket 50 (Jan.
8, 1975); In re Jo M. Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523, 5 SEC Docket 37 (Aug.
21, 1974); In re Robert E. Lee, Securities Act Release No. 5462, 3 SEC Docket 600 (Feb.
27, 1974); In re George Mariscal, Securities Act Release No. 5442, 3 SEC Docket 101 (Nov.
30, 1973); In re Paul Gerstner, Exchange Act Release No. 10,458, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,610 (Oct. 26, 1973); In re Emanuel Fields, Securities
Act Release No. 5404, [1973 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 79,407 (June 18,
1973).
99. See, e.g., Note, SEC Disciplinaty Proceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e), 79
MiCH. L REv. 1270, 1286 (1981) (criticizing SEC's use of Rule 2(e) proceedings against
attorneys instead of bringing proceedings in federal district court); Marsh, Rule 2(e)
Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAw. 987, 1010-15 (1980) (raising question whether Rule 2(e) is
constitutional, as Commission applies it to attorneys and accountants); Downing & Miller,
The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 774, 777-81 (1979)
(Commission's application of Rule 2(e) to attorneys and accountants exceeds the agency's
statutory authority); When Accountants Fail to Spot Fraud's Liability, Bus. Wit., Mar. 15, 1976,
at 74, col. I (criticizing SEC's application of Rule 2(e) to accountants); Daley & Karmel,
Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747, 780-93 (1975)
(criticizing, among other things, the SEC's attempts to obtain de facto licensing authority
over securities counsel).
100. See Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (remarks to the New York County Lawyers' Association) (Jan. 13, 1982), reprinted
in 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 168 (Jan. 20, 1982).
101. See, e.g., SEC v. Oak Indus., Civ. Action No. 85-1507, 33 SEC Docket 694 (S.D.
Cal. June 25, 1985); SEC v. PepsiCo, Inc., Litigation Release No. 10,807, 33 SEC Docket
861 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1985); SEC v. E.F. Hutton Group, Litigation Release No. 10,915, 33
SEC Docket 588 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 1985).
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well as efforts designed to preclude certain violators of the federal
securities laws from reassuming high corporate office,"° the SEC of
the 1980s has practiced enforcement efficiency with a more recent
variation of the access theory.
b. The Heightened Possibility of Criminal Prosecution
The SEC also has been the beneficiary of criminal law
enforcement authorities' renewed interest in securities law violations.
Prior to the 1970s, the SEC enjoyed a relatively arms-length
relationship with most criminal law authorities. The Commission
would prepare cases for formal submission to the Department of
Justice, as originally contemplated by statute."5 This would entail the
preparation of a detailed Criminal Reference Report, including an
analysis of the evidentiary predicates for the staff's view that criminal
prosecution was warranted, as well as a detailed legal analysis of the
merits of criminal prosecution and the theories on which the
prosecution should rest. Finally, the Commission itself would review
the Report. After a formal Commission vote approving the criminal
reference, the appropriate referral would occur.'"
102. See, e.g., In re Michael R. Maury, Exchange Act Release No. 23,067, [1982-
1987 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 73,493 (Mar. 26, 1986); In re Thomas C. Runge, Exchange Act Release
No. 23,066. 35 SEC Docket 432 (Mar. 26, 1986).
103. Securities Act Section 20(b) provides that "[tihe Commission may transmit such
evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General who
may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this subchapter."
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1982). Exchange Act § 21(d)(1) contains a virtually identical provision.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1988).
104. The Commission has described its formal criminal reference process as follows:
[A] formal criminal reference . . .involves the preparation of a written report by
Commission staff members. Such reports generally set forth a detailed statement of
the information developed during the course of the Commission's investigation
keyed to the available evidence, an analysis of applicable law, an analysis of
strengths and weaknesses of the case, and recommendations as to who should be
prosecuted and for what offenses.
Memorandum of the SEC, Ami'us Curiae at 11-12, United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d
Cir. 1978) (No. 77-1342), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief
(Fields)]. This process comports with a clear Congressional mandate to maintain such
channels of communication. See H.R. RZP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977)
("Traditionally, there has been a close working relationship between the Justice Department
and the SEC. The Committee [on Interstate and Foreign Commerce] fully expects that
this cooperation between the two agencies will continue. ") (quoted in SEC Amicus Brief
(Fields) at 8, n.21).
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Although it was not the exclusive method by which cases were
brought to the attention of criminal prosecutors,' °5 the criminal
reference process survived through the early 1970s, but proved far
too cumbersome a procedure to warrant its continued longevity. By
the early 1970s, the Commission's staff had begun working out
informal relationships with various United States Attorneys Offices
around the country, particularly those located in the same cities as
SEC Regional and Branch offices. As a result, prosecutors' requests
for access to Commission files became more frequent, and the
preparation of formal criminal reference reports began to dwindle."°
In 1978, the SEC's criminal reference process changed.
Knowledgeable practitioners understood that the SEC staff could
not, and would not, bind criminal law enforcement authorities
regarding the possibility of criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, the
interest (or lack of interest) of criminal prosecutors was relevant to
settlement discussions, and the agency was quite successful in
utilizing that interest, or lack of interest, to assist it in the pursuit
of negotiated settlements of enforcement proceedings.
In United States v. Fields, counsel for a settling defendant asserted
that settlement was procured by SEC staff officials only upon the
promise that no criminal prosecution would ensue. 7 When criminal
prosecution proceeded, the defendant's counsel argued that the
"government," a phrase claimed to include the SEC,0's should be
estopped from proceeding with the prosecution, since the
defendant's settlement with the government allegedly was
conditioned upon an oral promise of non-prosecution."° The SEC
105. Throughout the Commission's history, various law enforcement officials have
sought to obtain access to information about securities law enforcement initiatives of the
Commission and its staff. Thus, it was not unusual during this period for a United States
Attorney to learn of an SEC investigation (despite its nonpublic status), and request access
to the Commission's files regarding that investigation. Although the Commission itself was
required to approve each such request for access to its files, requests of this nature were
routinely granted.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 917 (1979).
107. Id. at 643.
108. It is useful to note, in this context, that the defendant's argument assumes the
existence of a single government. The SEC, of course, has always relied upon its status as
an independent regulatory agency to thwart any attempt to lump it with other elements of
the government. This has caused the agency to confront other branches of the government
with seeming regularity. See generally RFGUL4TION BY PROSECUTION, supra note 38, at 86-91.
Indeed, within a year of its creation, the Commission launched an effort to break away
from the control of the Department of Justice, seeking approval for its right to try its own
cases before the lower federal courts. See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 940-41
(2d Cir. 1935).
109. See Fields, 592 F.2d at 643.
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ultimately explained its criminal reference procedures to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, advising the Court
that its staff had many ways in which to refer information
concerning investigations to criminal prosecutors, and that the SEC
never apprised settling defendants of the likelihood of criminal
prosecution.1
Although the SEC denied that its officials had misled counsel for
the defendant in Fields, the court found that issue of little relevance.
It quite properly suggested that, if counsel were claiming that the
Commission lulled his client into settling with a promise of no
criminal prosecution, the court would simply reopen the SEC
proceeding, and allow the criminal prosecution to proceed."' From
that point on, however, the SEC amended its organizational rules,
to make explicit that its Director of Enforcement had the authority
to make informal references of cases to criminal prosecutors without
the involvement of the Commission itself.1 After the adoption of
these internal rules, the Commission's involvement in the formal
criminal reference process markedly declined."'
In the 1980s, criminal prosecutors began to recognize the value
of securities law indictments. Led by the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, the Department of Justice and
individual United States Attorneys began paying closer attention to
the SEC and its law enforcement activities. As a result, the
heightened prospect of criminal prosecution by Justice Department
officials has become a more potent weapon in the SEC's enforcement
arsenal.
110. See SEC Amicus Brief (Fields), supra note 104, at 8-13.
111. See Fields, 592 F.2d at 647.
112. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1987) (authorizing Commission to refer matters
to Department of Justice for criminal prosecution) with 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4(a)(7) (1987)
(expressly delegating to the Director of Enforcement the authority to grant access to
Division investigative files to other government agencies).
113. An interview with John M. Fedders, two years into his tenure as SEC Director
of Enforcement, demonstrates the degree to which the criminal reference process had
become a function of informal contact below the Commission level:
Statistics of how many criminal references there have been, how many prosecutions
have come out of those references is [sic] good, but it's not entirely reflective of their
attitude of cooperation and support. That's the key . . . Bob Ogren, who's in charge of
Justice's fraud section, meets with us here on almost a monthly basis to review our inventory
of cases to discuss possible references and to obtain information from us.
SEC Should Consider Revised Policy on Modifying Injunctions, Fedders Says, 15 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2143, 2147 (Nov. 25, 1983) (emphasis supplied).
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By jointly pursuing a number of investigations,1 4 the SEC has
benefited from the subtle, and not so subtle, pressures brought to
bear by criminal prosecutors. For example, in the recent Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel) case, the United States Attorney
was able to effect a settlement with Drexel, a prime condition of
which was that the firm resolve its 'difficulties with the SEC, which
had commenced separate proceedings against Drexel and certain of
its officials." Drexel, which claimed it was unfairly compelled to
settle with the United States Attorney,"' was in turn persuaded to
settle with the SEC, after lengthy and, apparently, acrimonious
negotiations."' The SEC has thus achieved a certain amount of
efficiency in its enforcement program by taking advantage of the
current aggressive criminal prosecution environment.1 8
114. The law places limitations on the extent to which the SEC and criminal
prosecutors can collaborate on investigations. By virtue of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, grand jury information cannot be shared with persons outside the
grand jury or the United States Attorney's office directing the work of that grand jury. See
FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e). Accordingly, information sharing efforts usually involve the furnishing
of information by the SEC to various Justice Department officials (Rule 6(e) does not
prohibit that type of information sharing), or involves the sharing of non-grand jury
materials by the Justice Department with the SEC. To facilitate the work of the Justice
Department, the SEC frequently details enforcement personnel to a United States Attorney's
office to assist in the development of a criminal case. See Concern Over Congressional Reactions
Affects SEC Decisions, Longstreth Says, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 566, 568
(Mar. 18, 1983) (Commissioner Longstrcth discusses benefits of detailing SEC staffers to
Department of Justice).
115. See Drexel Reaches S.E.C. Accord in Civil Charges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1989, at
Al. col. 2; SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,474 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 27,236, 44 SEC Docket 907 (Sept. 11, 1989).
116. Drexel stated that the threat of the pre-trial forfeiture provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)
compelled it to settle and abandon its defenses to the United States Attorney's allegations.
Debate Rages Over the Long Arm of RICO, LA. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 4; see also
Justice Restricts, Reuters, Bus. Rep., Oct. 24, 1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file); Can
Fred Joseph Save Drexel?, FORTUNE, May 8, 1989, at 18; Justice Dept. Revises Rules on RICO
Cases, LA. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, at 1, col. 2; U.S. Moves to Limit Racketeering Law in Business
Cases, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, at Al, col. 3; Justice Dept. Limits Pretrial Freezes of Assets
Under RICO, Newsday, Oct. 21, 1989, at 13, col. 3.
117. For example, a major point of contention between the Commission and Drexel
appears to have been the agency's insistence that Drexel relocate its junk bond operations
to New York from Los Angeles, a demand that was apparently abandoned. See Drexel Settles
Charges, Faces Stiff Supervision, LA Times, Apr. 14, 1989. § 1, at 1, col. 2 ("The Drexel
lawyer said the SEC had dropped a demand to move the junk bond department back to
New York"); DrexelJunk Bond Unit Reportedly to Stay in Southland, LA Times, Feb. 22, 1989,
§ 4 at 1, col. 5 ("[T]he [SEC] had demanded that Drexel move the high-yield junk bond
operation back to the firm's headquarters in New York .... But Drexel strongly resisted").
118. Ironically, the increased interest of criminal prosecutors in securities law
violations may make it more difficult to settle some cases. In earlier times, a settlement with
the SEC might discourage criminal prosecutorial interest in the same case. Today, such
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c. Settlements
Traditionally, the SEC has relied most effectively on a high
volume of settlements to keep its enforcement program efficient and
vigorous."9 As long as defendants are prepared to settle cases, the
SEC's enforcement program should thrive. Conversely, if the SEC
were required (or chose) to litigate a substantial number of cases
each year, its enforcement program would become less efficient, less
successful and ultimately less visible.
The SEC has managed to promote settlements, among other
things, by (i) catching defendants in egregious situations for which
there is no likely successful defense; 2 ' (ii) offering to negotiate the
terms of the charges that will be brought against a proposed
defendant;' (iii) permitting the proposed defendant to negotiate the
terms of any relief to be obtained by the SEC's staff;,' (iv) saving
the proposed defendant the cost and burdens of litigating the
action;2 3  and (v) deploying the threat of exposure to possible
settlements often pique the interest of prosecutors. As a result, counsel must carefully weigh
the ramifications of whether, and on what terms, to settle cases with the SEC where
criminal prosecution is still a live possibility.
119. See, e.g., Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 439
U.S. 322 (1979).
120. Since virtually all cases are settled with the defendant(s) neither admitting nor
denying the allegations of the Commission's complaint, see 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (1987); see
also SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,474 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989); In re Link-Up [Plus] I Securities, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 20,940, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,625 (May 8,
1984); In re Thomas L. McGhee, Exchange Act Release No. 20,852, [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,605 (Apr. 12, 1984), it is not possible to tell which cases are
settled simply because the defendant(s) recognized the futility of their position, and which
cases reflect different judgments. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
121. In virtually every case, the SEC is prepared to negotiate some form of both its
charges and the relief it will seek. Many of the concessions the SEC is willing to offer a
prospective defendant in exchange for settling the proposed action (for example, not
alleging fraud in an accounting case, but limiting the charges to a failure to comply with
the SEC's filing requirements) are more a matter of perception than reality. Nevertheless,
the avoidance of certain charges may benefit a proposed defendant in connection with
anticipated (or pending) shareholder litigation. See Rauch, Practical Perspectives on Advising
Clients in Responding to Insider Trading Investigations, PLI, NINETE L'TH ANNUAL INSTITU~rE
ON SmcurnEs REGULAnON 351, 375 (1987) [hereinafter Practical Perspectives].
122. Id.
123. This is the usual rhetoric employed by many settling defendants: A, the President
and Chief Executive Officer of XYZ Corporation stated that the Company had decided to
settle, rather than contest, the SEC's charges in order to avoid the expense and burden of
litigation. See, e.g., SEC Bars Local Financial Adviser, Sacr. Bee, Aug. 22, 1989 at DI, col. 2
("The settlement was one of 'economic expediency,' to save Mason the cost of litigation, he
said"); Carl's Jr. Founder Agrees to Settle, Pay Lump Sum in Insider Trading Case, L.A. Times,
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criminal sanctions for the same conduct as a friendly persuader of
the need to settle the SEC's enforcement action. 24
In order for the SEC's enforcement program to remain successful,
the agency must continue to encourage early settlements by the
overwhelming preponderance of those persons against whom the
Enforcement Division's staff proposes to commence enforcement
actions."' The SEC's capacity to encourage early settlements is a
function of the strength of its proposed cases and its flexibility in
LA Times, May 3, 1989, at 1, col. 4 ("Karcher's attorney, Wes Howell, said the 72-year
old founder and chief executive , . .chose to settle the case to avoid both the emotional
and financial costs of trial").
In many cases, this may, in fact, be an accurate portrayal of the circumstances. Congress
has recognized some of the difficulties inherent in this situation, and attempted to redress
those difficulties by enacting the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980 (EAJA), Pub. L.
No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 26, 28, 41 U.S.C.
(1982)). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that "a court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses, ... unless the court finds
that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982). The EAJA was designed to
"press[ I the agency to address the problem of abusive and harassing regulatory practices"
and "to caution agencies to carefully evaluate their case and not to pursue those which are
weak or tenuous." H.R. REP. NO. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4953, 4993.
Courts have demonstrated no reluctance in enforcing this provision against the
Commission. See, e.g., SEC v. Kluesner, 834 F.2d 1438, 1440 (8th Cir. 1987) (SEC not
substantially justified in pursuing defendant who did not act with scienter); SEC v. Comserv
Corp., 698 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (D. Minn. 1988) (SEC action not substantially justified
where agency introduced no evidence of recklessness in establishing system of internal
controls; defendant's invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege does not constitute a special
circumstance rendering unjust an award of fees and costs).
124. As noted above, see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text, in past decades,
the SEC made formal criminal references to the Department of Justice, or one or more of
the various United States Attorneys, although it moved away from formal criminal
references in the late 1970s, particularly after the Fields decision, supra note 106.
Concomitantly, criminal prosecutions for violations of the federal securities laws appear to
have risen substantially during the past ten years. See Criminal Prosecutions, Insider Trading
Questions Are Probed by Panelists at ABA, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1202, 1202
(Aug. 15, 1986) ("There have been more criminal prosecutions under the federal securities
laws over the past two-to-five years than previously, Securities and Exchange Commission
Enforcement Director Gary Lynch acknowledged ... 'It is a trend,' Lynch said . . [that]
'has grown out of the realization that civil enforcement alone really isn't effective for some
types of violators, chronic violators...').
125. See genemlly Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae at 16, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322 (1979) (No. 77-1305) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief (Parlane)].
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offering would-be defendants meaningful incentives to enter into a
settlement agreement, among other factors. 2 '
126. As a general proposition, the SEC advances the law through settlements that
build on the various enforcement remedies in the agency's arsenal of weapons. Surprisingly,
for a highly effective agency, the SEC has long labored without a broad variety of
meaningful enforcement remedies. Under the Exchange Act, for example, the SEC can
(i) issue a public report of investigation, pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982);
(ii) commence an administrative proceeding to determine whether any
person subject to the requirements of Sections 12, 13, 14 or 15(d)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m, 78n, or 78o(d) (1982), have
committed violations of those provisions, or whether any other person
catuad such a violation;
(iii) commence an administrative proceeding to determine whether any
regulated person or entity (specifically, securities market professionals)
violated any provision of the federal securities laws and, if such
violations occurred, either suspend such person from functioning as
a market professional for up to one year, bar such person
permanently from serving as a market professional, or impose some
other form of limitation on the nature of the activities such market
professional can continue to pursue;
(iv)commence an action in federal court seeking to enjoin any person
from violating any provision of the federal securities laws; and
(v) refer a matter to the Attorney General of the United States for
criminal prosecution, pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1982); and Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
In 1984, at the Commission's request, Congress authorized the Commission to seek (but
not to impose itself) a monetary civil penalty in insider trading cases, in an amount up to
three times the illicit profits obtained (or losses avoided) from insider trading by a
defendant found to have violated the law. In addition, at various times during the
Commission's history, some courts have confirmed the Commission's implied authority to
seek ancillary relief in the form of (i) disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, see, e.g., SEC v. Blatt,
583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); (ii) appointment of a receiver for a public enterprise, see,
e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); (iii) requirement
of a special investigation, or the appointment of a special committee to perform certain
specified tasks, see, e.g., Handler v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1979); and (iv) an order
precluding certain recidivist officers and/or directors from resuming their positions with
publicly held companies, see, e.g., SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., Utigation Release
No. 6054, 2 SEC Docket 451 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 1973).
The SEC is attempting to alleviate this dearth of enforcement remedies by proposing
the creation of sweeping new administrative powers. See infra note 410 and accompanying
text. For the present, when the SEC staff comes upon a novel activity that it believes
violates the law, it will often attempt to settle the first several cases of that nature, so that
it can establish its own set of precedents. Thus, the first person accused of certain novel
violations of the law may be offered the opportunity to settle the matter for a public report
(a device utilized less frequently today than prior to the late 1970s) or an order under
Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act. The advantage to the Commission of these
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d. Encouragement of Private Rights of Action
Given the inherent limitations on the government's capacity to
mount an effective enforcement program, an agency will often seek
to improve its efficiency by encouraging private rights of action.
Early in the Commission's history, it supported the creation and use
of such implied rights of action 2 7 as a necessary supplement to its
own enforcement activities. 2 Such actions have been consistently
used ever since."'
forms of settlement is that the Commission can issue a lengthy description of the conduct
it finds objectionable, and its rationale for finding that conduct violative of the law. See
Exchange Act § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1982 & Supp. 1986) ("If the Commission
finds ... that any person ... has failed to comply with any such provision, rule, or
regulation in any material respect, the Commission may publish its findings and issue an order
.") (emphasis supplied).
After one or two of these relatively lenient, settlements, the SEC will then increase the
"penalty" for similar violations seeking administrative orders against professionals or
injunctive relief against corporations and their officers and directors. Compare In re Woods
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 15,337, 16 SEC Docket 166 (Nov. 16, 1978)
(administrative proceedings against issuer for inadequate disclosure in proxy materials;
issuer consented to various undertakings), with In re Spartek, Inc. and John K. Cable,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,567, 16 SEC Docket 1094 (Feb. 14, 1979) (administrative
proceeding against issuer and its chairman for inadequate disclosure in proxy materials,
citing Woods, supra, as precedent; issuer and chairman consented to various undertakings).
See also In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, 35 SEC Docket 1148 (June
16, 1986); In re George C. Kern, Jr. (Allied Stores Corporation), [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988), discussed infra at notes 496-
522 and accompanying text. In the wake of the controversy surrounding the Kern case, the
Commission has dramatically circumscribed the Staffs ability to craft creative settlements
under Section 15(c)(4).
127. Indeed, the legislative history of the Exchange Act demonstrates that the
Commission's support of such actions comported with the intentions of the authors of the
legislation. Thomas G. Corcoran, in his testimony concerning the inclusion of private
remedies in the Exchange Act, pointed out that
The principle of civil liability for the damage . . .is moreover not only a matter
of justice to the person injured but is also the surest way of guaranteeing that there
will be some compliance.... In other words, there is no policeman so effective as
the one whose pocketbook is affected by the degree to which he enforces the law.
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d
Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), pt. 15, National Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6518 (1934), quoted in Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act:
A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. Law. 117, 163 (1978) [hereinafter Standing to Sue].
128. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
129. An example of the Commission's ongoing support for private vindication of the
remedial purposes of the federal securities laws is embodied in its enthusiasm for the
express and implied private remedy provisions of ITSFFA. See infra note 131.
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Of course, the establishment of a broad private right to sue for
alleged securities law violations can be problematic at times. Private
plaintiffs are not as likely as the Commission to be circumspect about
the theories they pursue in private litigation, and the law established
in such actions can redound to the distinct disadvantage of the
Commission.
Nonetheless, properly circumscribed private rights of action serve
as a valuable adjunct to an agency's own enforcement program, and
the Commission has attempted to foster such rights at every available
opportunity.' It is one of the hallmarks of the Commission's
enforcement program that, through the years, it has adopted a
decidedly hospitable approach to private litigation, in contrast to the
posture sometimes assumed by other law enforcement agencies.'
130. See, e.g., Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of the Utility of Private Litigation under the
Federal Securities Laws, 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1977). There are, to be sure, differences between
private causes of action (particularly those implied by the judiciary) and government causes
of action. Nevertheless, since the same statutes are usually involved, judicial interpretations
of the statute in a private implied action can have a decidedly negative impact on the
SEC. Id. See also Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
131. Thus, the Commission consistently has supported the implication of private
rights of action in amicus curiae briefs before the Supreme Court and other federal courts.
See SEC Amicus Brief (Parklane), supra note 125, at 2; INSIDER TRADING AND SECURrES
FRAUD ENFORCEMENr ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1988)
[hereinafter HOUSE ITSFEA REPORT] (quoting then-SEC Chairman David Ruder's testimony
that "private rights of action have traditionally served as an important supplement to the
Commission's enforcement of the federal securities laws"); See generally Standing to Sue, supra
note 127. In addition, upon the passage of new securities legislation, the Commission has,
from time to time, issued releases indicating the agency's position that courts should imply
a private remedy under the provisions in question; see, e.g., Notification of Enactment of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release No. 14,478, [1937-1982
Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,264 (Feb. 16,
1978). Finally, in connection with the adoption of recent insider trading enforcement
legislation, the Commission strongly supported both the creation of an express private right
of action by persons who trade contemporaneously with, but on the opposite side from,
insider traders, see Exchange Act § 20A(a). 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(a) (West Supp. 1989); HOUSE
ITSFEA REPORT, supra, at 26, and the creation of an express implied remedy for anyone
else who can demonstrate actual injury resulting from insider trading by another, see
Exchange Act § 20A(d), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(d) (West Supp. 1989); see also Insider Trading:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (July 11, 1988) (statement of David S. Ruder, SEC
Chairman).
132. See generally Commodity Conferees Examine Implied Rights, CFTC Enforcement, 14 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1696, 1696 (Oct. 1, 1982) (discussing status of private
rights of action under Commodities Exchange Act).
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2. Visibility
An essential predicate for any effective enforcement program is its
visibility.' In essence, a law enforcement agency like the SEC seeks
to create "the illusion of three dimensions";"3 4 that is, that the agency
is omnipresent, and is more likely than not to detect illegal behavior
if someone is foolish enough to attempt it.'35 When required to
choose between proceeding against a relatively nondescript target
and a highly visible one, therefore, an enforcement agency generally
is apt to choose the highly visible target if it wants to achieve the
greatest deterrent effect for its enforcement efforts. Free advertising
is often available to the SEC by dint of the targets it selects, and
through certain other endeavors described below.
Accordingly, the SEC and its enforcement staff will often consider
the public relations value of a case in deciding whether, when and
how to pursue it.' A case of smaller dimensions (in terms of the
magnitude or complexity of the illegal conduct alleged) with a more
visible target may be deemed to be more appropriate than a larger
case with a less visible target. 7 The SEC selects its targets carefully;
particularly given its freedom from political influence,'38 it has been
unusually adept at tackling prominent individuals in the domestic
political,' -9  religious,' 4  entertainment,14' medical,' 4  legal, 14  cor-
133. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
134. See Suddenly, A Sleepy S.E.C. is Wide Awake, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, § 4. at
5, col. I ("The S.E.C. needs to maintain the illusion of being three-dimensional... . It has
to appear to be everywhere at the same time, which it is not").
135. See Dannen, The SEC's Insider Trading Quandary. Institutional Investor, Oct. 1986,
at 237 (" We want to create an environment where the downside is so staggeringly painful,
it's not worth even a million bucks to take the risk,' says [then Associate Director (now
Director) of Enforcement William R.] McLucas"); Egan, The War on Wall Street's Inside
Dopesters, N.Y. Mag., Mar. 28, 1983, at 41 (" We're out to cover a lot of ground,' says John
Fedders, the S.E.C.'s enforcement chief. 'We want to get the butcher, the baker, and the
candlestick maker' ").
136. See generally Moore, The SEC on the Beat, 19 Nat'l J., Jan. 3, 1987, No. 1, at 22,
col. I ("The SEC has sought to achieve more enforcement with fewer troops by highlighting
major cases that are designed to deter illegal activity... . 'we try to provide . . . a very
visible presence through the publicity of these outrageous cases . . .to inhibit others from
engaging in the activity,' [SEC Chairman] Shad told the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee ...").
137. See, e.g., infra note 264 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., SEC v. Thayer, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 99,718 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1984); SEC v. Reed, Litigation Release No. 9537, 39 SEC
Docket 1001 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1981).
140. See, e.g., SEC v. Ambassador Church FinjDev. Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1208 (6th
Cir. 1986).
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porate,1" arbitrage,Ie investment banking,' 46 junk bond,147 tender
offer,L48 print media,14 and marketmaking"'5 fields.
Similarly, the SEC has not been shy about tackling well
established and large business enterprises in those fields as well.''
Nor has the SEC restricted its efforts to the United States; the
Commission has shown itself equally adept at pursuing prominent
individuals and entities abroad.'52
Apart from the visibility of its targets, the SEC has employed
other methods to create a public awareness of its enforcement
141. See, e.g., In re De Laureniis Ent. Group, Exchange Act Release No. 24,786, 38
SEC Docket 1343 (Aug. 10, 1987).
142. See, e.g., SEC v. Moore, Litigation Release No. 11,013, 35 SEC Docket 230 (D.
Conn. Mar. 3, 1986).
143. See, e.g., SEC v. Grossman, Litigation Release No. 11,359, 37 SEC Docket 919
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1987); SEC v. Elliott, itigation Release No. 11,335, 37 SEC Docket 477
(N.D. 111. Dec. 30, 1986); SEC v. Reich, Litigation Release No. 11,246, 36 SEC Docket 949
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986); SEC v. Madan, Civ. Action No. 83-5053, 34 SEC Docket 1434
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1986); SEC v. Florentino, Civ. Action No. 81-5903, 23 SEC Docket 958
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1981).
144. See, e.g., SEC v. PepsiCo, Inc., Litigation Release No. 10,807, 33 SEC Docket
861 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1985); SEC v. General Dynamics Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,293 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 27, 1980); In re American Express
Company, Exchange Act Release No. 23,332, 35 SEC Docket 1163 (June 17, 1986).
145. SEC v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 88 Civ. No. 88-0755 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1988); SEC
v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 1986).
146. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,717 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986); SEC v. Siegel, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1987).
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Litigation Release No. 11,859,
41 SEC Docket 1047 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1988) (including charges against junk bond trader
Michael Milken).
148. See, e.g., SEC v. Bilzerian, Litigation Release No. 12,144, 43 SEC Docket 1950
(D.D.C. June 29, 1989); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1988), affd,
890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
149. See, e.g., SEC v. Ruderman, Litigation Release No. 12,109, 43 SEC Docket 1492
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1989); SEC v. Brant, Litigation Release No. 10,908, 34 SEC Docket 511,
512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1985) ("Southern District of New York has entered a Final Judgment
of Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief by Consent against R. Foster Winans,
Jr..).
150. See, e.g., SEC v. Jefferies, Litigation Release No. 11,370, 37 SEC Docket 1286
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1987); see also United States v. Jefferies, No. 87 Cr. 339 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
16, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfd library, Dist file).
151. See, e.g., SEC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Litigation Release No. 11,452, 38 SEC
Docket 647 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1987); SEC v. First Boston Corp., No. 86-3524 (S.D.N.Y. May
5, 1986).
152. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1751 (1988); SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call
Options for the Common Stock of Sante Fe Intel Corp., 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988); SEC v. Banca Della Svitzzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); SEC v. Collier, Litigation Release No. 11,817, 41 SEC Docket 711 (C.D.
Cal. July 26, 1988).
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presence. A principal device utilized by the agency is the issuance of
a Litigation Release every time the agency takes or commences
formal enforcement action.' These releases are catalogued and
disseminated to the news media as well as to those on the SEC's
mailing list. Even though the mere filing of an action is not, in and
of itself, a true precedent for future enforcement action, by
cataloging and publicizing its enforcement activities, the Commission
has been able both to deter similar conduct by others and, perhaps
more importantly, to utilize its prior enforcement activities, even if
in the form of a settled action, as precedent in a subsequent
contested enforcement proceeding.'"
Through these litigation releases, as well as through speeches by
Commissioners and staff officials, the agency disseminates information
regarding its enforcement agenda. The financial press is well attuned
to the SEC's activities and gives substantial attention to SEC litigation
releases. The language of these releases can be negotiated as part of
the settlement process, within limits, thus giving the SEC additional
leverage over alleged violators.'55
153. In 1942, the Commission issued its first litigation release, an untitled document
dealing with joint SEC and Department of Justice charges of failure of an issuer to register
securities pursuant to the Securities Act and failure of a broker-dealer to comply with the
Exchange Act's registration requirements. See Litigation Release No. 1 (Aug. 5, 1942)
(LEXIS, Securities library, Releases file). Even prior to the SEC's formation, in 1934, the
Federal Trade Commission (which administered the Securities Act prior to the SEC's
existence) had already developed the practice of issuing announcements relating to the
agency's enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 186 (July 2, 1934) (LEXIS,
Securities library, Releases file) (entry of a temporary restraining order against Carleton
Saunders & Co.). The Commission adopted this approach within the first year of its
existence. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 273 (Jan. 4, 1935) (LEXIS, Securities library,
Releases file) (entry of temporary restraining order against Plymouth Consolidated Gold
Mines, Ltd.).
154. See In re Allied Stores and George C. Kern, Exchange Act Release No. 24,648,
38 SEC Docket 987 (June 29, 1987), discussed infra notes 496-522 and accompanying text.
155. The Commission will allow its staff to negotiate the content of a litigation
release, but the staff will seek to obtain the same rights with respect to the defendant's
press release. Although a settling defendant is not required to admit wrongdoing as part
of the price of settling an enforcement proceeding with the SEC, as a matter of formal
policy, the Commission will not accept a settlement from any person or entity unless that
person neither admits nor denies the allegations of the Commission's complaint or order
for proceeding. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (1987). In some cases, individuals have settled with
the SEC and then issued statements denying any wrongdoing. The agency has reacted
negatively to such denials and, in one instance, reopened the proceedings and obtained
additional judicial relief. See SEC v. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8701,
17 SEC Docket 146 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 1979) (without admitting or denying SEC's
allegations, defendants consented to injunction against further inadequate disclosure in
proxy materials); SEC v. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8739, 17 SEC
Docket 465 (N.D. Ohio May 1, 1979) (announcing court order requiring defendant to
resolicit shareholders' proxies for annual meeting, based on alleged violation of final
judgment; defendant had circulated memorandum to certain shareholders stating that SEC's
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This free publicity is one method by which the agency can
promote the visibility of its activities, although it is difficult to
ascertain the degree to which publicity of this sort successfully deters
similar acts by other persons. 56 More recently the SEC also has
begun announcing its enforcement efforts with a formal press
conference. This procedure has long been utilized by various
criminal prosecutors, at both the federal and state levels, although
the SEC has only recently adopted it.
Another device by which the SEC has assured visibility for its
enforcement efforts is by attracting attention to anticipated, rather
than consummated, enforcement actions. Termed a program
approach to law enforcement, this approach involves the
identification of a type, or class, of reprehensible behavior and the
subsequent creation of a program to combat such activity. Developed
prominently during the 1970s and particularly as an outgrowth of
the Watergate scandal, 5 7 the Commission has devised programs for
allegations were baseless). See also Opening Statement of the Honorable Harold N. Williams,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, at the Commission's Consideration of the
Staff's Proposal Concerning Public Statements Inconsistent With Terms of Settlement (June
5. 1979) (unpublished speech on file with authors).
The above cited example is not the only instance of defendants denying SEC allegations
after entering into a consent agreement. See President of First Jersey Signs S.E.C. Decree, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 1984, at DI, col. 1 ("Even though Mr. Brennan consented to the decree
without admitting or denying the charges, Mr. Brennan took the view that the court order
'completely vindicates me and my firm' "); First Jersey Settlement Said "Unique," Wash. Post,
Nov. 22, 1984, at BI, col. 3 (" lHe can say whatever he wishes. The documents speak for
themselves,' retorted [SEC New York Regional Administrator Ira] Sorkin . . .The SEC is
angry that Brennan put out a release claiming vindication a few hours before the decree
was signed ...").
156. A graphic example of the lack of success achieved by the SEC's publicity
program occurred when the Commission brought charges in June, 1988 against Stephen
Sui-Kuan Wang, Jr., a twenty-four year old financial analyst in the Mergers and Acquisitions
Department of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. See SEC v. Wang, Litigation Release No. 11,780,
41 SEC Docket 384 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1988). The Commission accused Wang of tipping
material, nonpublic information concerning transactions by at least 25 Morgan Stanley
clients to Fred C. Lee, generating for Lee some $19 million in illegal profits. The amount
of illegal proceeds, however, pales in comparison to the brazenness of carrying out such a
scheme after the filing of civil and criminal charges against Dennis B. Levine and Ivan F.
Boesky, and the attendant publicity which emphasized that insider traders do get caught
and prosecuted.
157. A particularly effective program of the 1970s was the Commission's Voluntary
Disclosure Program. In the wake of Watergate and the resulting barrage of news reports
of illegal or undisclosed use of corporate funds for political purposes, the Commission
announced that the conviction of an officer or director of a public company for an illegal
payment was material, and must be disclosed to the public and to the issuer's shareholders.
See Securities Act Release No. 5466, 3 SEC Docket 647, 648 (Mar. 8, 1974) ("Such a
conviction is material to an evaluation of the integrity of the management of the
corporation as it relates to the operation of the corporation and the use of corporate
funds").
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many illicit securities activities, including its highly prominent
crackdown on insider trading initiated during Chairman Shad's
term."' Most prominent among the activities currently subject to this
programmed approach is the Commission's crackdown on illegal
activities in the Penny Stock markets. 5"
Few agencies have developed visibility for their enforcement
programs as well as the Commission has. Although the targets of
such publicity often find it unbecoming,60 the Commission's publicity
may in fact deter some individuals from violating the law, and
certainly puts the public on notice of the conduct the Commission
believes will constitute a violation of the law.'' It also has the
The Voluntary Disclosure Program was, in a sense, an SEC offer of amnesty--the
Commission let it be known that it would not likely investigate or prosecute companies that
cleaned their own house, by conducting a thorough internal investigation, announcing the
cessation of such payments, and disclosing the findings of its internal investigation. See
SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS CoMM., 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1976);
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRArICES (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 353, at 2 (May 19, 1976). As noted below, over 450 public companies came
forward and admitted such wrongdoing. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
158. See S.E.C. Chief Plans Insider Trade Curb, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1981, at DI, col.
1 ("Mr. Shad said . . . 'We're going to come down with hobnail boots [on insider
trading]'"); see also Insider Cases and the S.E.C., N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1983, at D2, col. I ("In
an oft-quoted remark, John S.R. Shad, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, has promised that his agency is 'going to come down with hobnail boots' on
anyone who dares engage in insider trading"). The Commission's insider trading
enforcement program is discussed infra notes 215-440 and accompanying text.
159. The Commission's penny stock enforcement program is discussed infra notes
523-44 and accompanying text.
160. There is an apocryphal story about a fellow who was indicted for market
manipulation at the behest of the SEC. Upon learning of the indictment, he protested his
innocence to several SEC officials and pleaded that they undo a grievous wrong. The
response, as expected, was a bureaucratic reliance on the wisdom of the criminal process,
and an assurance that, if the fellow was truly innocent, no jury would convict him. After
a trial on the merits, and an acquittal, the successful defendant happened upon the same
SEC officials from whom he had sought assistance. Despite the loss, these officials had the
presence to remind their former prey that the system had indeed worked, and he had been
acquitted. To their amazement, he responded angrily by pointing to the headline in his
hometown newspaper, which reported his victory under the headline: "Market Manipulator
Acquitted["
161. Indeed, a recent "tongue-in-cheek" letter to the Wall Street Journal provides
an amusing depiction of the effect upon the public of the considerable media attention
focused on the enforcement of the securities laws:
I was quite concerned when I saw your Oct. 26 article about Anheuser-
Busch's recent price cut and drop in demand.
A friend of mine and I might be in big trouble. We're afraid the Justice
Department and the SEC will soon be after us for manipulating stock prices by
using inside information. I hope this letter will explain the situation and at least
be some evidence of my contrition.
Recently, I went to see my doctor for a checkup. As soon as he saw my
weight he insisted I lose some poundage immediately. Since beer has been my
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salutary purpose of assuring investors that the Commission is
effectively monitoring the United States securities markets.
3. Litigation Success
A successful enforcement program is one that is credible both to
those who are confronted with the government's enforcement
initiatives, and those who must evaluate their validity. To the extent
the government is perceived as an effective litigator, with the
capacity to prevail should it commence an enforcement proceeding,
targets of proposed government enforcement action will be more
likely to settle cases. If the government is perceived as an ineffective
or unsuccessful litigator, it will have to litigate many more cases,
straining its limited resources, or it will be forced to settle cases on
less favorable terms.
The success of a litigation strategy can be measured in a number
of ways. The first is whether the SEC prevails more often than not
in its litigation. This may be more important to the object of the
SEC's proceeding than to the SEC itself. It is not a sign of weakness,
or failure, if the government loses a fair percentage of the cases it
actually litigates. In the SEC's enforcement program, there is a
Darwin-like process of natural selection in terms of which cases it
actually litigates. Typically, the most difficult cases for defendants will
be settled rather than litigated." 2 Those cases that defendants do
sin of choice for years and is the main source of my non-nutritional calories (at
least according to my wife), it seemed like a good idea to stop drinking beer
until my weight got on the south side of 200 pounds. I enlisted a
friend-another large consumer of beer--to go on this diet with me. He
stopped drinking beer, too. I can assure you and your readers that it never
occurred to either of us that this would have such an effect on the beer market
or that it would cause Anheuser-Busch such problems.
One source of hope: Rudolph Giuliani is no longer the U.S. attorney for the
Southern District of New York. I just hope neither his successor nor any
other district attorney will see fit to indict us.
Every investor in the U.S. should be aware that I hope to reach 200 pounds
very soon, and that when that happens my beer consumption will resume. I
hope that by making my plans public knowledge I can now buy beer-company
shares--knowing as I do that the demand for Budweiser will soon
surge-without any fear of trading on inside information.
Geo. Thomas Davis, Jr.
Swan Quarter, N.C.
See Inside Trader Sees Trouble Brewing, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1989, at A19. col. 2.
162. This is not intended to convey the impression that every case that is settled
reflects a judgment by the defendant (or defense counsel) that the defendant would have
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litigate most likely are those in which the government's position is
weakest, or where the stakes are highest.'
Of greater significance to the government is whether its legal
theories are accepted by the court. While the government may not
prevail in a specific enforcement action, it often advances or sustains
the basic legal theories upon which that action was predicated.'" In
such circumstances, the government's loss is often illusory, because
legal theories will be established or advanced for use in future
actions.
The failure of an agency to sustain its legal theories in an
enforcement proceeding, however, may seriously affect its
enforcement program. Losing a case because the government fails
to meet its burden of proof is of minimal concern to a government
enforcement agency."o  Similarly, if the legal theories of the
government are rejected because the regulations currently in place
do not comprehend the theories alleged, the loss is likely to be of
less concern to the government, since the agency can often amend
a rule or regulation to ameliorate the effects of an adverse
decision.'t 6 However, a serious setback may occur where a court
lost the proceeding had it been litigated. In some circumstances, cases are settled despite
a good faith belief by the defendants that they could have prevailed, because the outcome
of the case is simply not sufficiently important to them to warrant the burden and expense
of litigation. This is most often the case when the government seeks an injunction or some
other similar type of order.
In other cases, a settlement reflects the defendant's assessment that the risks of losing
enforcement litigation outweigh the benefits of winning. This is the case, for example,
where the government offers not to seek treble damages under the provisions of RICO, in
return for the defendant's agreement to settle the matter on a less dramatic basis. The
mere lodging, not to mention the loss, of a governmental RICO claim carries with it
significant implications for the defendant, both within the context of the government's
action, and in connection with the private litigation that inevitably follows.
163. It is not surprising to see defendants litigate where the government seeks to
impose criminal sanctions (in the form of a jail term), or where the relief sought by the
government approximates the realistic risk of losing should the case actually be litigated.
164. See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
165. Many cases are lost on this basis, particularly where there is a jury trial. See,
e.g., Jury Clears Reed in Amax Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, at Dl, col. 6. From the
government's perspective, a loss on that basis does no permanent damage to its program,
unless the court indicates that the government's theory could not have succeeded on any
set of facts.
166. Legislative grants of SEC rulemaking (and rule amending) authority speak in
very broad, general terms, see, e.g., Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1982) ("The
Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.. ."); Exchange
Act § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982) (granting similar authority). Nevertheless, an
agency regulation may not purport to exceed the bounds of the statutory provision
pursuant to which the regulation was promulgated. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976).
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rejects the government's legal theories because the controlling statute
will not accommodate the government's interpretations: only
Congress can remedy such a statutory disability. 6
In short, an effective enforcement program is one which
generates considerable concern on the part of prospective defendants
that the government is more than likely to prevail in the event of
litigation, and that the risks of refusing an offer of settlement and
losing the subsequent litigation outweigh the chance that the defend-
ant will prevail and be absolved of guilt.
The foregoing discussion delineates some of the more important
predicates of an effective enforcement program. 6 ' Throughout the
past several decades, the SEC's enforcement program has embodied
most of these attributes. We now turn to a retrospective evaluation
of the Commission's enforcement program during the 1980s, to
assess how well that program-which reflected a departure from
prior years' enforcement policies-conforms to the model we have
articulated.
II. Securities Law Enforcement During the 1980s
A. Background of the 1970s
The Commission's enforcement presence in the late 1960s and the
1970s personified the agency's tenacity and energy. Certainly the
167. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (rejecting Commission's
interpretation of an exdusion to antifraud provision of Advisers Act); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 665-667 (1983) (rejecting SEC's assertion that Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule lob-5
reached the agency's theory of tippee liability); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (rejecting government's interpretation of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5
as applied to alleged insider trading); American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 743-54
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting SEC's claim of authority to regulate banks as broker-dealers).
168. The importance of "fairness" to an enforcement program should not be
overlooked. A key ingredient for the success of any enforcement program is a perception
that the program operates fairly. In this context, fairness embodies
(i) the cases that are discarded, as well as those that are initiated;
(ii) the theories that are pursued (and, in particular, whether prosecutors
can avoid the temptation to pursue attenuated theories of law in the
context of a case that virtually assures them of the likelihood they will
prevail on other, more standard theories of law);
(iii) the persons who are targeted as defendants; and
(iv) the remedies and sanctions that are sought.
The government is, and should be, held to a higher standard than other litigants, since
its mission is to protect the public interest, and not simply to achieve a businessman's
result.
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events of the 1970s required creativity and tenacity to deal with the
regulatory implications of events such as Watergate, the foreign and
domestic payments scandals and the like. We highlight various of the
Commission's responsive enforcement programs, below, as they
portray the tenor of the Enforcement Division to which the Reagan
administration, which dominated most of the 1980s, responded.
B. Enforcement Programs of the 1970s
1. Unconventional Securities
From its inception, the Commission has been confronted with the
question of whether novel investment-related offerings that do not
fit the typical mold of corporate equity or debt instruments should
be treated as securities. The Commission opted for an expansive
view of its jurisdiction-a not uncommon trait of many regulatory
agencies--and, in a progression of cases beginning in the early
1940s, continuing through the end of the 1960s, the Commission
scored a series of impressive litigation victories in the Supreme
Court. Each of these cases vindicated the Commission's position that
atypical investment instruments offered for public sale through the
means or facilities of interstate commerce were securities for
purposes of the registration. 9 and antifraud' provisions of the
federal securities laws.1
71
During the 1970s, the Commission elevated its ingrained
fascination with novel and atypical securities interests virtually to an
art form, bringing a number of enforcement actions against the
169. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), it is
unlawful for any person to offer for sale, or sell, any securities through the means and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails, unless those securities have first been
registered with the SEC, and meaningful disclosure is made available to investors. Although
there are a number of securities and transactions that are exempted from this registration
requirement, see Securities Act §§ 3-4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1982), the burden is on the
person claiming entitlement to an exemption to prove such entitlement. See, e.g., SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). The public distribution of non-exempt
unregistered securities imposes absolute liability on the issuer of those securities. See
Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982).
170. See generally Securities Act §§ 11, 12(2), 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77q (1982);
and Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
171. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sale of
assignments of portions of oil drilling leases); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (sale
of packages consisting of deeds to a portion of an orange grove and a ten-year service
contract to operate the grove); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
(variable annuity insurance policies); cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)
(withdrawable capital shares of a savings and loan institution).
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promoters and issuers of such various and sundry instruments as:
self-improvement courses,' cosmetic distributorships,' franchising
agreements, 74 resort condominiums,' 7 cattle herds, 76 oil and gas
limited partnerships, 77 real estate limited partnerships,17 call options
for silver bullion,7 undivided fractional working interests in oil and
gas wells, 80 personal promissory notes,' and, for good measure,
interests in foreign sex centers for prostitutes.' n
The SEC, however, did not limit itself to enforcement
proceedings. It also issued releases alerting the investing public to
some of the scams that had arisen in connection with some of these
atypical securities.' And, the Commission filed amicus curiae briefs
with a variety of courts, in favor of private plaintiffs seeking to
expand the reach of the federal securities laws to such atypical
"securities" as pension plan interests,' shares in a cooperative
housing project,' and life insurance policies. 86 Although this effort
172. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
173. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC
v. Isis Indus., Litigation Release No. 8844, 18 SEC Docket 178 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1979).
174. See, e.g., SEC v. Futuristic Foods, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8636, 17 SEC
Docket 464 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1979).
175. See, e.g., SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., Litigation Release No. 8216, 20 SEC Docket 963
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1977).
176. See, e.g., SEC v. Southern Star Land & Cattle Co., Litigation Release No. 6895,
7 SEC Docket 52 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 1975); see also United States v. Schwartz, Litigation
Release No. 5741, 1 SEC Docket 23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1973); United States v. Pitts,
Litigation Release No. 7304. 9 SEC Docket 173 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 1976).
177. See, e.g., SEC v. Income Properties of America Investment Management Co.,
Litigation Release No. 8768, 17 SEC Docket 794 (D.D.C. May 30. 1979); SEC v. DiGiorno,
itigation Release No. 8278, 14 SEC Docket 130 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 1978); SEC v.
Garfinkle, Litigation Release No. 6687. 6 SEC Docket 95 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1975).
178. See, e.g., SEC v. Barnwell Indus., Litigation Release No. 6873, 6 SEC Docket
886 (D.D.C. May 8, 1975).
179. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex-A-Chief, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7205, 19 SEC Docket
65 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1975).
180. See, e.g., SEC v. Big D Oil & Gas Co., Litigation Release No. 8960, 19 SEC
Docket 65 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 1979).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Ginter, Litigation Release No. 8839, 18 SEC Docket
148 (D. Or. Aug. 15. 1979).
182. See SEC v. Globus Anlage-vermittlungsgesellschaft MBH, Litigation Release
No. 6229, 3 SEC Docket 523 (D. Md. Feb. 4. 1974); SEC v. Globus, Litigation Release
No. 6490, 5 SEC Docket 60 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 1974).
183. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,163 (Jan. 18, 1973); Securities Act Release No. 6051, 17 SEC Docket
190 (Apr. 5, 1979).
184. See Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
185. See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
186. See Grainger v. State Sec. Lie Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 932 (1978).
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was largely unsuccessful,187 it evidenced the expansive position the
Commission was prepared to espouse.'"
2. Questionable Payments
For much of the 1970s, questionable payments by public
companies, to foreign and domestic business and government
officials, occupied the SEC's agenda.'89 Congress, too, involved itself
in the issue, launching an investigation into whether International
Telephone and Telegraph Corp. (ITT) had offered a contribution
to the 1972 Republican Presidential Campaign in an effort to settle
an antitrust action against IT''
The Commission's investigations into corporate slush funds led to
a steady progression of cases revealing the use of these
unaccounted-for funds for illegal domestic political contributions,
domestic and foreign bribes, questionable payments to foreign agents
and the like."9' The Commission's inquiries revealed that over 450
187. The Commission's position was rejected in both the Forman and Daniel cases,
supra notes 184-85.
188. By the early 1980s, the Commission's position in the Supreme Court had
changed dramatically, as it affirmatively opposed treating bank-issued certificates of deposit,
and collateral agreements, as securities for purposes of the federal securities laws. See
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
189. One theory underlying the Commission's questionable corporate payments
enforcement program turned on the premise that, since a contract procured by bribing the
agent of one party is voidable at the instance of the affected principal, see CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 228 (1963), then an issuer's financial statements were false and misleading
if a contingency had not been noted with respect to a material contract procured in that
fashion. See generally COMM. OF CONF., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, H.R. REP. No. 831,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
at § A(2)(a)); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. (1977). Other theories
included the notion that public companies impiedly represent that they (1) obtain and
retain business solely on the merits of their goods or services, and (2) maintain accurate
books and records for which there is full corporate accountability.
190. See TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 28, at 446.
191. See, e.g., SEC v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,740, at 90,594 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1976) (secret payments to foreign
consultants and domestic business officials; accumulation of off-books slush fund for political
contributions); SEC v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7479, 9 SEC Docket
1074 (D.D.C. July 7, 1976) (undisclosed payments to foreign officials to influence
unspecified foreign government actions; undisclosed payments to retailers and wholesalers
to induce purchases of defendant's products); SEC v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,542, at 99,730 (D.D.C. May 6, 1976) (illegal
payments to officials and employees of foreign governments to "obtain removal from the
Arab boycott list"); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,509, at 99,569 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976) (secret payments to foreign
government officials to procure contracts and permits); SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,357, at 98,775 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1975)
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issuers had tampered with their accounting records or concealed the
payment of illegal gratuities in foreign or domestic transactions.9 2
3. Corporate Accountability
Related to, although distinct from, the questionable payments
issue was the larger issue of corporate accountability to shareholders
and, in particular, the conduct of directors of public companies in
overseeing the business afflairs of their companies. In cases where
the Commission believed that the board of a public company had
failed to carry out its responsibilities, it made public its views of the
nature of the lapse and the actions that should have prevented it.
Perhaps in recognition of the new ground that was broken by
measuring the conduct of directors against federal law rather than
state law,' the Commission did not commence enforcement pro-
ceedings in many of these cases, but chose to invoke its publication
authority under the Exchange Act to publish reports of its
investigations.'"
Thus, the 1970s saw corporate directors taken to task publicly for
a variety of misdeeds ranging from neglecting the affairs of their
company,9 ' to permitting an issuer to issue unduly optimistic press
(undisclosed payments to Honduran and European government officials "in the course of
its business"); SEC v. Northrop Corp., Litigation Release No. 6842, 6 SEC Docket 712
(D.D.C. Apr. 17. 1975) (undisclosed unlawful political contributions).
192. See TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 28, at 449. This information
gave rise to the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which both
proscribed certain types of payments and required that public companies keep sufficiently
accurate books and records to reveal the nature of all such payments. See COMM. OF CONF.,
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference at § A(2)(a)); HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACr OF 1977,
H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Scss. (1977).
193. Corporate governance has long reposed in the domain of state law. See, e.g.,
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S 69, 88-89 (1987).
194. The Commission's publication authority derives from Exchange Act Section
21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1981), which provides, in pertinent part, that "[the Commission
is authorized in its discretion, to publish information concerning any . .. violations" of the
federal securities laws uncoverred in its investigations.
The Commission has described its publication authority as a device to "advise the public
with respect to the obligations imposed by the securities laws." See The Commission's
Practice Relating to Reports of Investigations and Statements Submitted to the Commission
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release
No. 15,664, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,014, at 81,557 (Mar. 21,
1979).
195. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N STAFF REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY, H.R. Doc. No. 12,128, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1972), in which the Commission's investigation revealed that the inattention of the issuer's
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releases in spite of its knowledge that the company was in grave
financial distress.'"
4. Novel Theories of Ancillary Relief
As the Commission continued to advocate novel legal theories and
sought to apply the securities laws to forms of conduct not
previously recognized as falling within the ambit of federal law, it
found that the traditional equitable remedy of the civil injunction
was no longer adequate for a variety of the cases brought by the
agency. Thus, the SEC devised creative new forms of ancillary
equitable relief to tailor the remedy to address the wrong more
closely.
Particularly in cases of public companies whose officials had been
accused of corporate mismanagement, the Commission designed
creative forms of relief, tailored to the particular facts uncovered in
the investigation, such as (1) the designation of special counsel,
sometimes referred to as a "special review person," to conduct an
investigation of the issuer or the suspect transactions," (2) the
appointment of new independent directors to the issuer's board,'
(3) the establishment of an Audit Committee or Executive Committee
board of directors was, at a minimum, partly responsible for the chief financial officer's
successful misappropriation of at least $4 million. Id. at 158-63.
196. See, e.g., In re National Telephone Company, Exchange Act Release No. 14,380,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,410 (Jan. 16, 1978). Other
matters of director responsibility were also addressed by the Commission in Section 21(a)
reports during this period. See, e.g., In re Gould, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,612,
12 SEC Docket 773 (June 9, 1977) (failure of the board to inquire into a corporate
transaction tainted by management self-dealing); Report of Investigation In re Stirling
Homex Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,219 (July 2,
1975) (failure of outside directors to learn details of company's financial condition permitted
fraudulent securities offering).
197. See, e.g., SEC v. Westgate-Califbrnia Corp., Litigation Release No. 6142, 3 SEC
Docket 30 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1973), in which the court, among other things, appointed a
special counsel to investigate the issuer's activities, appointed a new board of directors, and
required former directors to resign from any other directorships with public companies,
based upon allegations that the defendants had misappropriated substantial assets of the
issuer and flsified the issuer's books and records.
198. See, e.g., SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., Litigation Release No. 6054, 2 SEC
Docket 451 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 1973), in which the Commission alleged that the issuer
omitted from various of its public filings information concerning its ability to meet its
business commitments. Particularly during the energy crisis resulting from the oil embargo
of that period, the Commission expected oil and gas companies to disclose information
concerning their reserves. The issuer settled the matter by consenting to an injunction and
ancillary relief in the form of the appointment of independent members to its board,
implementing a new disclosure policy concerning its reserves and submitting to a special
review of specified financial transactions by the company's auditors. Id.
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of the issuer's board, to assure appropriate review of certain items
of business,"' and (4) the incorporation into an injunction of a series
of undertakings by the defendant designed to cure the particular
problems revealed by an investigation.'00
C. Deregulation in the 1980s
The Reagan Revolution arrived in Washington, amid great
fanfare, in 1981. ' The new administration quickly announced that
regulatory relief would play a prominent role in its economic
policy.102 Deregulation was soon heralded as a tonic, if not a pana-
cea, for the country's sluggish, listless economy.'0
The regulatory (or deregulatory) reform movement was driven by
the conviction that "incentives, not rules, should guide business
conduct and that negotiation among the principals, not litigation
199. Id.
200. A consent injunction issued against a public accounting firm exemplifies creative
relief designed to remedy with precision a specific set of circumstances. The Commission
charged an issuer's auditors with certifying and distributing materially false and misleading
financial statements concerning the performance of an investment firm. See Accounting Firm
Agrees to Consent Decree Providing for Independent Investigation of its Practices, Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 204, at A-1 (May 30, 1973). The Commission alleged that the auditing firm
was unqualified to prepare certified financial statements because certain firm personnel
"during the period of time when they were working on the preparation of such financial
statements, received payments from the general partners of [the client] totalling
approximately $17,000 in the guise of profits from participation in the purchase and sale
of hot issues." Id.
The auditors consented to a set of undertakings that included the adoption of internal
controls procedures, cooperation with an independent investigation to determine whether
the new procedures were adequate and whether the auditors were complying with them,
a one-year agreement not to merge with, or acquire, another accounting firm without the
consent of the SEC's Chief Accountant, and a five-day bar from accepting new public
accounting engagements. Id.
201. Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, in a
landslide, on a platform of restoring conservative values, and a promise to "get the
government off the backs of the people." Reagan: Putting His Philosophy to Work Fast, BuS.
WL, Nov. 17, 1980, at 154, col. 1; see also Justice and Mr. Thurimond, The Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 19, 1980, at 24, col 1.
202. See generally Fix & Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan's
First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293 (1985) [hereinafter Prospects for Regulatory Reform]
(describing administration's plan to eliminate unnecessary agency regulations, revise
regulatory statutes, and abolish certain regulatory agencies).
203. One commentator has attributed to the early 1970s' framework of regulation
such ill effects as: suppression of innovation; limitation of variety in the price and quality
of goods; and such price distortions as, for example, the overpricing of long-distance
telephone service and the underpricing of crude oil and natural gas. See Kahn, The Theory
and Application of Regulation, 55 ANnImusT L.J. 177, 178 (1986).
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between the lawyers, should determine disputes. 2 °04 The Reagan
administration eagerly embraced this credo; the President empaneled
a Task Force on Regulatory Relief whose mandate was the
coordination of the overall regulatory reform initiative.205
The SEC was not excluded from the administration's regulatory
reforms: The President's SEC Transition Team saw the Commission
as a potential hindrance to effective capital formation and an
impediment to the administration's goals of economic growth and
increased productivity.20 Not surprisingly, then, the SEC Transition
Team advised President Reagan that, among other things, the staff
and budget of the Commission could be cut by 30% over three
years, "without any compromise in the mission of the Agency." 7
Despite its grudging admiration for the Commission,2 08 and, in
particular, its crown jewel, the Enforcement Division," °  the
Transition Team nonetheless urged that regulatory reform be visited
upon the agency in the form of, among other things, a four-fold
reduction of Enforcement Division personnel, from 200 to 50.110
The notion that the dismantling of multiple layers of regulation
should be accompanied by a comparable reduction in enforcement
worked at cross-purposes with the axiomatic correlation between
decreased regulation and increased supervision and enforcement.21 1
204. McGarity, Regultory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REv. 253, 254 (1986)
[hereinafter Regulatory Reform).
205. Id. at 261 (citing remarks by President Reagan (Jan. 22, 1981)).
206. Final Report of SEC Transition Team, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 587, at K-I
(Jan. 21, 1981) [hereinafter Transition Team Report].
207. See Transition Team Report, supra note 206, at K-I.
208. The Transition Team Report stated that, over the course of its history, the
Commission "has become known as an agency which is tightly run, ... a vigorous enforcer
of esoteric securities laws, and a jealous guardian of its reputation as a highly independent
agency." Id. at K-2.
209. In evaluating for the President the various divisions and offices of the SEC, the
Transition Team reported that "[t]he integrity, dedication and zeal of the staff of the SEC's
Enforcement Division is [sic] the envy of government.... The techitique of investigation
and litigation and the enthusiasm which the staffers of [the Division] bring to their work
is [sic] truly a model for all of government." Id. at K-8.
210. Id. at K-9. This recommendation fell at the midpoint of the range of
recommendations concerning the staffing of the Enforcement Division. At opposing ends
of the spectrum were the alternatives of (1) preserving the size and centralized management
of the Division; and, conversely, (2) eliminating the Division in Washington, in favor of a
coordinated regional enforcement program. Id. Similar recommendations were offered as
a means for reforming the other divisions and offices of the Commission, as well as many
of the agency's regulatory programs. Id. passim.
211. Not long after the initial deregulatory efforts were recommended for the SEC,
the Enforcement Division's new director, John M. Fedders, admonished the audience of the
Securities Industry Association Legal and Compliance Seminar that, notwithstanding the
agency's commitment to prudent deregulatory initiatives, the securities industry should not
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Nevertheless, the regulatory reformers were convinced that economic
incentives, rather than government enforcement, would motivate
compliance with a pared-down regulatory framework."1'
Chief among the substantive, enforcement-oriented recom-
mendations of the SEC Transition Team was the need to return to
the pursuit of traditional forms of securities fraud, such as insider
trading and manipulation."' The Transition Team urged Reagan to
appoint a new SEC Chairman and evaluate future appointments to
the Commission with a view toward assuring that the new Chairman
be able to achieve voting control.
14
D. Insider rading: Centerpiece of the Enforcement Program of the 1980s
With the arrival of Ronald Reagan and deregulation came a new
Chairman of the SEC, John S.R. Shad, and, shortly thereafter, the
newly appointed Director of Enforcement, John M. Fedders."5 As
subsequent events amply demonstrate, Shad and Fedders had read
the SEC Transition Team's Report and heeded its essential message.
Following, and to a large extent, in response to, the dramatic
expansion of the federal securities laws during the 1970s,"6 the
Shad-Fedders regime set out to restore to the Commission a
philosophy of strict construction of the federal securities laws."17 In
particular, Shad announced promptly upon his confirmation that
insider trading would become the object of heightened attention,
proclaiming that the Commission would "come down with hobnail
boots" on those who abused informational advantages." 8
misread broker-dealer regulatory reform. See Fedders Urges More Criminal Prosecution of Market
Manipulators, Insider Traders, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 795, 795-96 (May 7,
1982). Fedders called upon the industry to step up its self-regulatory efforts, underscoring
his readiness to recommend proceedings to criminal prosecuting authorities and to increase
the use of the remedies available to the Commission. Id.
212. See generally Prospects for Regulatoly Reform, supra note 202, at 305-06.
213. See Transition Team Report, supra note 206, at K-9.
214. Id. at K-28.
215. Prior to their appointment, Shad had been the vice-chairman of E.F. Hutton,
while Fedders, a litigator, had been a partner at a Washington, D.C. law firm. See The Man
From Wall Street: John Shad's Reign at the SEC, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
216. See supra notes 169-200 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. In this context, the concept of strict
construction embodied a decision to return to the fundamentals of securities law
enforcement and to eschew cases involving novel instruments and novel theories of law.
218. See S.E.C. Chief Plans Insider Trade Curb, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1981, at DI, col.
1. Indeed, the agency speedily announced a significant victory in an insider trading case.
See Profu on Santa Fe Trading Frozen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1981, at Dl, Col. 3 (court froze
$5.2 million in illegal proceeds from insider trading in Santa Fe stock and options).
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During the early 1980s, while the SEC focused on insider trading
cases, Shad and Fedders spoke out loudly and often against the evils
of this particular brand of illicit securities trading."9 Even with their
focus on insider trading, however, it seems safe to say that no one
anticipated the turn of events that would thrust insider trading into
the headlines, where it would remain for the rest of the decade."'
In a sense, the Commission's insider trading enforcement program
of the 1980s reflects, in a microcosm, certain overarching themes of
the last decade of SEC enforcement.
1. Back to Fundamentals
As noted earlier, the Shad-Fedders team proclaimed that their
mission was to restore to the Commission's enforcement program an
emphasis on fundamental principles of securities fraud, abandoning
the 1970s' approach of finding, and defining, the outer limits of
fraud.'
Although Shad and Fedders emphasized that their program
merely reflected a return to conservative legal principles, some saw
the deregulation of the early 1980s as benefiting big business, while
leaving the full force of the Commission's enforcement arsenal to
descend upon individuals.222 Insider trading cases provided a ready
219. See, e.g., Insider Trading: Why it Can't be Stopped, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, June 1984,
at 48; Insider Trading by Outsiders: The SEC Strives to Widen Its Net But Major Rulings Have Held
It Back, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1984, at Cl, col. 2; Insider Cases and the S.E.C., N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1983, at D2, col. 1; The Dispute Over the S.E.C., N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1982, at D1,
col. 3.
220. See supra note 2. Ironically, and sadly, at the moment of the SEC's greatest
triumphs involving insider trading, Fedders was no longer at the agency. See Fedders Resigns
as SEC Chief of Enforcement, Apologizes to Agency, LA Times, Feb. 27, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
221. See article cited supra note 211. In an interview with Forbes magazine, Fedders
extracted from a pick-up game of basketball with his predecessor, Stanley Sporkin, an
apocryphal analogy to the two men's differing approaches to enforcing the federal securities
laws:
I noticed Stanley shot outside shots .... At midcourt, he'd just be chucking them
away. Every time I got the ball, I was very slow and patient. I'd work the ball in
dose, then I'd go up and stuff it. Stanley's a guard, and I'm a center. I'm not
going for long shots.
Dunk Shot, FORBES, Dec. 7, 1981, at 148.
222. For example, in a speech on the topic of whether the failure of issuers to
disclose their unasserted illegal conduct constitutes a violation of the federal securities laws,
Fedders explained his disinclination to bring certain of those cases against issuers:
[Albsent (1) self-dealing, (2) a mandated disclosure requirement or (3) an untrue
statement of material fact or a statement rendered misleading by the omission of
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vehicle for pursuing individuals rather than issuers, since it was
thought that, only in the rare case, if at all, would a company play
a role in insider trading other than as the source or object of the
information in question.2"'
a material fact, law enforcement judgments based on the general antifraud
provisions of the securities laws generally should be made in terms of quantitative
materiality.
See J. Fedders, Speech Before the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the
American Bar Association (Nov. 19, 1982), reprinted in 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
46, at 2059, 2059 (Nov. 26, 1982) (emphasis supplied); see generally Fedders Says Commission
Less Likely to Go After Some Corporate Misconduct, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at
2037, 2037 (Nov. 26, 1982). This represented a departure from the prior decade's emphasis
on qualitative materiality during the management integrity disclosure program of the prior
decade. Id. at 2058-59.
And, in connection with the Commission's later emphasis on financial fraud, see infra
notes 474-83 and accompanying text, Fedders explained his views on the relative
responsibility of corporate officers and their subordinates for securities laws violations. In
a speech befbre the Second Annual Financial Executives Institute Conference on Current
Financial Issues, Fedders observed that, although top management might exert pressures
to perform that created the environment leading midlevel personnel to carry out a financial
fraud, it was the midlevel people who would be named in the enforcement action, since
senior officials were unlikely to possess the requisite degree of scienter necessary to sustain
a fraud charge. See SEC Beefing Up Financial Fraud Work, Fedders Tells Conference of Executives,
15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2234, 2235 (Dec. 9, 1983).
Not surprisingly, this redirection of the Commission's enforcement efforts downward
from issuers and their senior officers provided a lightening rod for Congressional criticism.
Representative John Dingell. whose Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee monitored
the Commission's activities, accused the agency of "a fundamental shift in [its] attitude
toward its responsibilities." See SEC's Shad, Fedders Deny Commission Is Overemphasizing Insider
Trading, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1785, 1785 (Oct. 22, 1982). Fedders
denied the accusation, asserting, "There has been no conscious effort to avoid certain areas
of the law." Id.
Nevertheless, at least one securities law practitioner observed two years later that a
then-recent financial fraud case, in which the issuer was not named as a defendant,
comported with Chairman Shad's practice of suing individuals and not companies in certain
cases. See SEC Enforcement, Financial Services, Accounting Issues Dominate SRI Meeting, 17 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 210, 211 (Feb. 1, 1985) (remarks of Arthur F. Mathews,
Esq.).
223. The Commission under Chairman Shad's tenure was consistent in its
determination to hold individuals responsible for securities law violations encountered by
the agency. In a rejection of the so-called "Good Soldier" defense, the Commission ruled
that middle and lower level corporate personnel who violate the federal securities laws by
following the directives of their superiors should be sanctioned as principal wrongdoers. See,
e.g., In re Michael R. Maury, Exchange Act Release No. 23,067, (1982-1987 Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,493
(Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Maury], in which the Commission charged the Respondent, a
vice president and controller of a public company, with causing the issuer's violations of
Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982), and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and l3a-13
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13 (1989). In finding Respondent
culpable for causing those violations, the Commission admonished that
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Concerns about selective enforcement of the federal securities laws
by the Commission are not new.2" During the 1980s, however, those
issues resurfaced, and at least one court showed an interest in seeing
the issue fully ventilated by the Commission before the court would
affirm the agency's choice of sanctions.2 '
2. Inadequate Statutoiy Framework
Having identified its principal mission as ferreting out and
prosecuting illegal insider trading, the Commission and its Enforce-
ment Staff were confronted with several anomalies in the federal
securities laws:
(a)the federal securities laws do not expressly prohibit
insider trading;
(b)the crime of insider trading was not defined in any of
the statutes or rules administered by the SEC;26 and
[although Maury may have made the appropriate recommendations to his corporate
supervisors, when those recommendations were rejected, Maury acted as the 'good
soldier,' implementing their directions which he knew or should have known were
improper.... Maury's actions clearly failed to fulfill the duty Maury owed as
corporate Controller.
Mauty, at 63,334.
224. See, e.g., Arthur Upper Corp. v. SEC. 547 F.2d 171. 182 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir. 1970) ("A finding
of a 'gross abuse of discretion' might be supported by proof of the suggestion emphasized
by counsel at oral argument that the Commission has consistently applied a different
standard to the violations of large and powerful Wall Street establishments,' and thus
exercised its powers discriminatorily"); Winkler v. SEC, 377 F.2d 517, 518 (2d Cir. 1967).
SEC Chairman Hamer Budge had espoused the view that the Commission should not
selectively bring to bear the enforcement weapons at its disposal, and insisted that small
securities firms be no more heavily sanctioned for their misdeeds than larger firms
responsible for similar misconduct. See TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREEr, supra note 28,
at 441.
225. See Blinder. Robinson & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("we would be less than candid if we did not flag for the Commission our concern that
petitioners have mounted a non-frivolous claim that they have been singled out for disproportionately
harsh treatment") (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
226. See infra note 245 and accompanying text. See generally A Legislative Remedy, supra
note 3, at 9. As noted below, the remedies available to the Commission were significantly
expanded in two legislative enactments. See infra notes 313-29, 371-407, and accompanying
text.
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(c) the federal securities laws provided only one express
remedy for so-called insider trading: an injunction
against future violations.'"
Indeed, the Commission's principal weapon was the broad,
catch-all antifraud provision of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Acte "
(and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder),"9 which provided the
basis for a series of judicial and administrative opinions inferring
from those provisions a prohibition against trading securities while
in possession of, or on the basis of, material, nonpublic information
affecting the securities.!"
This lack of statutory authority raised at least two questions for
the insider trading enforcement program: First, precisely what
conduct would, or perhaps more significantly, would not, provoke
a government enforcement action for insider trading (or, from the
opposite perspective, what conduct gave rise to a case that could be
won)? And, second, if the government brought and won such an
action, could courts fashion a remedy that would both properly
address the conduct at issue, and deter others from similar
misconduct in the future?
A war strategy that directs soldiers to battle against an undefined
target is bound to suffer a measure of failure and frustration. The
government's insider trading enforcement program of the early
1980s was no exception. While the government achieved some
impressive victories, these victories were largely confined to the
lower courts. ' In the Supreme Court, the SEC suffered some
significant defeats, which threatened to undermine the agency's war
on insider trading."
227. See Exchange Act §§ 21(d)-21(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)-78u(e) (1982).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
229. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
230. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
cert. detied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding
validity of misappropriation theory in government insider trading cases), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983); SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (conscious
avoidance of knowledge that information conveyed to defendants was from an unlawful,
insider source does not defeat liability); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1402-03 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (person who becomes fiduciary of issuer by accepting confidential information
will be treated as temporary insider for purposes of assessing Section 10(b) liability).
232. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). Chiareila was technically a criminal prosecution and not an SEC enforcement action.
Nevertheless, the SEC's lawyers took the lead in preparing the government's brief in the
Supreme Court.
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In essence, the Supreme Court's approach to the first insider
trading cases with which it was confronted at the onset of the 1980s
reflected a continuation of the Court's decidedly hostile approach to
the SEC's expansive interpretation of the federal securities laws
during the 1970s."' The Court's antipathy toward the agency's use
of Rule lOb-5 represented a potentially crippling blow to the SEC's
insider trading program. In Chiarella,"I and again in Dirks some
233. During the 1970s, in a series of cases involving a variety of attempts to expand
existing interpretations of the federal securities laws (mostly initiated by private plaintiffs),
the Supreme Court:
1. Restricted the ability of lower courts to recognize new implied rights of
action by private parties. See, e.g., TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors. Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 n.24 (1979) (citing
with approval, Standing To Sue, supra note 127); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977);
2. Restricted the categories of persons deemed to have standing for previously
recognized implied private rights of action. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977);
3. Substituted a philosophy of literalism in interpreting the meaning and scope
of various provisions of the federal securities laws, see, e.g., Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 at
756-57 (Powell, J., concurring), for the Court's previously enunciated
directive to the lower courts that they broadly construe the federal securities
laws to accomplish their remedial purposes. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
4. Curtailed and limited the scope of the government's and private parties'
causes of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, the
principal weapon against insider trading. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
and
5. Substituted great disdain, in place of its previously articulated respect and
deference, for the SEC. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper, 430 U.S. 1 (1977);
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1976)
("the Commission has not appeared as an amicus in this case. In any event
... we would not afford [the Commission's views] the deference to which
the views of the agency administering a statute are usually entitled . . .");
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
For a general review of the Supreme Court's attitude toward the federal securities laws
and the SEC during the 1970s, see Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of dow Utility of Private Litigation
under the Federal Securities Laws, 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1977).
234. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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three years later,"5 the Court expressed great concern about
applying a generic fraud statute to most modern day insider trading
cases--cases in which
(a) the two parties to the securities transaction have never
met, and do not know of each other's existence;
(b)the alleged insider trader trades through an impersonal
stock exchange, rather than face-to-face;
(c) the alleged insider trader does not induce the other
party to the trade to buy or sell the stock in question,
and does not communicate with the other party to the
trade in any manner whatsoever.1
6
Most insider trading during the late 1970s and the early 1980s
reflected certain market trends that conformed the cases to this
pattern.37 As a result, the SEC's war on insider trading seemed
destined for significant curtailment or failure, at least in the absence
of the legislative action the Court in Chiarella had exhorted Congress
to take.
2s
Given the Supreme Court's suggestion that Congress make dear
its intent with respect to the types of cases the Commission had
begun to pursue, it would have been logical for the agency to
prepare legislation to resolve any ambiguities in the law in favor of
the agency's program. But, as noted above,3 9 the Commission's
traditional distrust of, and uncertainty with, the legislative process
caused it to refrain from seeking a legislative solution. Instead, the
agency resorted to self-help in two discrete ways.
235. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
236. See Pitt, After the Fall The Ins and Outs of Rule lOb-5, PLI, TWELFrH ANNUAL
1NsTruT ON SECURITIES RFGULATION 603, 641-45 (1980).
237. Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67-78 (1986) (testimony of Harvey L. Pitt).
238. The Court directed Congress to make its intentions clear, if insider trading
legislation was to have its full force and impact. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227, 230, 234. The
Court pointed to the lack of dear guidance from Congress with respect to the intended
application of Section 10(b) to the conduct under review. Id. at 234.
239. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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First, the Commission adopted a rule-Rule 14e-3 2"--designed
to address some of the difficulties the Supreme Court pointed out
in Chiarella with respect to Rule 10b-5. In order to extricate itself
from some of the potential limitations of Rule 10b-5 and its
governing statute, Exchange Act Section 10(b), the Commission
adopted its new rule under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 4' an
arguably broader antifraud provision than Section 10(b),"' but
nonetheless a section with a more limited focus-namely, tender
offers. As events during the 1980s subsequently proved, the adoption
of Rule 14e-3 gave the Commission a potent new weapon that
covered most, albeit not all, of the insider trading cases that were to
arise.
Second, picking up on bits and scraps in the Chiarella and Dirks
decisions, the SEC began developing new theories to circumvent the
restrictions those decisions imposed on the agency's insider trading
enforcement efforts. Principal among these was the development of
the so-called misappropriation theory-that is, the theory that a
person who misappropriates information for personal use when that
information was made available to him or her (if in fact it was made
available at all and not merely stolen) for another, legitimate
purpose, breaches Rule 10b-5.
The agency's adoption of the misappropriation theory was not
perceived as necessarily troubling as a substantive matter; indeed,
some commentators concluded that there was merit to this
approach."s But, the adoption of this theory on an ad hoc basis, and
in the absence of any legislative predicate for it, troubled scholars
and commentators, irrespective of their overall support for the
240. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989); Adoption of Tender Offer Fraud Policy, Exchange
Act Release No. 17,120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,646 (Sept.
4, 1980) [hereinafter SEC Rule 14e-3 Release) (adopting Rule 14e-3).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
242. Section 10(b) authorizes the Commission to adopt rules designed to prohibit
manipulative or deceptive conduct. Section 14(e), by contrast, authorizes the Commission
(i) to adopt rules designed to prohibit manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent conduct; and
(ii) to adopt rules reasonably calculated to prevent such conduct. The Commission believed
that the inclusion of the term "fraudulent" in Section 14(e) might give it greater power
than a statute limited solely to manipulative and deceptive devices and contrivances. See
SEC Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 240, at 83,454. Those hopes were dashed when the
Supreme Court ruled that Section 14(e)'s inclusion of the term "fraudulent" did not extend
its coverage beyond conduct that was either deceptive or manipulative. See Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, 472 U.S. 1, 6-12 (1985).
243. See, e.g., Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOITRA L. REv. 101, 102 (1984) (misappropriation theory
provides "convincing rationale for finding that outsiders violate Rule 10b-5").
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agency's enforcement program.'" Particularly as the agency's insider
trading program began to gather momentum, and to attract the
attention and involvement of criminal prosecutors, concerns were
expressed that the agency had an obligation first to define the
predicate offense of insider trading, expose that definition to public
scrutiny and comment, and only then to pursue prosecutions based
on such a definition.24
As the agency's self-help approach began to take shape, it was
tested in the lower courts, and met with great success. 246 For
whatever reason, the lower courts were not troubled that the
validation of the SEC's new theories required judges to embrace the
inherent assumption that the SEC's ends-in this case, the curtail-
ment of insider trading-somehow justified the agency's means, that
is, the creation of theories of law without a proper statutory
foundation or predicate, in order to meet the exigencies of specific
cases and to evade the restrictions of negative precedents.47
Despite the problems caused by a lack of clear statutory law in
the area, the Commission told Congress it was in no hurry to
develop a legislative definition of insider trading.'" In particular, the
agency expressed the fear that it might be impossible to craft a
definition that could embrace all forms of wrongful insider trading
and that, even if such a legislative definition could be achieved, a
clear, bright-line definition might only assist potential wrongdoers
to devise schemes designed to fall just beyond the reach of the
prohibition. 2' Not surprisingly, the Commission was willing to trade
off uncertainty over the precise contours of the offense in exchange
for retaining the flexibility to pursue new varieties of wrongdoing
not yet within the contemplation of the lawmakers. For those subject
to the agency's jurisdiction and enforcement program, this flexibility
for the SEC came encumbered with a very heavy price-uncertainty
about the parameters of the law.
244. See, e.g., Definition of Insider Trading (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
17 (1987) (testimony of Harvey L. Pitt and John F. Olson) ("in so important an area of the
law, judicial legislation' is . .. inappropriate"); see also Pitt, Olson & Shapiro, 1987 Insider
Trading Proscriptions Act, N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1987, at 5.
245. See A Legislative Remedy, supra note 3. at 7. 8.
246. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), lfd, 833 F.2d 1086
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Combardfin v. SEC, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988); SEC v.
Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal.
1983).
247. See Remarks of Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 72.
248. See infra note 317 and accompanying text.
249. Id.
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Despite these gaps, the Commission's program began bearing
success. More insider trading cases were being settled, and those
that were being litigated were largely, but by no means exdusively,
resolved in the Commission's favor.5 Adopting a philosophy that
the risks of insider trading should be substantially increased, the
Commission attempted to compensate for the inherent limitation of
its organic statutes by seeking the disgorgement of insider trading
profits by those found guilty of illegal insider trading. This was not
a new development: in the 1965 landmark Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 5'
the Commission sought the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains by those
whose trading was deemed illegal, and by those whose illegal tips
enabled others to benefit. 52
The difficulty with this approach, of course, is that the Exchange
Act does not expressly provide for such a remedy.3" Moreover, even
if courts universally were to adopt the Commission's theory that, by
invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the court to consider the need
for an injunction in light of its substantive insider trading charges,
the SEC was also entitled to obtain a variety of equitable remedies
including disgorgement,21 there were no statutory guidelines for the
courts to follow.
For example, how should the profits gained by the defendant be
measured? 5 At what point should the nondisclosed information
utilized by the defendant be deemed to have been made sufficiently
250. Compare SEC v. Reed, Litigation Release No. 9537, 24 SEC Docket 442
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1981) (Reed disgorged profits from transactions in takeover target's
options) with SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (SEC litigated, and lost,
case against hometown college football coach).
251. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Litigation Release No. 3196 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 1965) (LEXIS, Securities library, Releases file) (announcing filing of complaint seeking
injunctive and ancillary equitable relief).
252. Id.
253. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
254. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the Commission's entitlement to
disgorgement under the Exchange Act, or other ancillary remedies under that Act. The
agency has relied on New Deal-related Supreme Court decisions involving other agencies,
see, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and on the language of the
Exchange Act § 28: "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition
to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity .... . 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
The lower courts have uniformly supported the agency's claim of entitlement to
ancillary relief. Indeed, a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia resoundingly affirmed the Commission's right to seek the full panoply
of equitable remedies inherent in the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts set forth in
the Exchange Act. See infra note 471. In light of the various amendments to the Exchange
Act in 1984 and 1988, designed principally to deal with the phenomenon of insider trading,
this issue may well be moot. See infra notes 314, 379-80, and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 470-71 and accompanying text.
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public so that no further illegal profits would be realized by the
defendant?s What should happen to the funds disgorged or, put
another way, who should be deemed to have a valid claim to those
funds?" 7 These are substantive, not technical, issues involving
important questions of policy.
To the extent that individuals profit from the misuse of inside
information, few critics of the SEC would doubt the propriety of
depriving those persons of their ill-gotten gains. But, the questions
posed by such an approach reflect fundamental decisions best left to
Congress, and not the judicial or administrative branches of
government. Nonetheless, the SEC effectively seized the initiative on
these issues: as the decade progressed, the SEC's entitlement to
disgorgement began to be taken for granted."8
While disgorgement adequately separated these wrongdoers from
their windfall gains, however, the number of insider trading cases
that followed suggested that the threat of disgorgement had failed
to deter other insider traders from abusing their informational
256. As long ago as 1968, the courts had asked the SEC to define when information
is deemed to have been made public. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
854 n.18 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (urging Commission to specify when information becomes
public, "to provide some predictability ... for the business community"), cert. denied sub
nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The SEC attempted to do so, see SEC Inquiry
into Use of Undisclosed Material Information in Connection With Purchase or Sale of
Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 10,316, 2 SEC Docket 229 (Aug. 1, 1973), but
ultimately abandoned the effort because of its difficulty. See Pitt & Shapiro, New Act May
Help Clarify Law, 198 N.Y.L.J. 21, 27 (1987).
257. In most cases involving the disgorgement of ill-gotten insider trading profits,
the defendants have settled with the SEC and have attempted to work out a formula for
the disposition of those monies. At times, the Commission failed to provide adequately for
the distribution of disgorged funds, including any monies remaining after the initial class
of beneficiaries of the agency's settlement had been satisfied. See, e.g., SEC v. Flight Transp.
Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 945 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) ("The SEC has not dearly stated to whom
it wishes the 'disgorged' money to be paid"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1113 (1988); SEC v.
Gen. Host Corp., 438 F. Supp. 105, 108-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (disgorged funds were not
exhausted by private claimants and settlement agreement did not provide for disposition
of remainder, so funds were returned to defendant). As a result, the Commission has been
careful to make certain that under any and all circumstances, once funds have been
disgorged by a settling defendant, those monies can never return to that defendant.
Nonetheless, disputes still arise regarding the disposition of these monies, and the agency
is still embroiled in litigation over the issue. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.
1989) (prescribing allocation of disgorged funds among competing claimants, including
defrauded investors and Internal Revenue Service).
258. Indeed, courts have upheld the Commission's entitlement to disgorgement even
though they would not grant the injunctive relief the agency sought. See SEC v. Ingram,
Litigation Release No. 11,739, 40 SEC Docket 1292 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 1988); SEC v.
Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403-04 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (court ordered disgorgement of profits
from insider trading, but denied injunction upon finding that trade was an "isolated
occurrence," unlikely to be repeated); cf. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705
(D.D.C. 1988), affd, 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Or. 1989).
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advantages. 5 ' More onerous penalties were thought appropriate,
since a judicial order for disgorgement, requiring the defendant to
"put the cookies back in the cookie jar, "" no longer seemed
adequate.
3. The Commission's Evolving Response to Insider Trading
While the Enforcement Division under the Shad-Fedders
leadership had abandoned the pursuit of esoterica in favor of insider
trading, a mainstream variety of fraud, great creativity and
imagination were needed to develop a strategy to combat this wrong.
One such response was the SEC's so-called Small Dollar program. In
the past, some commentators had expressed the view that only
greedy insider traders caught the eye of the regulators. 6' Because of
the Commission's scarce resources, this impression was quite
plausible.
The announcement, then, in March 1988, that the Commission
had filed a civil injunctive action against two foreign insider traders,
whose allegedly ill-gotten gains amounted to a relatively trifling
$9,156 and $17,747, respectively,"' seemed somewhat surprising."M
The Commission, however, pointed out that its selection of the case
turned, in part, on the very paucity of the unlawful proceeds,
observing that, "[i]n some cases people don't make a lot of money
by design to try to avoid being detected. That is why [the SEC feels]
259. See articles cited supra note 3.
260. This phrase was used by one federal judge who refused to sign a consent
decree in an SEC insider trading case, based on his dissatisfaction with the seemingly
lenient terms of the defendants' proposed settlement. See Judge Refuses Pa Setlement for
Second Time, Assoc. Press. Apr. 18, 1983 (AM Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
Judge William Orrick... rejected a proposed [SEC insider trading) settlement...
calling for repayment of profits, saying it was an 'outrageous disposition' and a mere
'slap on the wrist.'.. . The penalty, Orrick said, 'seems to be no more than telling
a person caught stealing cookies that he must return them to the cookie jar and
agree never to do it again.'
Id.
As noted below, the Commission soon acquired the authority to seek from the federal
district courts greater penalties in insider trading cases. See infra notes 314-15 and
.accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Insider Trading: Why It Can't be Stopped, DUN'S BUS. MONTH, June 1984,
at 48, 54.
262. See SEC v. Kerherve, Litigation Release No. 11,643, 40 SEC Docket 43
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1988).
263. See SEC Gains Selement in Egyptian Case, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1988, at B3, col.
1.
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it is important to pursue cases where the dollars are not large."' '
The Commission has since brought a series of small dollar cases,
confirming its initial admonition that minimal cupidity offers no
assurance of escaping detection or enforcement action."' The small
dollar program should dissuade illicit behavior in situations where
the stakes are relatively low and the costs of defending, or even
quickly settling, an insider trading enforcement case vastly exceed
the potential benefit of the wrongdoing.
There are, however, at least two perspectives from which to view
the SEC's small dollar program. On the one hand, as noted, it could
be viewed as an ingenious effort to discourage violations of insider
trading by creating the impression that no violation of the federal
securities laws is too insignificant to go unpunished. Particularly
given the agency's limited resources, however, such an approach
could not be maintained indefinitely; if it did not produce imme-
diate success, it might well have to be curtailed in favor of a more
efficient allocation of scarce enforcement resources.
On the other hand, the small dollar program may also reflect a
different trend on the part of the Commission and its enforcement
program. As the agency pursued its insider trading leads, its cases
produced enormous visibility and, through the process of
disgorgement and other remedies, meaningful monetary returns. An
aggressive program of insider trading prosecutions is one way to
deflect criticism from Congress and the media, and another way to
generate favorable commentary. Those who practice before the
agency noted a remarkable shift in the agency's enforcement efforts
during the decade of the 1980s. Despite the agency's protestations
to the contrary,2 the distinct impression emerged that agency
personnel were affirmatively searching for insider trading cases, even
in investigations largely devoted to other matters.
264. Id. The Commission also advanced another of its program goals with the
successful resolution of an insider trading case against two foreigners trading securities in
the United States markets. The ability of the agency to collect a one-times ITSA penalty
from foreign investors was of significance to the Commission. Id.
265. See, e.g., SEC v. Horwitz, litigation Release No. 12,236, 44 SEC Docket 754
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1989) (disgorgement and penalty of $1,696 and $1,386. respectively);
SEC v. Passov, litigation Release No. 12,174, 44 SEC Docket 218 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 1989)
(disgorgement of between $4,950 and $25,456, and range of up to "one-times" ITSA
penalty); SEC v. Sparks, litigation Release No. 11,916, 42 SEC Docket 396 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 21, 1988) (tipper paid penalty of $1,919.50; trader disgorged $1,919.50 and paid
penalty in same amount).
266. See SEC's Shad, Fedders Deny Commission Is Overemphasizing Insider Trading, 14 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1785 (Oct. 22, 1982).
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This is not surprising. There is an inherent appeal to cases
arising out of trading in advance of important news about a security.
And, apart from the high visibility and publicly-favorable response
to insider trading cases, these cases are not always as intellectually
challenging as other types of law enforcement cases brought by the
SEC, such as complex market manipulations or financial frauds, 6 7 or
even technical and detailed broker-dealer compliance issues (as are
extant in most of the so-called Penny Stock cases presently being
pursued by some members of the Enforcement Division).1"
4. International Aspects of the SEC's Insider Trading Program
The 1980s saw a significant movement toward globalized trading
in interlinked capital markets. This development was accompanied
by an increase in suspicious securities transactions originating outside
the United States.
Historically, the SEC's Enforcement Division staff has always been
skeptical about the bona fides of foreign cultural mores, foreign
statutory schemes, foreign officials, and foreign courts." And, as a
matter of sheer presumptive intuition, the existence of a foreign
bank account, for instance, much like the invocation of the privileges
accorded a witness under the Fifth Amendment, 7' always has been
267. Indeed, early in the Commission's insider trading program, Fedders observed
that insider trading cases could be concluded in far less time than was needed for complex
financial fraud cases. See SEC Should Consider Revised Policy on Modifying Injunctions, Fedders
Says, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2143, 2145 (Nov. 25, 1983) ("insider trading
cases can be brought in three or four months. The financial fraud cases take a lot more
energy, resources, and time to bring in . . .").
268. This is not meant to denigrate the enormous effort some of these insider
trading cases require; see The Mysterious 'Coincidences' in Insider Trading Cases, Bus. WK., Sept.
8, 1986, at 76, col. 1. Put another way, though, insider trading cases often require more
in the way of the skills of Sherlock Holmes than of Oliver Wendell Holmesl
269. See generally Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational
Securities Mar*et, 9 U. PA. J. INY'L Bus. L. 375 (1987) (hereinafter Problems of Enforcement].
270. Through the 1970s, a witness' decision to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was believed invariably to lead the Enforcement Division staff
to recommend the institution of an enforcement proceeding against that person. Today,
with the increasingly frequent involvement of criminal prosecutors in securities law cases,
the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights is no longer a reason, in and of itself, for the staff
to recommend an enforcement proceeding, although the majority of cases in which the
Fifth Amendment is invoked will still produce that result. See, e.g., SEC v. Comserv Corp.,
698 F. Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1988), in which the Commission sought to defend a claim
against the agency for attorney's fees and expenses, pursuant to the EAJA. The Commission
argued that the action brought against an officer of Comserv Corporation was justified
solely by reference to the officer's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege during the
agency's initial investigation. See Comserv Corp., 698 F. Supp. at 789. The court ruled against
the Commission, holding that, absent other evidence, the assertion of the Fifth Amendment
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viewed as a hallmark of fraud by the SEC staff."' This, in part,
explains some of the SEC's difficulty during its foreign payments
program of the 1970s, when the agency found itself at odds with
the Department of State. 72
In that context, the Commission's insider trading program was
potentially an open invitation to similar international disputes. It
quickly dawned on many with a venal bent that insider trading most
effectively could be performed from abroad.2 7' Through the use of
a Swiss Bank Account, or a bank account in a variety of other
foreign bank secrecy jurisdictions, and by utilizing Panamanian
corporations7 or Liechtenstein Anstalts,2 75 Americans and foreign
privilege "[was] not a sufficient basis for the SEC's action." Id. See also Pagel, Inc. v. SEC,
803 F.2d 942, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317
(1976)).
271. See generally Problems of Enforcement, supra note 269.
272. See, e.g., SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1975).
273. See Problems with the SECs Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws in Cases Involving
Suspicious Trades Originating from Abroad: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 83-85 (1988) (testimony of Harvey L. Pitt).
274. Prior to the political crises resulting from the charges of corruption leveled
against Panama's president, Manuel Noriega, Panama was regarded as "the Western
Hemisphere's primary financial and trading tax haven." 3 W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND,
TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD, at Panama-I (1989) [hereinafter TAx HAVENS]. Panamanian
corporations have no minimum capital requirement, and shares, if registered, need not be
fully paid in. Ownership in the corporation can be evidenced by bearer shares (in which
case, the shares must be fully paid in). TAx HAVENS at Panama-21. There must be at least
two shareholders for the purpose of electing a board of directors of three to eleven persons,
who need not hold shares in the company. After incorporation, the number of shareholders
may be reduced to one. There are no citizenship requirements except for the appointment
of a resident statutory agent, who is generally the incorporating attorney. Id.
Bearer shares of a Panamanian corporation allow ownership to be kept confidential;
these shares are freely transferable from one individual to another merely by transferring
possession of the share certificates. Other features of Panamanian incorporation include:
(i) banking secrecy laws, (ii) no taxation of income produced from sources outside the
country, and (iii) investment and capital incentives. See TAX HAVENS at Panama-2,-6;
Banking Law of Panama, Law No. 16, Arts. 2-4 (Jan. 28, 1959).
For examples of instances where Panamanian corporations have been involved in
violations of the federal securities laws, see, e.g., SEC v. Levine, Civ. Action No. 86-3726
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 12, 1986) (alleging defendant Levine made securities trades based on
inside information through two Panamanian corporations beneficially owned and controlled
by Levine) (a copy of this Complaint is on file with authors); In re Joseph A. Lugo, Admin.
Proc. File No. 3-6740 (LEXIS, Securities library. Releases file) (May 10, 1988) (Panamanian
bearer stock corporation involved in scheme to defraud investors); SEC v. Palmer Fin.
Corp., Litigation Release No. 12,082, 43 SEC Docket 1230 (D.D.C. May 3, 1989) (violations
of Sections 13(d) and 16(a) of the Exchange Act).
275. A Liechtenstein Anstalt or Establishment is a special type of corporation which
in practice serves as an international holding company (holding financial or controlling
interests in foreign corporations) with its residence in Liechtenstein. 2 TAx HAVENS, supra
note 274. at Liechtenstein-5. The Anstalt may be formed with only one founder or
promoter, who may be a Liechtenstein representative acting for an anonymous owner. Id.
at Liechtenstein-17. Features of the Liechtenstein Anstalt include: (i) no restrictions on
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nationals alike could attempt to conceal their identities while pur-
suing illegal securities trades predicated upon inside information.
As a result, early in the decade, the Commission's insider trading
program confronted the formidable combination of foreign bank
secrecy or blocking statutes,2" foreign entities organized to mask the
true identities of their owners, and illegal insider trading, often
immediately in advance of the announcement of a takeover.7'
If anything, the difficulties presented by foreign trades dwarfed
the legislative and remedial difficulties confronted by the SEC
vis-a-vis domestic insider trading.2 78 Not only was there no law
regulating many of the details of this activity, but the Commission
had to confront a host of cultural, 79 procedural,"' jurisdictional,"'
debt-equity ratio, (ii) low taxation rates, and (iii) the option of concluding a contract with
the Liechtenstein tax authorities guaranteeing the entity's present tax rate for a period of
up to thirty years. Id. at Liechtenstein-5 to -6. Recently, the United States assets of Finacor
Anstalt, a Liechtenstein firm, were frozen by a federal district court in connection with
charges of insider trading brought by the SEC. See Finaco's U.S. Assets Frozen as SEC Files
Insider-Trading Suit, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1989, at A3, col. 4.
276. Generally speaking, bank secrecy laws protect an individual's right to
confidentiality of information relating to the individual's banking relationships. The
confidentiality of this information is a personal Tight that can be waived by the true account
holder. Some countries have adopted blocking laws, either in addition to, or in the absence
of, bank secrecy statutes, which address national interests in preserving the confidentiality
of specified types of information. No individual can waive the application of these statutes
even as to personal information. Only the sovereign can waive the barrier to disclosure of
this information, See Problems of Enforcement, supra note 269, at 402-14.
277. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
279. In many foreign jurisdictions, at the beginning of the 1980s, insider trading was
simply not illegal. See Problems of Enforcement, supra note 269, at 390-92. Indeed, in some
foreign jurisdictions, insider trading was viewed as an affirmative right of corporate insiders.
Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 757, 762 (1982) (tipping considered "a social duty ... expected of relatives and
friends" in France); Akashi, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1296,
1296 (1989) (until recently, Japanese investors were "allowed, and sometimes even
encouraged, to act upon inside information"); Insider Trading in New Zealand, 'Deplorable' But
Legal, Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at 26, col. 1 (insider trading "is considered a way of life
[in New Zealand]" says founder of Insider Trading Hotline).
280. The United States is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Convention) which provides for three of
the most common methods of foreign discovery: by letters rogatory, evidence-taking by a
consular official, and evidence taking by private commissioners. The Convention is of no
assistance to the SEC during an investigation, however, as it is only available for use in
actual litigation.
281. The federal securities laws authorize the SEC to subpoena evidence from
anywhere in the world, so long as service has been properly effected in the United States.
See, e.g., SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, SA, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945). United States
administrative agencies, however, generally do not have the power to compel persons
outside the United States, who have no contacts with the United States, to produce evidence
for an investigation or to appear in court. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
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and substantive82 restrictions on its efforts to pursue an insider
trading investigation or prosecution.
The Commission showed remarkable dexterity in tackling these
obstacles. The agency invoked a bifurcated approach to the problem,
and developed legal theories designed to assist at least one aspect of
these efforts. Thus, the SEC quickly conduded that, since insider
trading reflects a crime of greed, it should respond in a manner
most calculated to get the attention of those whose greed had caused
the violation. Since most of the trades at the beginning of the 1980s
were effected in the United States,"' and since the SEC could
ascertain the identity of the agent that had placed and executed the
orders for the illegal trades, the Commission began to apply
pressure to the foreign banks with assets in this country, and United
States brokerage firms at which those banks held their accounts.284
With assistance from a receptive federal judiciary, principally
courts in the Southern District of New York, which took a dim view
of the conduct necessitating the agency's claims for extraordinary
relief, the SEC sought to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals
and foreign banks, using foreign assets present in New York as an
effective lever for obtaining the attention of those foreign nationals
v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Even if the SEC were aware of the identity of an
insider trading violator, that person might not be physically present in the United States.
Obtaining jurisdiction over such persons became a major problem for the agency. See, e.g..
SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988).
282. The SEC's capacity to obtain information from abroad was subject to a number
of restraints including, among other things, foreign nondisclosure principles and restrictions
on the agency's ability to obtain testimony and other discovery from foreign nationals. See,
e.g., Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (authorizing individuals whose privacy has been
invaded to sue for damages and injunctive relief) and Article 47 of Switzerland's Banking
Law of 1934 (prescribing criminal penalties for the disclosure of confidential information
acquired in the course of providing banking services, as well as attempts to induce bank
personnel to disclose such information). For a more detailed survey of various foreign
nondisclosure laws, see Problems of Enforcement, supra note 269, at 402-15; see also
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Report of the Staff of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, at VII-31 to VII-38 (1987).
283. By the latter part of the decade, global trading had arrived, and with it the
opportunity to trade United States securities on foreign exchanges. See Fraud Overseas Will
Force Action on Secrecy Laws, Lynch Says, 17 Sec. Reg & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1927 (Nov.
1, 1985); see also Global Investing More Complex as Markets End Wild Year, N.Y. Times, Jan.
4, 1988, at D3, col. I ("Global investing is here to stay, experts say. . ."). Nonetheless, most
of the trading in New York Stock Exchange-listed securities is still conducted in the United
States. See PROBLEMS WITH THE SEC'S ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS IN CASES
INVOLVING Suspicious TRADES ORIGINATING FROM ABROAD, H.R. REP. No. 1065, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988).
284. See, e.g., SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, No. 81-Civ-6553 (S.D.N.Y. July
25, 1983); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. III (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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and entities caught up in the SEC's investigative efforts."5 At the
same time, the agency began direct negotiations with foreign
governments to develop a methodology by which the SEC's
investigations could continue."' The result was a series of so-called
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), pursuant to which the SEC
could seek to invoke the cooperation of foreign nondisclosure
jurisdictions.2
Much of the SEC's efforts to bypass procedural and jurisdictional
impediments in foreign matters involved the same creativity in
devising legal theories as did the agency's development of theories
285. See cases cited supra note 284; see also Finacor's U.S. Assets Frozen as SEC Files
Insider-Trading Suit, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1989, at A3, col. 4 (noting recent freeze placed
on U.S. assets of Finacor); SEC v. Levine, No. 86-3726 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986) (order
freezing assets).
286. See generally Problems of Enforcement. supra note 269.
287. See Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Framework for
Consultations Between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commission des
Operations de Bourse (Dec. 14, 1989) (France); Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Mutual Administration Assistance in the
Exchange of Information in Securities Matters (Dec. 11, 1989); Communique on Exchange
of Information Between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commissione Nazionale per La Societa' e La Borsa (Sept. 20, 1989); Memorandum of
Understanding and Commissao De Valores Mobilarios (Brazil) (July 1, 1988); Memorandum
of Understanding Between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and
Ontario Securities Commission, Commission Des Valeurs Mobilieres Du Quebec and British
Columbia Securities Commission (Jan. 7, 1988); Memorandum of Understanding on
Exchange of Information Between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry In Matters Related to
Securities and Between the United States Commodities Future Trading Commission and the
United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry In Matters Relating to Futures (Sept.
23, 1986); Memorandum of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information (May
23, 1986); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Switzerland (to establish mutually acceptable means for
improving international law enforcement cooperation in the field of insider trading) (Aug.
31, 1982) [hereinafter Swiss MOU].
The Swiss MOU was designed to fill a gap in a treaty of broader application, governing
law enforcement in criminal cases. This treaty provided that the two countries would
provide investigative and certain other assistance with respect to conduct that was subject
to criminal prohibitions in both countries. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Between the Swiss Confederation and the United States, May 25, 1973 (effective
1977). 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty]. This dual criminality requirement,
however, cast insider trading cases beyond the scope of the Swiss Treaty since, until
recently, insider trading was not prohibited in Switzerland. Thus, the SEC's ability to gather
information was frustrated by Switzerland's bank secrecy laws when the agency sought to
investigate suspicious securities transactions directed through Swiss accounts.
The Swiss MOU overcame that obstacle; the agreement was drafted to expire, by its
own terms, upon the effective date of Swiss legislation prohibiting insider trading. The Swiss
criminal prohibition on insider trading became effective on July 1, 1988, thus triggering the
expiration of ths Swiss MOU. See the Swiss Penal Code, Art. 161; see also Hermann, Prompt
Disclosure Can Pre-Empt Insider Trading, Fin. Times (U.K.), Aug. 18, 1988, at 23, col. 5.
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to circumvent the absence in the Exchange Act of any definition of
the offense of insider trading. The SEC's foreign-based activities,
however, did not produce the same outcry that its domestic
endeavors did. In large measure, the SEC's efforts produced a slow
(sometimes tedious), but generally successful, process by which
foreign-based trading became less problematic for the agency." '
The MOU mechanism has proven to be a valuable tool for the
Commission. The most visible product of these agreements has been
in the area of enforcement actions. 8' It should, however, be
anticipated that the 1990s will see an increase in reciprocal assistance
with inspection, market surveillance, and other preventive functions
that will both reduce the incidence of securities law violations and
streamline the smooth operations of an increasingly globalized capital
market.
5. Heightened Emphasis on the Criminal Components of Insider rading
From 1942, when Rule lOb-5 was first promulgated,290 until 1978,
when an indictment was handed down in the Chiarella case, 9' there
had been a total of thirty-six insider trading actions brought by the
SEC, m but absolutely no criminal prosecutions for insider trading by
federal criminal prosecutors.2 " Although the public record is devoid
288. See, e.g., Financial Analyst, Father Settles Charges of Inside Trading on RCA Stock, 18
Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1157 (Aug. 8, 1986) (assistance under the Swiss
MOU); see also Liechtenstein Firm Faces SEC Charges of Inside Trading, Wall St. J., Nov. 20,
1989, at All, col. 3; Rules for the Global Market, Fin. Times (U.K.), Nov. 17, 1987, at 20, col.
3 (describing the SEC's assistance, pursuant to the United Kingdom MOU, in the United
Kingdom prosecution of insider trading in connection with the Guinness-Distillers
transaction). This is not to say that the SEC is without its critics in the international sphere.
Oddly, however, much of its criticism stems from Congressional concerns that the agency
is still not sufficiently effective when it comes to foreign-based trading in United States
securities. See PROBLEMS WITH THE SEC's ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. SEcuRInFS LAWS IN
CASES INVOLVING SusPicious TRADES ORIGINATING FROM ABROAD, H.R. REP. No. 1065,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1988). See also infra note 438 and accompanying text.
Legislation currently pending before Congress would improve the Commission's bargaining
position with foreign governments, as it seeks additional agreements for mutual cooperation.
See infra notes 423-28 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., SEC v. Katz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 92.867, at 94,226 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1986) (information obtained pursuant to terms of
Swiss MOU); see also articles cited supra note 88.
290. See Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (LEXIS, Securities library,
Releases file).
291. See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
292. See SEC Defends Enforcement Rate, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1982, at D8, col. I ('Since
1978, 50 [insider trading] cases have been brought, compared with 36 in all the years since
1934").
293. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 7: 149, 1990
of a definitive explanation for this lack of criminal insider trading
prosecutions, these statistics do speak for themselves, and may reflect
the fact that insider trading was not perceived as an attractive
subject for criminal prosecution.
Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the infirmities in
the statutory authority discussed above2 may have been more
disconcerting to criminal prosecutors than to the SEC, in part
reflecting the different prosecutorial standards each must meet. 9
Indeed, so diverse were the SEC's and the Justice Department's
perceptions of the law of insider trading at the beginning of the
decade, that the Department of Justice affirmatively opposed the
SEC's defense of its administrative decision on the subject of insider
trading in the Dirks case before the Supreme Court,2 6 forcing the
Court to resolve the differences between the two government
agencies, with predictable support for the Department of Justice
from Mr. Dirks,"7 and with predictable results from the Court.'"
When prosecutors for the Southern District of New York finally
did take an interest in insider trading cases, they did not meet with
immediate success. Apart from the Chiarella decision,2 9 the Reed case
reflected a significant setback in the criminal portion of the insider
294. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
295. The SEC is able to prevail in its cases if it can prove its allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence adduced. See, e.g., Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 390 (1983). Criminal prosecutors, however, must prove their charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Since most litigated insider
trading cases do not involve objective evidence or confessions of wrongdoing, criminal
prosecutions must confront an "explanation" by the defendant for his or her securities
trades that may satisfy the jury that a reasonable doubt exists. See, e.g., Jury Clears Reed in
Amax Case, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 17, 1985. at DI, col. 6.
296. "The Solicitor General is of the view that the holding of the court of appeals
is in conflict with this Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States, ... (and] that the
decisions of the SEC and the court of appeals have a potential adverse effect on federal
criminal law enforcement." Brief of the SEC in Opposition at 17-18, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983) (No. 82-276) (dissenting footnote of the Solicitor General).
297. "The views of the Solicitor General that the position of the SEC and the
decision below are not only wrong and inconsistent with this Court's ruling, but are
potentially harmful to federal criminal law enforcement, amply demonstrate that this case
should be reviewed by the Court." Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at
3, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (No. 82-276).
298. The Court, of course, sided with the Department of Justice. See Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 665 n.25. Under the circumstances, it would have been difficult for the Court to do
anything else. If the Justice Department could not agree with the SEC on what the laws
against insider trading covered, how could Mr. Dirks be expected to comply with those
laws? See Pitt & Ain, 'Dirk' Deals Blow to SEC Insider Program, Legal Times, July 11, 1983,
at 10.
299. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Securities Regulation by Enforcement
trading program, as juries seemed ready to believe almost any
explanation for alleged wrongdoing. o  Nevertheless, criminal
prosecutions were to become an important part of the SEC's
renewed focus on insider trading. To accomplish this result, the
agency actively publicized its own insider trading activities,50' and
renewed its relationships with both the Department of Justice and
the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New
York."' Eventually, the number of criminal prosecutions for illegal
insider trading increased exponentially.
Having developed a renewed interest in securities law
enforcement, the Department of Justice and various United States
attorneys began to pay closer attention to the SEC's enforcement
program, with the concomitant result that more and more activities
ferreted out by the SEC are of greater interest to criminal law
enforcement authorities. This has prompted some to decry the
criminalization of the federal securities laws, and to claim that the
SEC now is dominated by criminal law enforcement authorities. 03
The simple response, however, is that the SEC's insider trading
program led it to uncover a significant scandal on Wall Street, which
greatly interested not only the SEC but criminal law enforcement
authorities as well. Given the severity and magnitude of the alleged
wrongdoing, it is not surprising that more criminal prosecutions
300. The jury apparently was prepared to credit Mr. Reed's explanation that he
decided to purchase stock options for the first time in his life, and that there was nothing
untoward about the facts that (i) those options covered the securities of the company on
whose board of directors his father sat, (ii) the options were purchased immediately
following a telephone call to Reed from his father, and (iii) the call came immediately after
the board of directors meeting at which material, nonpublic, inside information relating to
the issuer of the stock underlying the options was communicated to the board and Reed's
father. For a full exposition of the facts in Reed, see United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
301. Prosecutors do look at public perceptions. As the Commission's insider trading
program gained substance and popular acclaim, it appeared to become more attractive to
criminal authorities as a vehicle for securities law prosecutions.
302. See Supreme Court Double Jeopardy Ruling May Affect SEC Enforcement, Lynch Says,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1104, 1104 (July 21, 1989) ("As a result of the
[Court's] decision, [Lynch] said the SEC Enforcement Division will have to increase its
coordination with the Justice Department").
303. See U.S. Attorney Giuliani to Step Aside; Deadline on Drexel Settlement Extended, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 63, 63 (Jan. 13, 1989) ("Under Giuliani, the U.S.
Attorney's office helped 'criminalize' many securities law violations"); Insider Trading,
Internationalization, Rule '144A' Discussed at ABA Conference, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 33, at 1242, 1243 (Aug. 14, 1987) ("Other 'mischief that has resulted (from the insider
trading scandal) is the criminalization of things that up to now have been viewed as
technical violations of the securities laws, such as 'net capital violations, § 13(d) violations,
parking .. .books and records").
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would arise.3" The result of the Commission's renewed effort to
attract the attention of criminal law enforcement authorities has not
always been salutary, however.
For one thing, the SEC cannot, and will not, give assurances
regarding the possibility of criminal prosecution should a defendant
settle with the agencysas Consequently, defendants who are
enmeshed in SEC enforcement investigations must decide whether
a settlement with the agency will produce greater or lesser interest
on the part of criminal authorities in commencing their own
prosecution of the defendant."5 Undoubtedly, some will conclude
that a settlement with the SEC will produce greater criminal interest,
and thus the SEC may find itself forced to litigate more insider
trading cases in the future.
304. Some of the criticism directed at the SEC and the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York is decidedly misplaced. Both have been
attacked for making trivial or technical securities law violations the subject of criminal
prosecutions. Particular reference is made to prosecutions for the evils of "parking" and
noncompliance with net capital requirements. See Has the SEC Abdicated Its Role as Cop?, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 6, 1987, at 3 ("In the last 30 or 40 years not one practitioner would have even
guessed that a net capital violation would result in a criminal prosecution") (citations
omitted).
Parking connotes circumstances in which the true ownership of securities is masked by
nominee arrangements. See Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003,
1005 (7th Cir. 1989). Parking is not a trivial violation of the federal securities laws,
however. The essence of virtually every provision of the federal securities laws is stock
ownership. If stock ownership can be masked, the application of many of the provisions of
the federal securities laws, including the ban against insider trading, will be undermined.
In order to ensure the safety of customer funds and securities, and to protect other
securities brokers and dealers, every brokerage firm must meet certain minimum net capital
requirements. See Exchange Act § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1982). Prior to 1975, the
net capital requirements were one of the few provisions of the federal securities laws the
violation of which did not give rise to criminal liability. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). In 1975, however, Congress amended the
Exchange Act, and, among other things, specifically provided that the violation of any
requirement under the Act could give rise to the assertion of criminal liability. See Securities
Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Star. 97 (1975). While net capital
requirements are technical, their impact on other broker-dealers and on customers is not
highly technical. See, e.g., Blaise D'Antoni Assoc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1961)
("The net capital rule is one of the most important weapons in the Commission's arsenal
to protect investors"); see also In re Hankoff, Exchange Act Release No. 24,390, 38 SEC
Docket 220 (Apr. 24, 1987); In re Sloan, Exchange Act Release No. 11,376, 6 SEC Docket
772 (Apr. 28, 1975). Moreover, the cases in which net capital violations have been charged
criminally have all been settled actions, in which it is more likely than not that negotiations
between the defendant and the prosecutors limited the charges to net capital violations. See,
e.g., United States v. Davidoff, No. 87 Cr. 78 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1987) (Davidoff consented
to permanent injunction against further violations of net capital requirements); United States
v. Lewis, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 94,479 (S.D.N.Y. June 15,
1989); United States v. Jefferies, No. 87 Cr. 339 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1987).
305. See supra note 110.
306. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 121, at 375-77.
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Similarly, because the Commission has been so successful in
attracting the attention of criminal prosecutors, defendants can
assume that, increasingly, they will be prosecuted criminally
regardless of whether they settle with the SEC. To the extent that
the Commission is prepared to proceed first,107 and that discovery
against the SEC is broader than discovery against criminal law
enforcement prosecutors, s' s the agency may also find that an
increased litigation burden is a logical outcome of its persuasiveness
with criminal prosecutors.
6. Legislative Initiatives and Responses
Ultimately, the most enduring legacy of the Commission's war on
insider trading will be the fruits of its various legislative initiatives.
During the 1980s, the Commission embarked upon an active and
largely successful campaign of legislative advocacy, proposing a
number of bills to expand its authority and clarify the law.
As noted above,'09 prior to the 1980s, the Commission had
traditionally eschewed Congress' assistance, in the form of legislation,
particularly where the party dominating Congress is not the party
307. As a practical matter, if both the SEC and the criminal authorities are prepared
to bring an action at the same time, only the criminal prosecution will be allowed to
proceed. See generally United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978) (holding
that a civil summons issued during the pendency of a parallel criminal proceeding will not
be enforced).
308. Civil discovery is significantly broader than criminal discovery. See FED. R. CIv.
P. 26 (scope of discovery includes any non-privileged matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (defendant only entitled (i) to
examine and copy any relevant written statements of defendants, (ii) to learn the substance
of any oral statement of defendant to be offered into evidence, and (iii) to inspect and copy
any books, papers, photographs, and tangible objects within the control of the government
which are material to preparation of defendant's defense or constitutes the prosecution's
evidence in chief). Of course, if the SEC's enforcement proceeding is brought before an
administrative law judge, the amount of discovery the defendant will receive is more limited
than civil discovery, although still broader than criminal discovery. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(d)
(1987). The rule provides in pertinent part:
[T]he hearing officer, at the request of any party or upon his own motion .... may
in his discretion and with due regard for the convenience and necessity of the
parties or their attorneys, order a party, including the interested division, to furnish
where practicable any or all of the following: An outline of its case or defense; the
legal theories upon which it will rely; the identity of the witnesses who will testify
on its behalf; and copies of or a list of documents which it intends to introduce at
the hearing.
Id.
309. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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comprising a majority of the SEC. There are a number of reasons
for this phenomenon.
First, the Commission is reluctant ever to admit that it does not
possess all the legislative authority it needs. The agency seems to
fear that, by seeking legislation, it will be deemed to have conceded
that it lacked the authority it sought in the first place."'
Second, the Commission is skeptical about the legislative process.
Since the agency has generally lacked political acumen, "' it has
worried that, once the process starts, others will wield greater
influence with Congress than the Commission will, resulting in a
final legislative product that will not meet the agency's needs.
Finally, the Commission has always been concerned that the
legislative process will produce substantially greater scrutiny for the
subject of the particular legislative proposal than would otherwise be
the case, and that, upon closer examination, Congress may not
approve of the Commission's various approaches to the issues
involved."'
The insider trading enforcement program, however, prompted
reciprocal interest by the Commission and Congress in closer
scrutiny of the agency's program. From the Commission's
perspective, the growing success of its program in the early part of
the decade suggested the timing was right to seek additional
remedies with which to attack the problem. This, in the long run,
would enhance the agency's capacity to pursue its program with
even greater effectiveness. By the same token, the high degree of
visibility garnered by the SEC's insider trading program made it a
310. The SEC has rational basis for this fear. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33 (1975) (Congress' failure to adopt legislation requested
by the SEC is evidence that the existing statutes administered by the agency do not extend
to cover the conduct for which legislation was sought).
In two recent legislative proposals, the Commission has not hesitated to state that it
seeks new authority. See infra notes 408-09, 423-24, and accompanying text. In documents
accompanying the two proposals, however, the Commission does indicate that certain of its
proposals are intended to clarify existing agency authority. See Memorandum of The
Securities And Exchange Commission In Support of The International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989, at 2 (Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter SEC Memorandum
In Support (ISECA)] (proposing, among other things, a statutory provision "making dear
that the Commission, by rule, may provide for the disclosure of nonpublic documents");
Memorandum of The Securities And Exchange Commission In Support of The Securities
Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, at 2 (Jan. 18, 1989) [hereinafter SEC
Memorandum In Support (SLERA)] (proposing legislation to "clarify" the authority of
federal courts to bar persons from serving as an officer or director of a public company
upon application of SEC).
311. See supra note 9.
312. This is something akin to the theory about sleeping dogs.
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logical subject for even higher visibility hearings by both
Congressional oversight committees and those committees with
authority over securities legislation. As a result, the last six years of
the 1980s produced a flurry of legislative hearings, proposals, and
enactments.
a. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA or the
Sanctions Act)"' represented the Commission's first foray into the
insider trading legislative arena. The Sanctions Act authorizes the
federal district courts to impose a penalty, in addition to any
amounts ordered to be disgorged, of up to three times the wrongful
profits gained, or losses avoided, by illegal insider trading. t4
Additionally, the Sanctions Act increased the criminal penalty set
forth in Exchange Act Section 32(a) from $10,000 to $100,000 for
each violation of the Exchange Act. The Commission also acquired
expansive new administrative enforcement powers over individuals
alleged to have caused certain specified violations of the Exchange
Act.3
15
The Commission easily overcame its natural reluctance to seek
Congressional assistance in connection with ITSA. Under no
imaginable set of circumstances could the SEC have claimed it
already had the authority to seek, and that courts had the authority
to impose, a civil fine of up to three times the amount of the profits
gained, or losses avoided, from insider trading. Similarly, it took
little political acumen to recognize that most, if not all, Congressmen
313. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (Supp. IV 1986)).
314. See former Exchange Act § 21(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV
1986). This provision has been superseded by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub. L. No. 100-704, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS (102 Stat. 4677) (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). See infra notes 371-83 and accompanying text.
As amended, this treble damage provision implicitly ratifies the Commission's authority
to seek disgorgement in insider trading cases. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1989) ("Mhe actions authorized by this paragraph may be
brought in addition to any other actions that the Commission . .. [is] authorized to bring)
(emphasis supplied); see also Exchange Act Section 20A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1989) ("The total amount of damages imposed against any person [in related private
litigation] shall be diminished by the amounts, if any, that such person may be required to
disgorge, pursuant to a court order obtained at ,, instance of the Commission, in a proceeding
brought under section 21(d) of this title . - .") (emphasis supplied).
315. See generally McLucas & Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section
15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 145 (1985).
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would naturally oppose insider trading, and that the imposition of
increased penalties for insider trading violations was itself not a
highly controversial proposition. And finally, the Commission was at
little risk that the initiation of the legislative process would either
produce legislation with which it could not live, or that Congress
would not approve of the agency's enforcement program.
" 6
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the Sanctions Act,
however, was the provision that was not included. Conspicuously
absent from the Sanctions Act was a definition of the offense that
would invoke ITSA's new treble penalty."7
The Sanctions Act nevertheless marked a significant turning point
in the Commission's insider trading enforcement program. Prior to
this legislation, the law provided little, if any, deterrence to an
insider trader-at most, after a lengthy delay during which the
Commission first had to detect and investigate a suspicious
transaction, the defendant would merely be ordered to disgorge his
ill-gotten gains, as ancillary relief to a civil injunction. As previously
noted, this penalty hardly constituted a significant disincentive,
particularly when balanced against the possibility that the wrong-
doing might go undetected."'
316. In fact, the agency actually came close to being saddled with a definition of
"insider trading" that might have restricted future enforcement efforts. As noted below,
however, the agency was able to fend off those initiatives. See infra note 317 and
accompanying text.
317. This omission was no mere oversight. See Levine, Recent Insider Trading Sanctions,
19 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 185, 186 (1986) ("ITSA took so long to pass [partly because
of] the extensive debates at the Commission, in the securities bar, and in the securities
industry over whether the legislation should include a definition of insider trading . . .").
During congressional hearings on ITSA. Fedders presented arguments illustrating both
sides of the debate. Apparently, his arguments against a definition were more persuasive
than his arguments in favor of one-in pointing out the reasons that a definition could
be disadvantageous, Fedders observed, among other things, that (1) the offense could not
be defined in a way that would embrace all forms of wrongful insider trading; and (2) if
such a legislative definition were attainable, a dear, bright-line definition would only pave
the way for the development of schemes designed to fall just beyond the reach of the
prohibition. See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
35-37 (1984) (testimony of John M. Fedders). As noted, a definition was not included in
the statute.
318. Indeed, since all insider traders would enjoy the use of any illegal proceeds
during the time spent on the investigation, there may have been some room to profit from
wrongdoing even after disgorging the ill-gotten gains. This anomaly may have played a
role in a recent development at the SEC. Chairman Breeden is insisting that insider trading
settlements include the payment of pre-judgment interest. See Issue of Cease and Desist
Authority May Be Reexamined, Fienberg Indicates, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at
1631, 1631 n.43 (Nov. 3, 1989) (Breeden has indicated to the SEC staff that full
disgorgement of insider trading profits must include pre-judgment interest); see also SEC
Accuses Two of Breaking Trading Rules, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 1989, at F3, col. 2 ("Lindberg
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The adoption of the Sanctions Act substantially altered the
balance between the potential cost of insider trading and its potential
benefit. The Commission's ability to seek disgorgement of any illegal
profits plus a civil penalty of up to three times the amount
disgorged created significant disincentives against insider trading.
Furthermore, by applying this considerable penalty to those persons
who illegally tipped inside information to others, who used the
information to trade the affected securities,"'9 the Commission
expected that these sources of inside information would be somewhat
more circumspect in their communications. As with any law
enforcement program, it is impossible to determine the precise
number of people who have been deterred from illegal insider
trading since the adoption of the Sanctions Act.
The passage of ITSA was not entirely an unmixed blessing,
however. In its wake came the concomitant pressure for the agency
to develop an approach to future insider trading cases and the
circumstances under which the SEC would seek the payment of a
civil penalty, as well as the amount of such civil penalties. While the
agency's approach is subject to change, and a variety of
circumstances, it has become relatively clear that the SEC would seek
an ITSA penalty in virtually every insider trading case arising after
the effective date of the statute. 20 Moreover, the minimum amount
the SEC apparently will accept in settlement is (i) disgorgement of
all ill-gotten gains and (ii) at least a one-times ITSA penalty 21 If the
agency litigates, however, it invariably seeks an injunction,
disgorgement, and a three-times ITSA penalty.
22
The establishment of this approach comports with the
Commission's original intent in seeking the legislation-namely, it
enables the Commission to increase the stakes for those who engage
settled the matter by paying the SEC about $114,000.00-representing his illegal trading
profits plus interest . . .").
319. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 ("The [treble civil] penalty would
also be imposed upon persons who aid and abet violations by communicating ('tipping')
material nonpublic information, even if they do not trade").
320. If the defendant is impecunious, the agency may forego seeking some or all of
the ITSA penalty. See, e.g., Levine Settles Insider Trading Charges, Pleads Guilty to Perjury, Tax
Evasion, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 793 (June 6, 1986) (Dennis B. Levine,
who allegedly reaped $12.6 million in insider trading profits, disgorged only $11.6 million).
321. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, Civ. Action No. 86 Civ. 3726 (filed May 12, 1986).
322. Thus, if a defendant engaged in illegal insider trading, and made a profit of
$1 million, the SEC could commence an injunctive action against the defendant and seek
disgorgement of all ill-gotten profits (in this hypothetical, $1 million) and a civil penalty
in an amount up to three times the illegal profits (or another $3 million), for a total of $4
million.
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in illegal insider trading. The only problem with this result is that
money (as opposed to injunctive relief) is something over which
many defendants may be willing to fight. As a result, the passage of
ITSA portends an increase in the number of insider trading cases
the SEC may be compelled to litigate.
Directly related to the possibility that the passage of ITSA might
ultimately produce more contested insider trading litigation for the
SEC are the conditions under which that litigation will be required
to take place. Shortly after the passage of ITSA, a Supreme Court
decision in an unrelated area of the law made it mandatory that
SEC cases seeking some form of ITSA civil penalties be litigated
before a jury, if the defendant so requests."' Since the SEC was not
an active litigator prior to the passage of the statute,"' it most
assuredly lacks familiarity with the nuances and strategies of jury
trials. Even in the midst of the heightened media attention on
insider trading generated by the Dennis Levine insider trading
scandal, surveys of average Americans-the kind of individuals most
likely to serve on juries--suggested less than an unqualified
condemnation of insider trading."'
As a result, the requirement that the SEC try cases before a jury,
combined with the likelihood that those trials would not take place
in Washington, D.C.,"2 6 suggests that the passage of ITSA may
produce some highly particularized constraints for the SEC's
323. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (where monetary penalty is at
stake constitutional guarantee of trial by jury attaches).
324. As noted, see supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text, the Commission settles
the overwhelming percentage of its enforcement cases.
325. Indeed, a survey taken in the aftermath of the Levine and Boesky insider
trading settlements suggested an interesting contrast. On the one hand, a comparison of
August 1986 and November 1986 population samples showed that, by the November time
period, a larger percentage of the sample believed insider trading should be illegal (66% in
November, up from 52% in August), and a smaller percentage believed most people would
trade if they had a tip (78% in November, down from 82% in August), thus lending some
measure of credence to the general deterrent effect resulting from the recent high-profile
insider trading cases. See Business Week/Harris PoWl: Outsiders Aren't Upset by Insider Trading,
Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1986, at 34, col. 2.
On the other hand, however, there was a slight increase in the November percentage
of the sample who said they personally would trade if they had a tip on a stock (55% in
November, up from 53% in August). More significant, however, is the conclusion that, in
both periods, more than half of the sample population would have succumbed to the
temptation of insider trading if they thought they had a sure thing in the form of a tip.
Id.
326. Venue for most of these cases will be in the defendant's hometown, see 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1982), with a greater likelihood that the defendants will benefit from a trial
at home. See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
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enforcement program. The SEC's experience with ITSA, thus far,
suggests a mixed record in trying its cases in a different locale.'"
However ITSA is characterized, some prominent members of the
securities industry apparently were not deterred by the ITSA civil
penalties. 2  As the Wall Street insider trading scandal unfolded in
the wake of the May 12, 1986 arrest of Dennis B. Levine, the
co-head of mergers and acquisitions at Drexel, it became apparent
that insider trading had infected persons at the highest echelons of
the securities industry.
These revelations precipitated a renewed Congressional interest
in strengthening the government's enforcement capabilities against
insider trading and tipping.2 9 The ensuing legislative initiative
sought to enhance the government's ability to prosecute these cases
by clearly defining and prohibiting insider trading and tipping.
b. Insider rading Proscriptions Act of 1987
While the Sanctions Act demonstrated a congressional deter-
mination that illegal insider trading must be deterred, as noted
above, no consensus had emerged on a workable definition of the
offense or even on the desirability of such a definition.'" The Wall
Street insider trading scandal, however, changed the views of some
members of Congress (and, eventually, a majority of the
Commission) as to the propriety of criminally prosecuting an offense
that was neither expressly defined nor specifically prohibited."3 ' As
a result of the drafting efforts of an ad hoc committee of private
sector lawyers,3 in June 1987, Senators Riegle and D'Amato jointly
327. Compare SEC v. Clark, Litigation Release No. 12,111, 43 SEC Docket 1574, 1574
(W.D. Wash. May 31, 1989) ('The order by Judge Thomas S. Zilly is the first ITSA penalty
ordered paid by a defendant after trial of an insider trading case"), with SEC v. Ingram,
Litigation Release No. 11,739, 40 SEC Docket 1292, 1292 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 1988) ("The
court ordered Ingram to disgorge the commissions ... [but] declined to impose penalties
under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act and to enjoin Ingram from violating the securities
laws in the future on a finding that there was no reasonable likelihood of future securities
laws violations"). Other Commission ITSA cases are still in litigation. See, e.g., SEC v. Peters,
Litigation Release No. 11,950, 42 SEC Docket 789 (D. Kan. Dec. 28, 1988).
328. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
329. See Dingel Spins Yarn About Caracas Connection in Levine Case, SEC. Wx., Dec. 15,
1986, at 10 ("'we must make the punishment fit the crime,' said committee chairman John
Dingell ... 'Clearly, the unbelievable greed of some was not sufficiently deterred'").
330. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
331. See Definition of Insider Trading: Hearing Before the Subcomr. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Part I, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1987)
[hereinafter S. 1380 June Hearings] (remarks of Subcomm. Chairman Riegle).
332. The ad hoc committee was chaired by Mr. Pitt, at the request of Senators Riegle
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introduced the Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987
(Proscriptions Act or S. 1380) to remedy this deficiency."'
Congress' initiation of the drafting of the Proscriptions Act,"
combined with the processes by which that proposed legislation was
considered,3 5 are instructive of the marked changes in SEC
and D'Amato. Its members included: Lewis Black (then Chairman of the Committee on the
Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association's (ABA's) Section on
Corporate and Banking Laws); Theodore A. Levine (Chairman of the ABA's Subcommittee
on Civil Liability); Sam Scott Miller (Chairman of the ABA's Subcommittee on Broker-Dealer
Regulation); John F. Olson (Vice-Chairman of the ABA's Committee on the Federal
Regulation of Securities); Richard M. Phillips (Past Chairman of the ABA's Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee, and Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange's Legal
Advisory Committee Task Force on Insider Trading); Irving M. Pollack (former
Commissioner and Director of Enforcement of the SEC); and the Honorable Stanley
Sporkin (United States District Judge fbr the District of Columbia and former Director of
the SEC's Division of Enforcement). Ms. Shapiro served as the Reporter for the Ad Hoc
Senate Committee. See Oversight of the Securities & Exchange Commission and the Securities
Indus"): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) (remarks of Subcomm. Chairman Riegle).
333. In a shift of position, see supra note 317, the SEC endorsed the desirability (but
not the necessity) of a definition, and its Director of Enforcement conceded that S. 1380
was an improvement over existing law. See Definition of Insider Trading (Part II): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Com. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1987) [hereinafter S. 1380 August Hearings] ("I think [S. 1380]
would put us in a stronger position than current law") (testimony of Gary G. Lynch). On
August 3, 1987, the Commission submitted a revised legislative proposal to the Securities
Subcommittee to define and prohibit insider trading and tipping. Id. at 9-12 (Memorandum
of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the Insider Trading Proscriptions
Act of 1987). Ultimately, two reconciliations of the Commission's draft and the Ad Hoc
Committee's draft were prepared. For the text of these documents, see A Legislative Remedy,
supra note 3, at app. 1-2.
334. It is significant that the Senate initiated consideration of a legislative definition
for insider trading. Responding to two critical concerns, Senators Riegle and D'Amato made
plain their concern that (i) Congress address the problems identified by the Supreme Court
in its Chiarella decision, see supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text, so that future SEC
enforcement prosecutions could proceed unhampered; and (ii) the intensity with which both
the SEC and the criminal law enforcement authorities were pursuing insider trading cases
necessitated the development by Congress of a plain-English definition of the crime for
which individuals were being heavily fined and sentenced to increasingly longer jail terms.
See S. 1380 June Hearings, supra note 331, at 3 (Sen. D'Amato emphasizing the need to
respond to the Court's opinion in Chiarella); Id. at 2 (Sen. Riegle advocating plain-English
definition as a means of deterring insider trading abuses).
335. It was important to the Senate that the Ad Hoc Committee it established be
fairly representative of a diversity of viewpoints. See 5. 1380June Hearings, supra note 331,
at 1-2. In addition to the individuals who were actual members of the Committee, see supra
note 332, senior staff members of the SEC, id. at 12, and senior staff members of the
Senate Subcommittee on Securities attended and participated in the Committee meetings.
Id. In addition, once the Committee crafted a plain-English draft, it circulated copies of the
proposed legislative language to a wide variety of interested persons in the fields of
practicing lawyers, academics, banking, securities, accounting, and investment companies.
Id. at 12 (describing Ad Hoc Committee's methodology); id. at 43-44 (identifying persons
who commented on draft of S. 1380).
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enforcement practices that had occurred by 1987. Indeed, while the
legislation has not yet been reintroduced in the current session of
the Congress, portions of the proposed Proscriptions Act already
have been incorporated into law,38 and Senator Riegle (who now
chairs the full Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs) has indicated his intention to reintroduce the Proscriptions
Act during the current legislative session.3 Moreover, the high
degree of visibility garnered by the SEC's insider trading program
made it logical and appropriate that Congress would itself review
the Commissions activities as well as the courts' responses thereto,
and then reach its own conclusions regarding the wisdom of various
approaches and the need for various pieces of legislation.
Accordingly, although still only in the proposal stage, the
Proscriptions Act is an important indicant of both how Congress has
perceived the SEC's enforcement, program and the principal
component thereof over the last decade, and what possible changes
in the Commission's governing statutes may lie ahead over the next
decade that could have an important influence on the future
directions of the agency's enforcement program.
The introduction of the Proscriptions Act signaled Congress'
support for, and direction to continue, the agency's emphasis on
insider trading enforcement actions." ' In addition, the effort to
define and expressly prohibit insider trading served both to respond
to judicial uncertainty regarding the proper interpretation of insider
trading prohibitions and to disavow the notion that insider trading
promotes market efficiency"'
336. Compare S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16A(a) with Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (ITSFEA) § 2
(congressional findings to enable courts to-ascertain the goals of securities legislation) and
compare S. 1380 Proposed Section 16A(d) with ITSFEA § 21A(B)(2) (limitation on derivative
liability of person whose sole nexus to the insider trading of another is the employment
relationship); and compare S. 1380 Proposed Section 16A(e) with ITSFEA § 21A(c)
(Commission rulemaking authority to implement legislation); and compare S. 1380 Section
16A(f) with ITSFEA § 20A (private right of action).
337. It is unclear, however, whether the Commission will continue to support the
effort to enact a legislative definition of insider trading. Compare Breeden, the SEC Hopefu,
Just Breezes In, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 2, 1989, at 8, col. 2 ("Mr. Breeden made it clear that he
supports a [legislative] definition [of insider trading], saying enforcement targets should have
had 'some fair appreciation ... the conduct they were engaging in was across the line'")
with Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 4 (stating he was no longer certain that a legislative
definition is necessary, in view of success of insider trading enforcement program).
338. This mandate later would be reinforced with the adoption of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, discussed below. See infra notes
371-407 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 260 (1968); H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
229
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 7: 149, 1990
The eventual structure and substance of the Proscriptions Act
embodied several major predicates. First, the Act was intended to
serve as a vehicle for Congress to articulate precisely its assessment
of insider trading, and to give direction to the judiciary on how
insider trading prosecutions should be addressed. In essence, as
noted above,"4 this offered Congress the opportunity to address (and
redress) the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Chiarella"
and to articulate the theories on which insider trading should be
prohibited."' A principal feature of the statute, in this regard, was
its treatment of insider trading not as a species of fraud, but as a
species of wrongful conduct deemed detrimental to the marketplace
as a whole and unfair to those who trade in the marketplace."'
While some have since taken issue with this approach," it
responded to the major difficulty the Supreme Court has had in
resolving the two principal insider trading cases presented to it at
the beginning of the decade by the SEC-the Chiarella and Dirks
cases--that trading on the basis of an unfair informational advantage,
in which the person with inside information neither induces anyone
to trade the stock in issue nor in any way misleads anyone
concerning the value of that stock, does not look or sound like a
traditional fraud, and is tantamount to a victimless crime."5
(1966).
340. See supra notes 333 and accompanying text.
341. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
342. Much of this was accomplished in a series of Congressional findings set forth
at the beginning of the Proscriptions Act. This technique, although to a different effect, was
utilized in connection with ITSFEA. See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
343. See S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sss. § 16A(a)(1) (1987) ("The fairness, honesty,
and integrity of the Nation's securities markets are impaired [by insider trading]"); see also
A Legislative Remedy, supra note 3, at 11 ("this legislation would remove insider trading from
the rubric of fraud . . .").
344. See Need for Insider Trading Definition Has Diminished, Grundfest Says, SEC. WK.,
Feb. 1, 1988, at 6; Grundfest Expresses Preference for Case Law Insider Trading Definition, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 136 (Jan. 29, 1988).
345. See Post-Winans Insider Trading Law Debated by Lawyers at AL-ABA Seminar, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 329 (Mar. 4, 1988) (" 'Is insider trading really securities
fraud?'... [I]n Winans and cases like it, investors are not defrauded into making trading
decisions. Rather, their claim is that they did not have information to which they were not,
in fact, entitled"). As reprehensible as insider trading is, the persons who trade
contemporaneously with the insider trader are not truly the "victims" of that insider trader.
This is so because the information to which the insider trader is privy is not information
to which any investor was entitled. Moreover, those who trade contemporaneously with a
Chiarella or Dirks do so volitionally, not because anyone induced them to trade, but
because it was their judgment, or economic necessity, that compelled them to trade the
securities they traded, at the price they traded, at the time they traded. As a result, those
people who trade contemporaneously with an insider trader are not really injured by his
or her act; they really are complaining that the insider trader achieved a windfall to which
230
Securities Regulation by Enforcement
Second, the Proscriptions Act sought to codify precisely what
theories could be employed by the government in pursuing insider
trading cases. Congress had never considered or ratified the
misappropriation theory that was created out of whole cloth by the
government and endorsed by the lower courts.Hs Although the
theory has become widely accepted, it was felt that the Congress
should formally embrace it in order to legitimize the existing process
by which insider trading cases are prosecuted.- 7 The Proscriptions
Act started with the essential premise, moreover, that no insider
trading case that the government could legitimately have brought at
the time of the introduction of that statute should be foreclosed by
the adoption of S. 1380.1
Third, the Proscriptions Act was intended to craft a plain-English
definition of the crime of insider trading, so that all persons subject
to its terms could fairly understand what was prohibited and what
was not." A major concern of many securities professionals was that
the growing use of the misappropriation theory, without any
indication of its ultimate contours, exposed such professionals to a
variety of lawsuits at the behest of the government and others,
without fair warning or notice of all the conduct that might be
deemed illegalSw A concomitant concern of many lawyers was that
the failure to articulate with precision the contours of an insider
trading violation might subject future criminal prosecutions to
constitutional challenge.3
5'
Fourth, the Proscriptions Act reflected an attempt to structure the
prohibition against insider trading in a manner that would enable
the government to adapt its theories to a changing marketplace,
without sacrificing clarity or appropriate notice of the conduct
intended to be proscribed. Thus, the Proscriptions Act stated its
essential prohibitions in terms of wrongful trading and wrongful
tipping by persons with access to material nonpublic information,
and expanded the class of information that might constitute so-called
he or she was not entitled, by virtue of special access to material nonpublic information.
Id.
346. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
347. See S. 1380 June Hearings, supra note 331, at 18 n.5, 23-26, 30, 36 (joint
statement of Harvey L. Pitt and John F. Olson).
348. Id. at 17.
349. id. at 16-17; see also A Legislative Remedy, supra note 3. at 10-11.
350. See S. 1380June Hearings, supra note 331, at 23-26. The achievement of this goal
would cure an area of potential vulnerability on the criminal side of the insider trading
enforcement program by precluding due process arguments flowing from criminal
prosecutions of an undefined offense. Id. at 16.
351. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980).
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inside information beyond information about a single company's
securities to information about a class or group of securities, or the
market for such securities.'
Fifth, the proposed legislation specifically codified the dual evils
inherent in insider trading-wrongful trading and wrongful tipping.
In statutorily addressing the problem of wrongful tipping of infor-
mation for the first time, the draft statute attempted to place liability
for illegal tipping on a sounder and express statutory footing, and
to correct the problems that had arisen by virtue of the Dirks
decision's adoption of the nettlesome and rl-conceived "personal
benefits" test.ss
Sixth, the Proscriptions Act attempted to respond to the
phenomenon of takeover-related trading, by adopting special
352. See S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16A(b)(2) (1987). A simple hypothetical
demonstrates the reach of this concept:
Assume that A is a lawyer, and that his firm specializes in bankruptcy work. A's firm
is asked to handle the still-secret proposed bankruptcy filing of XYZ Corp., a major
widget manufacturer. A is assigned to work on the project. A is an astute follower
of the widget industry, and recognizes immediately that the bankruptcy filing of
XYZ will leave only PQR Corp. as the major domestic source of widgets. A buys
PQR stock before any announcement of XYZ's intention to file a bankruptcy
petition.
Under current law, there exists significant doubt whether the Commission could prosecute
A for illegal insider trading, since current concepts of materiality are restricted to the
particular stock in question. See A Legislative Remedy, supra note 3, at 19. Under the
Proscriptions Act, this conduct would be dearly prohibited. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 16A(b)(2) (1987).
353. In addressing tippee liability, the Supreme Court in Dirks set forth the following
standard: "the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his breach. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders.
And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach [by the tippee]." 463 U.S.
at 662. Thus, to prevail under the rule of Dis, the government must prove that the tippee
(a) "tipped" the information in order to receive a personal benefit; or (b) was bound by an
independent duty to speak before trading on the basis of the tipped information.
In order to meet this burden, the government has been forced to include rather
titillating allegations in its complaints. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827,
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing the "private,
personal, non-business relationship" between two male co-defendants); see also SEC v.
Thayer, Litigation Release No. 10,251, 29 SEC Docket 730 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1984)
(allegations of "private personal relationship" to support charge that tipper benefited from
his mistress/tippee's trades); and undertake a search for independent duties. See, e.g., SEC
v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766-67 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (corporate outsider who overhears
an insider discuss material, nonpublic infbrmation has no relationship with, and therefore
owes no duty to, shareholders of insider's company).
The Proscriptions Act would relieve this problem by establishing as the predicate for
tipper liability the facts that the insider conveyed the material, nonpublic information and
that the tippee's trade was reasonably foreseeable. See A Legislative Remedy, supra note 3, at
21-22.
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prohibitions against the selective tipping of tender offer-related
information for the purpose of facilitating the successful acquisition
of the target company.5
Seventh, the Proscriptions Act attempted to address the difficult
problem of vicarious liability by distinguishing between employers
who were, in effect, victimized by errant employees and those
employers who failed adequately to supervise their employees or
establish a meaningful set of guidelines and procedures to preclude
illegal trading. Thus, the statute expressly recognized that the mere
existence of an employer-employee relationship, without more, could
not give rise to vicarious liability for an employer who had the
misfortune of employing a venal employee who engaged in illegal
insider trading."' Nonetheless, the Proscriptions Act embodied the
SEC's philosophy that greater liability must apply to those who
employ or control individuals with access to inside information, to
stimulate increased vigilance in the business community and to
promote more effective self-regulation in the securities industry.
56
Finally, the Proscriptions Act sought to clarify the murky area of
private rights of action by providing an express cause of action for
persons who trade contemporaneously with, but on the other side
of, an insider trader.57 Although long endorsed by the Commission
(and accepted by the courts) as a necessary supplement to the
Commission's own enforcement program,' private remedies were
relegated to second-class status by virtue of the fact that they were
required to be implied by the judiciary, instead of emanating from
express directives of Congress. In the four decades following the
first judicial recognition of a private remedy for violations of Rule
lOb-5,'-9 the Supreme Court first expanded and encouraged such
remedies, and then changed direction and began to curtail and
restrict them.- Particularly in the absence of a meaningful
354. See S. 1380, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 16A(c)(2) (1987). Section 16(A)(c)(2) was
designed to prohibit what was perceived as the practice of corporate raiders (or their allies)
tipping information about their plans to put companies "into play." See S. 1380 June
Hearings, supra note 331. at 32 (joint statement of Harvey L. Pitt and John F. Olson).
355. See S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16A(d) (1987).
356. The legislative process provided the Commission with the forum for advocating
its position that controlling persons and employers of insider traders should be derivatively
liable for those violations unless the only nexus between the two parties was the
circumstance of employment or control.
357. See S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16A(f) (1987).
358. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964).
359. The first private right of action fbr a violation of Rule 10b-5 was recognized in
1946. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
360. Compare Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)
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delineation of the precise wrong inflicted by insider trading, the
courts experienced difficulty in articulating a coherent approach to
the question of private remedies."'
The Proscriptions Act did not become law. Although strongly
supported in the Senate, two separate events relegated the legislation
to continued proposal status. First, Congressman John Dingell,
Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
(which has jurisdiction over the SEC and the federal securities laws),
opposed a definition of insider trading. According to Congressman
Dingell, such a definition would only enhance the ability of clever
lawyers to argue that the insider trading of their clients did not
violate the law.16
(Section 10(b) applied to actions of bank employees who failed to disclose to sellers that
they were in a position to obtain financial gain from sales of stock in corporation managing
assets of American Indian tribe); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971) (corporate receiver allowed to pursue private cause of action under Section
10(b) of the Securities Act against officer who perpetrated a fraud against the corporation);
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966) (derivative suit brought by
shareholder based on violations of the federal securities laws by corporation's officers and
directors); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (right of action exists for private
parties under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act) with TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (limited private right of action exists under Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 for rescission; that Act does not allow for the implication of additional
private remedies); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied
private cause of action arises from violations of Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offerors have no right to
maintain a private cause of action under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act even where the
fraudulent actions of successful offeror may have frustrated efforts of defeated offeror);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty by majority
shareholder in absence of deception, misrepresentation or nondisclosure, does not violate
Section 10(b) of Exchange Act or Rule lOb-(5)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (Section 10(b) liability may not be imposed on the basis of negligent conduct alone);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (offeree defrauded out of
contractual right to purchase securities has no standing to bring a private cause of action).
361. The companion cases of Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984), and United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981). cert. denied. 464 U.S. 863 (1983) illustrate this point. These cases were both decided
by the same court, and both arose out of the same conduct. In the former case, the court
held that Mr. Newman could be incarcerated and fined for illegally misappropriating
material, nonpublic information about a variety of stocks for his personal trading purposes.
In the latter case, however, the court held that those persons who traded
contemporaneously with Newman lacked standing and so could not recover any of the
alleged losses they suffered, or any alleged windfall Newman received as a result of his
trades. It thus became the law in the Second Circuit that it was easier to send a man to
jail for insider trading than it was to require him to recompense those individuals who
traded contemporaneously with him.
362. See Enatment of Insider Trading Bill Unlikely this Year, SEC Official Says, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9. at 324, 324 (Mar. 4, 1988) ("Dingell opposes legislation to
define insider trading because he believes it would narrow the SEC's ability to bring
enforcement actions, [SEC Chairman Ruder's Executive Assistant Linda] Feinberg said").
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This opposition did not abate after the Proscriptions Act received
the endorsement of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, 6" the Director of the SEC's Division of
Enforcements" and, ultimately, the Commission itself.'6' In essence,
Congressman Dingell's opposition ran directly counter to, and gave
further fuel for, the arguments in favor of adopting a plain-English
definition, since Congressman Dingell's stated concern was that a
plain statement of the offense would put people on notice of
precisely what conduct was, and what conduct was not, violative of
the law.
The second major event that eviscerated the urgency prompting
consideration of the Proscriptions Act was the Supreme Court's
resolution of the so-called Winans case.' 6" R. Foster Winans, a
reporter and columnist for the Wall Street Journal, was indicted by
the government for tipping collaborators about forthcoming Journal
articles on specific companies in the widely-read and followed
"Heard on the Street" column that Winans principally authored.
The case was seen as a major challenge to the misappropriation
theory, and the Supreme Court's decision to review Winans'
conviction created an air of expectation that the conviction might be
reversed and the misappropriation theory circumscribed or rejected.
Instead, dividing four-to-four, the Court ultimately expressed no
view on that theory vis-a-vis the federal securities laws. 67 Justice
Powell, who was widely expected to oppose the application of the
misappropriation theory to securities fraud cases, did not participate
in the decision, and the remaining justices split evenly, without
elaboration on the subject. The principal conclusion drawn from this
decision, however, was a weakened perception that legislation was
363. See SEC Counsel Says Commission to Offer Legislation to Define Wrongful Information
Use, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA), at A-10 (June 25, 1987) ("Speaking at the annual dinner
of the New York Financial Writers Association .... Giuliani said, 'From a criminal point
of view, [S. 1380] would-unless I'm missing something-it would embrace all the things
that we think we have to do'").
364. See S. 1380 August Hearings, supra note 333, at 19 (testimony of Gary G. Lynch).
365. See The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(Dec. 15, 1987) (SEC Memorandum in Support of Legislation).
366. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
367. The Court did embrace the misappropriation theory for purposes of the mail
and wire fraud statutes. Id. at 28. Its willingness to do so left open the possibility that the
theory might apply to securities fraud as well, although its different treatment of securities
fraud suggested that at least four members of the Court perceived a difference between
securities fraud on the one hand, and mail and wire fraud on the other. See Pitt, Winans
Case: The Limits of Securities Law, Legal Times, Nov. 23, 1987, at 18.
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needed to assist the SEC, a perception that, in part, may have
motivated the Commission's own support for the Proscriptions Act."
The Commission's misappropriation theory thus survived a major
Supreme Court challenge. While not endorsed by the Court, the
theory also was not rejected. As a result, the Commission remained
free to pursue cases on the basis of the misappropriation theory
until another Supreme Court challenge could be mounted."6 Given
the high degree of visibility and acclaim for the Commission's insider
trading program that had evolved, Congress was unlikely to adopt
insider trading legislation unless it would enhance the Commission's
enforcement efforts. Since there was no longer any compelling fear
that the courts would require such legislation, the Proscriptions Act
faded from public attention, and Congress turned to other legislative
proposals more directly supportive of the Commission's program."' 0
c. The Insider TRading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
Against the backdrop of a continuous stream of headlines about
the Wall Street scandal, insider trading and tipping continued to
preoccupy Congress, resulting in the introduction and rapid passage
of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 (ITSFEA).'71 Despite Congress' reluctance to define the crime
368. See SEC Submits Draft Legislative Histo" to Accompany Insider Trading Proposal, 20
Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 252, 252 (Feb. 19, 1988) ("Grundfest conditioned
his support for the SEC's November proposal on the SEC submitting acceptable language
that could serve as legislative history for an insider trading definition bill"); Grundfest
Expresses Preference for Case Law Insider Trading Definition, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 4, at 136, 136 (Jan. 29, 1988) ("Securities and Exchange Commissioner Joseph
Grundfest ... said that he is leaning strongly in favor of relying on case-by-case
development of insider trading law rather than enacting either of the two major pending
legislative proposals to define insider trading offenses").
369. See Pitt, The Limits of Frau& An Analysis of the Winans Case, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1988,
at 14.
370. While the Commission's new Chairman has advised the Senate that he supports
the adoption of the Proscriptions Act, he also has expressed reservations about the need for
such legislation at this time. See Confirmation of Nomination for Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Before the Senate Banking Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989)
(statement of Richard C. Breeden). But see Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 4, in which
Breeden observed that it was no longer clear to him whether, in view of the Commission's
great success in recent insider trading cases, a legislative definition was, in fact, necessary.
371. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on
August 2, 1988, see H.R. 5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. E2583-E2585 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1988), and was passed by a vote of 410 to 0, on September 13, 1988. See H.R.
5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC H7570 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988). The Senate
first considered the bill, on October 21, 1988, in the waning hours of the 100th Congress,
and voted to approve the next morning. See H.R. 5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
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of insider trading, ITSFEA reflected that body's absolute lack of
hesitation to increase the sanctions associated with this as yet
undefined crime."'
ITSFEA reflects Congress' overriding concerns about insider
trading, that is, that (1) harsher deterrents were needed to prevent
insider trading and other illegal securities transactions; and
(2) expanded secondary liability would promote increased supervision
and self-regulation, both among regulated securities professionals,
and in the business community and related service industries that
generate or otherwise control confidential business information.
ITSFEAs most dramatic changes to the laws governing insider
trading include: substantial increases in the civil and criminal
penalties associated with the offense;"'3 the imposition of an
affirmative obligation on registered securities professionals to put
into place and enforce policies to "prevent" the "misuse" by their
employees of material, nonpublic information concerning publicly
traded securities; 74 the expansion of the derivative liability of persons
who employ or otherwise "control" persons who have violated the
federal securities laws;3 75 and the creation of both an express private
remedy on behalf of persons who traded contemporaneously with an
insider trader,7 and an express invitation to the judiciary to imply
additional causes of action as appropriate.3 ITSFEA also broadens
the SEC's ability to facilitate investigations by foreign enforcement
authorities. 78
As noted, the penalty provisions of ITSFEA reflect Congressional
concern that, notwithstanding the treble civil penalty provision of the
Sanctions Act, the potential risk associated with insider trading did
not sufficiently outweigh the perceived benefits. 79 To address this
REC. S17218-S17222 (Oct. 21, 1988). The law became effective January 3, 1989, see 135
CONG. REC. H29 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989).
372. See generally A Legislative Remedy, supra note 3, at 7.
373. See Exchange Act §§ 21A(a)(1), 32(a), 15 U.S.CA §§ 78uA(1), 78ff(a) (West
Supp. 1989).
374. See Exchange Act § 15(o, 15 U.S.CA. § 780() (West Supp. 1989); Advisers Act
§ 204A, 15 U.S.CA § 80b-4A (West Supp. 1989).
375. See Exchange Act § 21A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-l(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
376. See Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(a) (West Supp. 1989).
377. See Exchange Act § 20A(d), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(d) (West Supp. 1989).
378. See Exchange Act § 21(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
379. In other words. Congress sought to assure that the risk of detection,
disgorgement of profits and payment of a penalty, would sufficiently outweigh, and
therefore deter, the potential benefits of an undetected violation, that is, the substantial
profits that flow from the use of an unfairly gained informational advantage.
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concern, ITSFEA preserves the treble penalty framework first
introduced in the Sanctions Act.380
Perhaps the most significant deterrent effect of the law, however,
appears in the criminal penalties for insider trading, which were
increased tenfold, from $100,000 to $1,000,000, for individuals, and
five times, from $500,000 to $2,500,000, for entities."' ITSFEA also
doubles the maximum term of imprisonment for criminal violations
of the Exchange Act from five to ten years.82
In addition, ITSFEA substantially increases the civil and criminal
penalties that courts may impose upon those who employ persons
who have engaged in insider trading and tipping. Thus, it authorizes
the federal district courts, at the request of the SEC, to impose upon
such employers a civil penalty of up to $1,000,000, or three times
the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the employee's
violation, whichever is greater.83
380. See Exchange Act § 21A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-l(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
381. See Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West Supp. 1989). The
Commission was also required by this section of the bill to submit to each house of
Congress any recommendations the agency believes appropriate concerning the extension
of its authority to impose civil penalties or administrative fines. See ITSFEA § 3(c). The
agency's responsive proposal, the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, is
discussed infra notes 408-22 and accompanying text.
382. See Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West Supp. 1989). This sanction
is applicable to any violation of the Exchange Act, and its express purpose was to persuade
judges to increase their sentences. See HousE ITSFEA REPORT, supra note 131, at 23
(emphasis supplied), which states that
The Committee's interest in the maximum jail term is an explicit congressional
statement of the heightened seriousness with which insider trading and other
securities fraud offenses should be viewed. Although the legislation does not include
an explicit mandatory minimum sentence the Committee believes in the strongest possible
manner that courts should impose jail tenrs for the commission of these crimes, and erpects that
raising the ceiling will increase the certainty of substantial prison sentences.
383. See Exchange Act § 21A(a)(3), 15 U.S.CA § 78u-l(a)(3) (West Supp. 1989). For
a court to impose a penalty upon a controlling person, the Commission must establish that
the controlling person (i) knew or recklessly disregarded that the controlled person "was
likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the violation[,] and [(ii)] failed to take
appropriate steps to prevent" the conduct. Exchange Act § 21A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-
l(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989). This language may encourage a fair degree of hindsight
judgments.
The legislation purports to carve out a safe harbor from this stringent derivative liability
by providing that
[n]o person shall be subject to a penalty under [this provision] solely by reason of
employing another person who is subject to a penalty under such subsection, unless
such employing person is liable as a controlling person under paragraph (1) ...
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This provision underscores Congress' intent to impose greater
accountability on employers and controlling persons for the violations
of subordinates, suggesting that the 1990s will witness a redoubled
effort toward self-imposed codes of conduct, either by affirmative
obligation (for regulated entities) or in an effort to build a record
showing that the employer took every reasonable step to safeguard,
and prevent the misuse of, information in its custody.'s
The heightened focus on vicarious liability further evidences the
severely circumscribed ability of controlling persons to defend against
liability for the alleged violations of their controlled persons. The
new provision, which apparently eliminates the so-called good faith
defense for controlling persons as set forth in Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act,sss now would prevent controlling persons from
escaping secondary liability, if the Commission can show that the
person "knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such controlled
person was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the violation and
Section 78t(a) of this title shall not apply to actions under subsection (a) of this
section.
Exchange Act § 21A(b)(2), 15 U.S.CA § 78u-l(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989). In fact, it is not
clear how helpful this safe harbor will actually prove to be, since it does permit someone
who supervises or employs a wrongdoer to be held liable if the employer recklessly
disregards the fact that the employee was likely to violate the law, and if the employer
failed to take appropriate steps to prevent the violation before it occurred. See Exchange
Act § 21A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
In the case of brokers and dealers or investment advisers registered with the SEC. a
controlling person can be fined severely if the SEC establishes that the employer knowingly
or recklessly failed to implement procedures otherwise required under the federal securities
laws, where the failure to do so "substantially contributed to or permitted the occurrence
of the act or acts constituting the violation." Exchange Act § 21A(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78u-1(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1989). And, regardless of whether an insider trading violation
has taken place, registered brokers, dealers, and investment advisers are required to
maintain procedures "to prevent the misuse ... of material, nonpublic information" by
their employees. See Exchange Act § 15(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(f) (West Supp. 1989); Advisers
Act § 204A, 15 U.S.CA § 80b-4a (West Supp. 1989).
384. See generaUy Corporate Codes, sup=, note 5. It should also be noted that a
controlling person can be an individual well below the level of an actual employer.
Consistent with the origins of ITSFEA. the critical term "controlling person" is not defined
in the statute, but apparently is intended to include "any entity or person with the power
to influence or control the activities of another person." See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1988). This suggests that mid- and lower-level supervisors may be liable
for the conduct of those who report to, and are influenced by, them.
385. See Exchange Act § 21A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989)
("Section 20(a) of this tide shall not apply to actions under subsection (a) of this section").
Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982), provides that controlling persons are
subject to joint and several liability for the Exchange Act violations of their employees (or
other "controlled" persons), "unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation . ..."
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failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts before they
occurred ....
This language, however, could plausibly be construed to hold a
controlling person accountable for many actions taken by an
employee; in the case of broker-dealers, portfolio managers, and
other securities professionals, the trade itself arguably comprises the
"act ... constituting the violation." So construed, this provision
could render broker-dealers and similarly circumstanced employers
virtual insurers of their employees' acts. Such a reading would
depart from the prior statutory framework, which permitted a good
faith defense for controlling persons."8 7
Moreover, it is unclear precisely what would constitute
"appropriate steps" to prevent a violative act before it occurred. This
provision could, for example, be construed as imposing a heavy
obligation to prevent insider trading and tipping violations by
controlled persons. That goal is unattainable. The imposition of
substantial monetary penalties might incrementally improve the
performance of some controlling persons, but could not prevent all
violations. If the term "appropriate steps" is read expansively,
effectively requiring the complete prevention of insider trading by
subordinates, liability for employers and controlling persons under
ITSFEA would be greatly expanded.
However these provisions are construed, they fundamentally
misperceive the role of most employers who have been involved in
the insider trading scandal to date. Far from being responsible for
their employees' violations of the law, and far from failing to take
steps to prevent those violations, most of the employers who have
had the unfortunate experience of employing someone who trades
on inside information are in fact the only true victims, in an
otherwise victimless crime, of their employee's defalcations."'
386. Exchange Act § 21A(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
387. As previously noted, supra note 385, ITSFEA does specify that controlling
persons shall not be liable to private plaintiffs based solely upon employment or control of
a person who violates the Exchange Act. In the context of private litigation, controlling
persons may still invoke the good faith defense contained in Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act. See Exchange Act § 20A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(b)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
If such a corporation is found not to have taken "appropriate steps" to prevent the
violation, however, liability will ensue, and the good faith defense contained in Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act is not available in government prosecutions. (This provision will only
be relevant, of course, when someone already has violated the law; an employee's violation
could be asserted by zealous prosecutors, however, as evidenceof whether "appropriate
steps to prevent" the violations were in fact taken).
388. Ironically, ITSFEA might well have altered the results in the Winans case. The
Supreme Court went to great lengths to indicate that the Wall Street Journal (the Journal)
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Consistent with the Congressional goal of imposing greater
accountability on those who employ insider traders, ITSFEA imposes
on registered brokers, dealers, and investment advisers a new
obligation to "establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed . . . to prevent the misuse . . . of
material, nonpublic information" by their employees."8 9 Similarly, new
Section 204A added to the Advisers Act by ITSFEA would impose
an analogous obligation upon registered investment advisers.13 0
These provisions reflect an increased emphasis on self-regulation,
by imposing substantial liability on those regulated employers who
fail to carry out their new supervisory responsibilities. Presumably,
these provisions are enforceable in administrative proceedings and
may, in addition to other remedies available to the SEC, result in
limitations on the business activities these entities are allowed to
perform, if they are found not to have developed adequate
mechanisms to prevent insider trading violations by errant
employees.3 91
Apart from SEC enforcement powers, ITSFEA also adopts the
idea, first developed in the Proscriptions Act,'" of granting private
litigants an express right of action against persons who engage in
had been victimized by Winans and his cohorts, and that proprietary information belonging
to the Journal had wrongfully been purloined by the Journal's employees. See Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987). For his part, Winans indicated that he really did not
know the Journal had a policy against misuse of theJoumal's inside information, and if such
a policy existed, it was not enforced. See R. Foster Winans, Remarks at the National Joint
Conference on White-Collar Crime, Aug. 31, 1987, at 5 ("seeing the policy in black and
white . . . might have sensitized me to the issue so that when the offer was made [to sell
information concerning his impending Wall Street Journal columns], maybe I would have
hesitated just long enough for the temptation to pass"). If Winans' statements were credited,
under ITSFEA both Winans and the Wall Street Journal could be prosecuted for illegal insider
trading.
389. See Exchange Act § 15(0, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(f) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis
supplied), and Advisers Act § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4A (West Supp. 1989). Yet, while
seeking to expand the accountability of such persons, new Section 15(f) of the Exchange
Act may in fact narrow the class of persons within its reach; in mandating that registered
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers establish, maintain, and enforce procedures to
prevent the miswse of material, nonpublic information in violation of this title, this provision
could impose on the government the burden of having to prove that a wrongdoer
subjectively "used" material, nonpublic information, rather than having traded while in
possession of such information.
390. See Advisers Act § 204A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4A (West Supp. 1989).
391. Cf. Exchange Act § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982) (authorizing the
Commission to censure, limit the activities of, suspend or bar registered brokers and dealers
for failure reasonably to supervise their employees with a view to preventing violations of
the Exchange Act); Advisers Act § 203(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (West Supp. 1989) (same
as to investment advisers with respect to employee violations of the Advisers Act).
392. See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
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insider trading, provided that the private plaintiffs traded the
affected securities contemporaneously with, and on the opposite side
of, the alleged insider trader."' This express right of action gives
private litigants a potent weapon against which there appear to be
few limiting defenses.'
In an effort to encourage even broader judicial recognition of
implied remedies for alleged insider trading, ITSFFA also contains
a provision negating any inferences that its legislative scheme
predudes private plaintiffs from successfully maintaining other,
implied causes of action to recover damages sustained by virtue of
a violation of any provision of the Exchange Act."' This broad
recognition of other, implied rights of recovery is intended to
enhance the deterrents to illegal insider trading by encouraging
active private litigation.13
Significantly, Congress did not limit its attention to domestic
enforcement issues or the creation of domestic private rights of
actions. ITSFEA also broadens the Commission's ability to conduct
investigations on behalf of, and for the sole benefit of foreign
securities authorities, without regard to whether the conduct at issue
would constitute a violation of United States law."97 As noted above,
the Commission increasingly has promoted cross-border cooperation
in securities law enforcement and oversight matters among nations
that share an interest in fostering honest capital markets.s?8
Heretofore, the Commission has largely been the recipient of
cooperative efforts by foreign governments.99  This provision
of ITSFEA ensures that the Commission will have the capability to
respond to reciprocal requests.
393. See Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(a) (West Supp. 1989).
394. For example, there is no requirement that the injury sustained as a result of
the alleged violation breach any duty owed to the plaintiff. Moreover, the provision
authorizing the court to award "appropriate equitable relief" offers no guidance as to what
is contemplated, and so could be read as an extremely broad grant of authority to impose
civil liability.
395. See Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1(d) (West Supp. 1989).
396. Private rights of action under ITSFEA are governed by a five-year statute of
limitations. See Exchange Act § 20A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(b)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
The SEC recently filed an Amicus Biief in Lehman v. Aktiebolaget Electrolux (U.S.
June 26, 1989) (No. 88-1114), asserting that all Rule lOb-5 private actions should be
governed by a five-year statute of limitations, consistent with the statute of limitations
applicable to SEC penalty actions, see Exchange Act § 21(d)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-
l(d)(2)(D) (1982 & West Supp. 1989), and the newly-created private rights of action, see
Exchange Act Section 20A(b)(4), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(b)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
397. See Exchange Act § 21(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
398. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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Plainly, the Commission's continued ability to seek helpful
information from other countries in international market oversight
and law enforcement matters will likely correspond to its ability to
extend such cooperation to other countries. Prior to the adoption of
this provision, the Commission did not possess the authority to
conduct investigations or otherwise gather information for the sole
benefit of foreign securities regulators. Thus, this section of ITSFEA
not only fills an important gap in the SEC's power and recognizes
the benefit of reciprocal assistance among financial regulators, but
assures that the agency can continue to expand its efforts in the
international arena well into the future.
While the grant of additional enforcement authority to the SEC
may prove salutary, ITSFEA suffers from its failure to adopt a
definition of the underlying offenses of insider trading and tipping.
This omission is particularly troublesome in view of the significant
increase in penalties authorized by ITSFEA. The failure to include
a definition of the underlying substantive offenses disregards the
conclusions of a report commissioned by Congressman Dingell,
Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and
issued by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The report
examined the insider trading enforcement programs administered by
the Commission, the Department of Justice (Justice), and the various
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that oversee member
broker-dealers."
After analyzing evidence secured by, and interviewing personnel
from, the SEC, other federal law enforcement agencies, and selected
SROs, ' the GAO concluded that "[a]dditional investigative
methods . . . along with changes in the securities laws, such as
defining insider trading, may be necessary if the goal is stronger
penalties for this violation."' 2 Indeed, the GAO Report further
observed that a statutory definition of insider trading might be
400. see UNITED STATES GENERAL AccOuNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES: SECURITIES REGULATION-EFFORTS TO DETECT. INVESTIGATE, AND
DETER INSIDER TRADING [hereinafter GAO REPORT] 14-17 (1988).
The GAO REPORT resulted from hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations in December 1986 concerning the then-recent revelations of significant
insider trading schemes. See Securities and Exchange Commission and Insider Trading: Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The GAO's mandate was "to review the approaches used to
deal with insider trading and identify alternatives that might lead to improved detection,
investigation, and prosecution." GAO REPoRr, supra, at 2.
401. Id. at 17.
402. Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied).
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required in order for the "relevant provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 [to] meet the constitutional principle of
'specificity' required of criminal law."" °
Viewed in its entirety, ITSFEA moves the federal securities
regulatory framework in a direction that is both dangerous for the
unwary and unforgiving of those who suffer the misfortune of
employing an insider trader. In essence, the new securities
regulatory scheme increases supervisory responsibilities for employers
and supervisors,4 14 and fortifies these provisions with steep increases
in the applicable dviP" and criminal"6 penalties. At the same time,
the legislation erodes certain defenses formerly available to those
persons who, by definition, may be secondarily liable for the acts of
other persons over whom they may in fact exercise little, if any,
meaningful control."°7
d. The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989
On January 18, 1989, the Commission submitted to Congress a
legislative proposal to enhance its ability to enforce the provisions of
the various federal securities laws. This proposal responded to the
403. Id. at 58; see also id. at 61, 63. The authors endorse the GAO's conclusion in
this regard.
404. See supra notes 384-91 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 383. In a sense, the company that employs a truly venal person
exercises virtually no meaningful "control" over his wrongdoing. For example, the investment
banker who calls his Bahamian broker from pay phones and conceals his illicit trades
(based, of course, upon information pilfered from his place of business and his clients)
simply cannot be thwarted by even the best compliance department.
Yet, the employer firm could well face onerous penalty proceedings should the
government choose to pursue the matter. (Of course, the firm would not be subject to
penalty liability in private claims since ITSFEA preserves the peculiarly governmental
feature of that provision). Thus, if a firm employs a broker who executes a small illegal
trade, for a total profit of $2,500, the firm could be held liable for up to $1 million in civil
penalties, and $2.5 million in criminal fines. While the likelihood that such a fine and
penalty would actually be imposed is remote, it is certainly possible and unnecessarily harsh.
Nevertheless, even if substantial civil and criminal liability (at the behest of the
government) is not necessarily a preordained result in insider trading cases under ITSFEA,
the ramifications of private litigation should not be overlooked, in light of the adoption of
ITSFEA. As previously noted, private plaintiffs now have their choice between an express
action (for contemporaneous traders) and/or an implied action (expressly sanctioned by
Congress). See Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(a) (West Supp. 1989) (express
private remedy for contemporaneous traders); Exchange Act § 20A(d), 15 U.S.CA
§ 78t-l(d) (West Supp. 1989) (other express or implied private remedies not prohibited).
This facilitation of private litigation necessarily encompasses the likelihood that private
litigation, even if not meritorious, will have a settlement value to busy corporations and
their senior executives.
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directive in ITSFEA that the Commission review, and forward to
Congress recommendations for enhancing, its enforcement
capabilities."
The resulting proposal, the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies
Act of 1989 (Remedies Act), °9 represented a bold effort by the
Commission to expand its enforcement powers. If this measure had
been enacted as originally drafted, the Commission would have
acquired sweeping authority over corporate officials that would
effectively have permitted the Commission to decide who could, and
who could not, serve as an officer or director of a public company.
Additionally, the Act would have authorized the imposition of
substantial civil and administrative fines that would have been
applicable to any violation of the four securities statutes affected by
the Remedies Act.""
408. See H.R. 5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(b)(2), (c)(l).
409. H.R 975, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H270 (daily ed. Feb 9, 1989).
410. The proposed legislation included the following broad categories of provisions
that would have amended the Securities Act, Exchange Act, Company Act, and Advisers Act:
1. Authorization for the Commission to seek, and the federal district
courts to impose, against any person found to have violated any
provision of the federal securities laws (or any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder), a bar against serving as an officer or
director of a public company. Id. at § 101 (Proposed Securities Act
Amendment), § 202(1) (Proposed Exchange Act Amendment),
§ 302(1) (Proposed Company Act Amendment), § 402(1) (Proposed
Advisers Act Amendment);
2. Authorization for the Commission to seek, and the federal district
courts to impose, civil penalties in connection with any violation of
the federal securities laws or any rule or regulation promulgated
thereunder. Id. at § 102(a) (Proposed Securities Act Amendment),
§ 202(a) (Proposed Exchange Act Amendment). § 302(a) (Proposed
Company Act Amendment), § 402(2) (Proposed Advisers Act
Amendment). The various fine provisions specify a maximum of the
greater of $100,000 for individuals ($500,000 for entities) or the
gross amount of pecuniary gain associated with the violation; see id.
at §§ 102, 202, 302, 402. The statute does not define the concept of
pecuniary gain;
3. Authorization for the Commission to impose in administrative
proceedings pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(c)(4), against any
person found to have violated specified provisions of the federal
securities laws or any rule or regulation promulgated under those
provisions, a bar against serving as an officer or director of a public
company. Id. at § 201, see supra note 315 and accompanying text;
and
4. Authorization for the Commission to impose in administrative
proceedings a monetary penalty against any person found to have
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On February 1, 1990, the Securities and Exchange Commission
submitted proposals to amend S. 647 which, if adopted, would grant
the Commission (i) administrative authority to issue cease-and-desist
orders, including temporary orders; (ii) the right to obtain grand
jury information, upon judicial application by a prosecutor, if the
information sought to relates to potential securities law violations;
(iii) administrative authority to impose equitable remedies, such as
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and an accounting, against any
person; and (iv) the authority to compel a federal district court to
impose minimum fines for noncompliance with certain insider
reporting requirements under the Exchange Act. In return for these
new powers, the Commission concomitantly proposed to (i) delete
those portions of S. 647 that would have enabled the agency
administratively to bar certain persons from serving as officers or
directors of public companies; (ii) limit the power of the federal
courts to bar persons from serving as officers and directors of public
companies to situations in which those persons had been found to
violate a scienter-based fraud statute; and (iii) modify its proposal to
obtain the authority to impose monetary fines administratively.
If enacted in either form-as originally introduced, or as the
Commission now proposes to amend it-the Remedies Act would
substantially increase the sanctions confronting respondents in SEC
enforcement proceedings. One significant alteration to the remedies
framework would be the de facto shift from remedial to punitive
sanctions. The new authority sought in this bill, which could, in
many cases, be invoked even in response to the most minor,
technical violations of the securities laws, suggests an effort by the
government to amass an enforcement arsenal of excessive
proportions.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this proposed legislation is
the prospect that, if adopted, it would in almost every case allow the
Commission, at its own discretion, to bypass the federal courts
altogether, thereby bypassing many of the safeguards currently
protective of respondents' rights in the judicial system. In view of
the many highly technical requirements specified in the federal
securities laws, some of which operate as strict liability provisions
violated any provision of the federal securities laws or any rule or
regulation promulgated thereunder. Id. at § 203(a) (Proposed
Exchange Act Amendment), § 301(a) (Proposed Company Act
Amendment), § 401(a) (Proposed Advisers Act Amendment).
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that arguably do not require any showing of scienter,"' this remedies
framework could permit the imposition of extraordinarily harsh
punishment for seemingly trivial misconduct. This result is, at best,
inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the federal securities
laws.
412
These new penalties are disproportionately harsh in several
respects. For example, a violation of the net capital rules of the
Exchange Act does not necessarily bear a relationship to the
violator's qualifications to serve as an officer or director of a public
company. We have serious doubt that the SEC requires this
authority to carry out its mission;413 moreover, regardless of whether
the SEC requires this authority, the grant of such authority would
intrude the SEC into the proper domain of state law and
shareholder rights. 414 Of course, even if such a measure were
411. For example, Exchange Act § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (1982), and
Rules i3a-I and 13a-13 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13 (1989), prescribe the
requirements of, and time periods for, filing annual and quarterly reports for issuers having
securities registered pursuant to Exchange Act § 12. If a required report is filed one day
late, these provisions have been violated, even if the issuer acted without scienter. See, e.g.,
Rule 13a-I ('annual reports shall befiled within the period specified in the appropriate form
.") (emphasis supplied).
412. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The
principal purpose of... [an] injunction is, of course, to deter future violations, and not to
punish the violator") (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); SEC v. Geon
Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976) ('The historic injunctive process was designed to
deter, not to punish") (emphasis supplied); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477,
487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same), affd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
413. Our views in this regard are reflected in the American Bar Association's Section
on Corporations' comment letter on this proposed legislation. See Letter from Jean Allard
to The Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Apr. 9, 1990) [hereinafter ABA Letter] (on file
with authors). The ABA Letter was drafted by a comment team chaired by Mr. Pitt.
It is conceivable that the SEC might be confronted with a situation in which it
genuinely requires a court order enjoining someone from serving as an officer or director
of a public company, for example, where an individual has looted one public company and
is about to do the same with another public company. But, those instances in which the
SEC needs this authority are quite rare. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this relief
has only been granted once in a litigated case. See SEC v. Techiculture, Inc. [1973-74
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,501 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974). Presumably,
if the SEC has the authority to seek disgorgement and other equitable remedies, it may be
able to obtain an extraordinary writ from a federal judge, enjoining someone from serving
on a board, when a true emergency so requires. See generaUy Exchange Act § 21(d)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (1982) (general authority for the federal district courts to issue injunctive
relief upon application of SEC).
414. See generally CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)
(corporate governance is properly a function of state law). The times when such a remedy
will be needed by the SEC is likely quite small, since the SEC's effectiveness over the past
fifty-five years has not been impaired by the absence of this authority. In light of the lack
of any demonstrable need for this authority, Congress should not attempt to vest such
authority in the SEC given the dangers this legislation poses as a potential usurpation of
legitimate state law functions.
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appropriate on rare occasions, a more narrowly-tailored provision
should limit the availability of this sanction." 5
The new monetary penalties sought by the Commission also raise
concerns over their potentially excessive applicability. Particularly in
the wake of ITSFEAs sharply increased monetary penalties,"' the
need for an additional layer of civil and administrative fines has not
been shown. 7
And, this civil fine authority would be a non-exclusive remedy,
available "in addition to any other actions that the Commission or
the Attorney General is entitled to bring. '418 If this non-exclusivity
feature is retained, particularly with respect to insider trading
allegations that may be charged under Exchange Act Section 10(b)
(with the attendant Exchange Act civil penalties), Securities Act
Section 17(a), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)," 9 the pecuniary sanctions available to the
government would reach a maximum of
(i) seven times the profit gained (or loss avoided) in the
transaction;
(ii) a civil fine pursuant to this provision;
(iii) if the defendant is a securities professional
registered with the Commission, one or more
administrative fines pursuant to other provisions of
the Remedies Act; and
415. At a minimum, the Commission should be required to show that the offender
was an officer or a director of a public company at the time of the violation and that the
violation bears on the offender's ability to carry out the responsibilities attendant to the
corporate office. An additional benefit of narrowing this sanction would be the resulting
limitation of the Commission's ability to extract settlement concessions from defendants faced
with the ultimate sanction-a bar against remaining with his or her present, or any other,
public company.
416. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
417. These large fines could apply to cases in which the alleged wrongdoer reaped
no pecuniary gain, such as the late filing of a Form 3 or 4. See infra note 460 and
accompanying text. This seems particularly ill-advised in light of the Supreme Court's recent
ruling that excessive civil fines in government proceedings, the amounts of which bear no
rational relationship to compensating the government for its losses or the costs of detecting
and prosecuting the matter, may in fact constitute punishment rather than a remedy. In
such cases, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy would preclude subsequent
criminal prosecution of the offense. See United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
418. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.CA_ § 78u-1(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
419. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
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(iv) an order banning the individual defendants from
ever serving as officers or directors of a public
company.
This "piling-on" of sanctions seems both vindictive and unnecessary.
The administrative fine provisions, however, suggest even more
troublesome failings, possibly of constitutional dimensions.
Presumably, the imposition of these fines would follow a trial before
a Commission administrative law judge, who would act in the dual
capacity of trier of fact and trier of law. Yet, the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial
in actions seeking monetary penalties.40 This provision, however,
would permit the Commission to avoid that requirement, as no
other litigant could, simply by instituting an administrative pro-
ceeding.
Other significant issues of fairness permeate the question whether
the Commission should be permitted to assess monetary fines in an
administrative proceeding. These questions arise largely because the
Commission has the choice, at its complete discretion and without
any express or implied standards, to proceed in an administrative or
judicial forum. If the Commission chooses to institute an
administrative proceeding before one of its administrative law judges
(ALJs), there is no right to remove the case for a hearing before an
independent federal district court."
In sum, the Remedies Act would vest in the Commission
considerable procedural and strategic advantages, to the detriment
of assuring fairness to potential respondents and defendants. Taken
420. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-25 (1987) (Seventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees right to jury trial in cases where the government
seeks a monetary penalty).
421. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979). From the point
of view of the respondent, a federal district court proceeding includes a right to a trial
before an independent federal judge, the right to immediate relief by motion to dismiss,
summary judgment or other means, a right to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see supra note 308, a right to subpoena witnesses without special permission of
the trial judge and the imposition of the burden on the Commission to prove its case by
a preponderance of the evidence. In contrast, in a Commission administrative proceeding,
the respondent may subpoena evidence only upon the approval of the ALJ, preliminary
dispositive motions are prohibited, and there are no rights of discovery, notwithstanding the
considerable advantage the Commission enjoys by virtue of the compulsory process available
to the Staff in the investigations that precede administrative proceedings. The authors
believe that, at a minimum, the Commission should not be permitted to assess the
substantial penalties provided in the Enforcement Remedies Act without assuring the
protections inherent in the level playing field established by the federal rules of civil
procedure.
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in conjunction with the higher penalties prescribed in ITSFEA, these
two bills portend a trend toward potentially draconian, punitive
enforcement of the federal securities laws. 22
e. The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989
As the Commission continued to seek law enforcement
information from foreign securities regulators, it sought an
expansion of its authority to permit the extension of reciprocal
assistance to foreign regulators. To that end, the Commission
submitted to Congress proposed legislation entitled "The
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989"
(ISECA). This legislation contemplates empowering the Commission
to exchange certain types of information with foreign securities
regulators, subject to assurances that the confidentiality concerns of
each nation will be addressed."3 Additionally, ISECA would authorize
422. Among other concerns engendered by the Commission's proposed amendments
to S. 647 are the following:
1. The Commission's proposal to ease its access to grand jury matters (i) virtually
eliminates the current assurance of secrecy essential to protecting respondents'
rights in the grand jury process and contains no express sanctions for abuse of
the grand jury information obtained, and (ii) would further perpetuate the
unfairness of the present administrative process and would inject into federal
court actions enhanced discovery for the Commission without a reciprocal
enhancement for the respondent.
2. An extraordinary remedy, such as civil fining authority should be granted only
on a section-by-section basis, and only after the Commission demonstrates, as
it did when requesting ITSA, that the remedy is essential to enforcing a specific
section of the securities laws.
3. Under the civil penalty provisions of the proposed legislation, federal courts and
(with respect to regulated entities) the Securities and Exchange Commission
would be empowered to impose huge fines for violation of the federal securities
laws, with virtually no requirement for determining whether a fine is
appropriate or, if so, in what amount.
4. The SEC's proposal for cease-and-desist authority contains ambiguous language
that might authorize the SEC to act administratively to inhibit zealous
representation by counsel, and might impose severe (perhaps crippling)
monetary sanctions without the intercession of a court, and without the benefit
of a stay of the SEC's order pending such judicial review as may be obtainable.
A copy of the Commission's proposed amendments to S. 647 is on file with the authors.
423. See ISECA § 6(b), H.R. 1396, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H5870,
H5872 (1989). As noted above, Congress has already expanded the Commission's authority
to gather and provide information to foreign securities regulators. See supra note 397 and
accompanying text.
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the Commission to rely on the findings of foreign tribunals as the
basis for imposing administrative sanctions on securities professionals
registered, or applying for registration, in the United States.42
ISECA would cure numerous problems impeding the
Commission's ability to deal with investigations extending beyond the
territorial limits of the United States. For example, the SEC thus far
has been unable to assure foreign securities authorities that any
documents they provide to the Commission will not be disclosed; the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) mandates disclosure of
investigative records in the Commission's possession unless, among
other reasons, a current enforcement interest requires preserving the
confidentiality of the requested information. 5
The agency's inability to offer that assurance may well inhibit
foreign securities authorities from providing information to the
Commission."6 Granting the Commission the authority to offer these
assurances comports with the purposes of FOIA,21 since affected
documents would likely never have found their way to the
Commission's files (thus rendering them subject to FOIA requests)
absent assurances of confidentiality.42
In seeking a form of reciprocity for foreign sanctions against
securities professionals, however, the Commission's proposal stands
on less sure footing. By these provisions, the Commission seeks
authority to invoke the findings of foreign tribunals, concerning
certain violations of foreign law, as a basis for imposing
administrative sanctions upon securities professionals registered, or
seeking registration, to do business in the United States securities
markets.49 Thus, securities professionals found by a competent
424. See id. at §§ 3, 5. The bill also includes certain housekeeping details, such as
definitions, id. at §§ 4, 6, and provisions relating to the expenses of covered investigations,
id. at § 7.
425. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(3), 552a(b)(7) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 200.80(b) (1988).
426. For a discussion of foreign nondisclosure principles, see generally Problems of
Enforcement, supra note 269, at 381.
427. The legislative history of the FOIA demonstrates that the purpose of the Act
is to assure "[t]he right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government is
operating ... ." H.R. REP. NO. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2423.
428. Of course, the availability of such confidential treatment may encourage foreign
authorities to request it, even when there may be no clear obligation under foreign law for
them to do so. Nevertheless, the benefit of increased cooperation in international law
enforcement, particularly in the face of the impediments presented by foreign nondisclosure
laws that might otherwise prevent the SEC from obtaining needed information, should
outweigh the inconvenience of testing the occasional unwarranted request for confidential
treatment.
429. See ISECA §§ 3, 5, H.R. 1396, 101st Cong.. 1st Sess., 135 CONG. Rac. H5879
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foreign tribunal to have engaged in conduct that violates foreign law
that is the "substantial equivalent" of an analogous SEC prohibition,
would be subject to the full panoply of SEC administrative sanctions,
based solely upon foreign misconduct.430
The Commission is of the view that, since certain of the statutory
predicates for the administrative sanctions that may be imposed
upon brokers and dealers do not preclude basing those sanctions
upon foreign misconduct, the Commission currently enjoys, at least
impliedly, the authority to impose sanctions on brokers and dealers
registered (or seeking registration) in the United States based upon
a violation of certain foreign prohibitions. 3'
Nevertheless, rather than waste scarce time and resources
litigating the question, 2 it seems sensible to vest the Commission
(1989).
430. See Exchange Act §§ 15(b)(4), 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), 78o(b)(6) (1982)
(authorizing the Commission to censure, limit the activities of, suspend, or revoke the
registration of any broker or dealer, or person associated with a broker or dealer,
respectively, upon a finding of specified violations of law).
Thus, for example, the Commission is empowered to so proceed against any broker or
dealer that: has made (or caused to be made) a false filing with the Commission, see 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(A) (1982); has been convicted, within 10 years before its application for
registration, of any felony or misdemeanor (a) found by the Commission to involve a
securities transaction, a false oath or report, bribery, perjury or burglary (or conspiracy to
commit these offenses, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(B)(i) (1982); (b) that arises from the business
of the securities or commodities industry, insurance, banking, investment advisory services,
fiduciary or transfer agency, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1982); (c) involving the
wrongful obtaining of funds or securities, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(B)(iii) (1982), or
involving concealment of assets or other offenses in a bankruptcy proceeding, mail or wire
fraud, counterfeiting, forgery or other federal fraud or false statements, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)(B)(iv) (1982); (d) has been permanently or temporarily enjoined from conducting
securities, commodities, banking or insurance business or from any conduct or practice in
such industry, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C) (1982); (e) has willfully violated, or is unable to
comply with, any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, the Advisers
Act, the Company Act, the Commodity Exchange Act, the rules or regulations under any
of the Acts or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)(D) (1982); () has willfully aided, abetted or otherwise induced or procured a
violation of the above statutes by another person, or failed to adequately supervise a person
who violates one of the above statutes, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1982); or (g) is subject
to an order of the Commission barring or suspending the person from association with a
broker or dealer, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(F) (1982).
431. See SEC Memorandum in Support (ISECA), supra note 310, at 13 (citing In re
R.P. Clarke & Co., 10 S.E.C. 1072 (1942) (revoking United States registration of Canadian
broker-dealer based on conviction in Canadian court for crimes in connection with securities
transactions, without discussion of jurisdiction)).
An important distinction exists between imposing sanctions for foreign conduct that
violates domestic law, and imposing sanctions for foreign conduct that does not violate
domestic law (regardless of whether it violates foreign law). See generally Problems of
Enforcement, supra note 269, at 393-97.
432. In the context of settled, proceedings, the Commission recently brought a civil
injunctive action against a foreign national for insider trading in non-United States securities
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with explicit authority to protect the integrity of the United States
securities industry by preventing the specified class of wrongdoing
foreign securities professionals from conducting business in the
domestic securities markets.
This legislative proposal should ease the Commission's ability to
provide the type of international cooperation governed by MOUs, by
permitting the agency the flexibility to address the concerns of
securities regulators in jurisdictions with nondisclosure laws. This, in
turn, should help to encourage a community of interest among
nations with developed capital markets in coordinated market
surveillance and law enforcement, to advance the shared goal of
honest securities markets.
listed on a foreign securities exchange, without encountering any jurisdictional obstacle.
The broker and brokerage account through which the transactions were ordered provided
the sole nexus to the United States. See SEC v. Collier, Litigation Release No. 11,817, 41
SEC Docket 711 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 1988).
It is unclear, however, whether the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction would have
succeeded had the action been contested. Well-settled principles of international law
demonstrate that, under the "conduct" test for determining whether a sovereign may
prescribe rules governing actions:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its
territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the
effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territoy.
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 17 (1965) (emphasis
supplied).
It is also unclear whether a court would interpret Restatement Section 17(b), as
precluding the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction over domestic transactions by a foreign
citizen in securities of a foreign issuer traded on a foreign exchange, where the effects of
the wrongful conduct do not impinge upon any interest located in the United States. Despite
numerous judicial opinions suggesting that the federal securities laws can be applied beyond
the United States borders, see, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir.
1975) ("We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base
for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export . . ."); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d
109, 114 (3d Cir.) ("We are ... skeptical that Congress wished to preclude all SEC suits
for injunctive relief where the victim of a fraudulent scheme [carried out in the United
States] happens to be foreign or where there was insubstantial impact on the United
States"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977), some cases imply that certain limitations
nevertheless constrain the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities law. Cf. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) SAL., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir.)
(fraudulent transactions from abroad on United States exchanges cause sufficient harm to
invoke United States jurisdiction), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); lIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F.
Supp. 209, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (in predominantly foreign transaction, facts that defendants
were American and offering circulars were prepared in United States are insufficient for
prescriptive jurisdiction), affd in part, rev'd in part, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
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f. Congressional Oversight
Apart from Congress' consideration of specific legislative proposals
either submitted by the SEC or initiated in Congress, the
Commission has always been subject to an extensive amount of
general Congressional oversight, directed at a review of how the
agency functions and whether improvements in its processes can be
effected."' The success of the agency's insider trading program,
combined with its high degree of visibility, however, exponentially
increased the amount of oversight devoted to the SEC, M  and
expanded the scope of that oversight in a direction that has had,
and will have, implications for the Commission's enforcement
program.
Despite the overall success of the SEC's insider trading
program-a success crafted in the face of significant obstacles
relating to the lack of a precise statutory definition of the crime of
insider trading and the lack of express remedies for that
conduct-a great deal of the Congressional oversight of the 1980s
has been devoted to a variety of criticisms of the agency's
performance. Much of the remainder of that oversight has reflected
the efforts of members of Congress to enmesh themselves in a
popular, highly-visible, SEC enforcement effort, in a desire to
become a part of the process and contribute to its effectiveness.
Thus, during the past decade, Congress principally focused on:
(i) ascertaining whether the agency's settlements of
various insider trading cases were too lenient;
43 6
433. See, e.g., SEC Lets Some Firms Skirt Disclosures on Dubious Payoffs, House Study Shows,
Wall St. J., May 25, 1976, at 2. col. 3. During the SEC's foreign payments program,
Congressman Dingell's predecessor, Congressman John E. Moss, conducted a review of the
effectiveness of the SEC's program, and singled out for special criticism eight cases (out of
the hundreds in which the Commission either brought enforcement action or compelled
affirmative disclosures) in which the Commission, on the advice of its General Counsel,
Chief Accountant, and Director of Corporation Finance, had declined to institute
enforcement proceedings against companies that did not disclose questionable foreign
payments. Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices issued by
SEC on May 12, 1976, cited in H.R. RF'. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 241, 246 (1977).
434. By way of comparison, the SEC testified before Congress once in 1977, see 43
SEC ANN. REP. 26 (1977) and ten times in 1987, see 53 SEC ANN. REP 67 (1987).
435. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
436. See, e.g., Companies, Securities Firms Enlist Top Lobbyists for Showdown Over Bid to
Tighten Takeover Law, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 50, col. 1 (Congress conducting its own
investigation into conduct of insider trading enforcement proceedings); see aLso Democrats'
Hold on Senate Banking Panel Augurs Tougher Stance With Banking, Securities Sectors, Wall St. J.,
254
Vol. 7: 149, 1990
Securities Regulation by Enforcement
(ii) exploring allegations that the agency's response to,
and follow-up on, referrals of insider trading cases
from the various stock exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. was
inadequate; " 7
(iii) assessing whether the Commission's ability to deal
with foreign-based insider trading violations was, as
charged, woefully inadequate; 8 and
(iv) conducting a public investigation to ascertain
whether the targets of SEC insider trading
investigations had committed other violations of the
law not being investigated by the SEC.""
There is little doubt that hearings of this nature have had, and
will continue to have, an effect on the agency's approach to
enforcement. The SEC is sensitive to Congressional or media
criticism."0 When its settlements are criticized, the SEC responds
first, by defending itself against the charges, and second, by
ensuring that such criticism is not repeated in future cases. This
suggests that, over time, the SEC's requirements to settle insider
trading cases are apt to become even more aggressive than is
presently the case.
Similarly, the mere assertion of the claim that the Commission
has not diligently pursued leads from various self-regulatory
organizations, or pursued foreign-based insider trading cases more
effectively, no matter how poorly founded, may well cause the
Jan. 12, 1987, at 52, col. 1 (further Congressional attention to be given to securities issues).
437. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 400, at 27-38.
438. See, e.g., COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PROBLEMS WITH THE SEC'S
ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS IN CASES INVOLVING SUSPICIOUS TRADES
ORIGINATING FROM ABROAD, H.R. REP. No. 1065, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) ("The
[Committee's] hearing and investigation disclosed serious problems with the SEC's ability
to enforce U.S. securities laws in cases involving suspicious foreign originated trading").
439. See, e.g., Milken Pleads F0fth to Questions on Drexel Officials' Personal Bond Deals, 20
Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 640 (Apr. 29, 1988) (House Committee investigation
extending to matters not included in SEC investigation of Milken and Drexel); House
Subcommittee Plans Hearings Today on Pacific Lumber Takeover, SEC. WK., Oct. 5, 1987, at 4.
440. See, e.g., DingeU: Woe to Those Whose Interests Conflict, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989.
at 14, col. 3 ("Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement chief, Gary Lynch,
implicitly criticized Mr. Dingell's committee recently as the source of a leaked internal
memo that suggested tardiness in the Boesky investigation").
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agency to exercise less discretion as to whether to abandon de
minimis violations of the law that are brought to its attention, and
may prompt the Commission to expand programs like the "small
dollar" program, which focus on very small violations of the law.
Despite the fact that the Commission cannot pursue every claim that
comes to its attention, the agency is particularly responsive to
Congressional criticism, and can be expected to adopt policies
designed to avoid it where possible.
E. Other Enforcement Programs of the 1980s
1. Manipulation
The pervasive problem of market manipulation was a principal
focus of the SEC Enforcement Division in the 1980s. Consistent with
the agency's stated intention of returning to a strict construction of
the federal securities laws, Shad and Fedders communicated to the
marketplace that mainstream types of securities fraud, particularly
market manipulation, would attract renewed attention, in both civil
and criminal proceedings."' By the end of the decade, the
Commission, albeit under new leadership,"2 gave credibility to its
promise to place greatest enforcement emphasis on mainstream
securities fraud, as demonstrated by the fact that its market
manipulation case against a prominent corporate "raider," was
accompanied by a criminal prosecution."
Information developed by the SEC during its insider trading
investigation" has apparently also resulted in several criminal
441. See, e.g., Acquisitions, Rule 415, Disclosure Dominate 15th PLI Securities Institute, 15
Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2104, 2105 (Nov. 18, 1983) ("die Commission is
monitoring the aftermarket trading activity of penny stocks [which can be the subject of
manipulations]"); SEC's Shad, Fedders Deny Commission is Overemphasizing Insider Trading, 14
Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1785 (Oct. 22, 1982) (Fedders tells press conference
that he is "surprised" by the low volume of market manipulation cases brought in fiscal
1982 but anticipates that the number will increase in 1983); Fedders Urges More Criminal
Prosecution of Market Manipulators, Insider Traders, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at
795 (May 7, 1982) (Fedders warns the Securities Industry Association's Legal and
Compliance seminar that brokerage firms must adopt stringent self-policing measures, as
he predicts an increase in criminal enforcement of the securities laws).
442. By 1985, Fedders had departed the agency, succeeded by Gary G. Lynch. In
1987, Shad was succeeded by David S. Ruder.
443. See SEC v. Bilzerian, Litigation Release No. 12,144, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,491 (June 29, 1989); United States v. Bilzerian, Cr-88-962-01
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1989); see also United States v. GAF Corp., 884 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1989).
444. See Another Wall Street Defendant Changes Mind, Pleads Gui/ty, Assoc. Press, Aug.
31, 1989 (PM Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file) which reported that: "The second
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prosecutions--market manipulation charges involving the securities
of Fireman's Fund Corp.' and Union Carbide Corp.' have thus
far resulted in settlements in the former case,"7 and, after two
mistrials, a conviction in the latter case." 8 The progression of these
two cases points up two recurring themes that have emerged from
the 1980's SEC enforcement program.
The first case, in which a decision was made to settle criminal
securities fraud charges late in the trial, reflects the different
strategic decisions that must be considered in the current, more
criminalized environment of securities law enforcement."9 Unlike the
big-time Wall Street securities professional in two weeks [, Salim B. Lewis,] has reversed
position and pleaded guilty to fraud charges that stem indirectly from the Ivan Boesky
insider trading scandal." See also Third GAF Trial Set for Today, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989,
at D6, col. 6 ("The GAF case was the first securities fraud trial stemming from the Ivan F.
Boesky insider trading scandal"); Crimes and Lying Get Bihleian Four Years, Newsday, Sept.
28, 1989, at 53, col. I ("Boyd Jefferies, who was implicated by Boesky . . .in turn testified
against Bilzerian and others").
445. The defendants in this case were charged with purchasing shares of Fireman's
Fund Corp. (FFC) stock, in trades that violated federal rules governing the extension of
credit in securities transactions, to establish a dosing price for FFC stock that would be a
factor in pricing a pending secondary offering of FFC stock. See United States v. Lewis,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,479 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1989).
446. The government alleged that the defendants in this case "conspir[ed] to
manipulate the price of Union Carbide stock during GAF's negotiations to sell its block of
Union Carbide stock in October 1986." GAF Corp., 884 F.2d at 671.
447. Although defendants Salim B. Lewis and his firm had initially contested the
charges, an unfavorable ruling on their motions to dismiss the government's allegations, see
United States v. Lewis, [1989 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,479 (S.D.N.Y.
June 15, 1989), was soon followed by guilty pleas. See A Prominent Trader Admits He Schemed
to Rig a Stock Price, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Top Wall Street Speculator Pleads
Guilty to Three Counts; Lewis Admits '86 Scheme was 'Wrong', LA T'nes, Aug. 31, 1989, § 4,
at 1, col. 4; 'Blueblood Trader Admits Price Rigging, Newsday, Aug. 31, 1989, at 47. S.B.
Lewis & Co. subsequently settled SEC administrative proceedings arising from the same
activites that gave rise to the guilty pleas described above. See Brokerage Firm Is Censured,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1989, at D7, col. 5 (SEC censured S.B. Lewis & Co. based on its "role
in . . .[the] manipulation of the stock price of the Fireman's Fund Corporation in May
1986").
448. See Stock Fraud Conviction Another Notch In Government's Belt, Assoc. Press, Dec. 14,
1989 (PM Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file); N.Y. Stock Manipulation Verdict In Third
Trial, Fin. Times (U.K.), Dec. 14, 1989, at 3, col. 7.
449. See Case of Sandy Lewis Points Up Dilemma About Clients Who Seek to Plead Guilty,
Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1989, at B9, col. 1, which notes that Lewis "reportedly is
second-guessing his attorneys" and wondering whether an earlier plea would have secured
a more favorable settlement with prosecutors; see also Bad Week for Wealthy Fraud Suspects;
Pressure Builds on Holdout Milken, Assoc. Press, Sept. 1, 1989 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS
library, Wires file), which reports that the conviction in Leona Helmsley's tax evasion trial
and the sentence in attorney Alfred Elliott's insider trading case "showed that judges and
juries are quite willing to purdsh white-collar felons as harshly as suspects convicted for
violent crimes. That fact may have played a role in the decision by [Salim B.] Lewis to
strike a deal with federal prosecutors in New York and plead guilty to three felonies for
stock manipulation. Lewis originally had asserted innocence and his lawyers had called his
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decision to contest a civil enforcement proceeding, in which the
potential consequences involve an injunction 5 ° and perhaps a
monetary penalty,4" the stakes in a criminal trial are much higher,
since courts have not hesitated to impose increasingly longer jail
terms, along with substantial fines, in criminal securities cases.42 The
apparent trend toward increased criminal prosecutions will make the
job of defense counsel all the more challenging as the difficult
decisions that emerge from these cases arise.4 s
The so-called GAF manipulation case, in which the government
proceeded through two mistrials, to a third full trial on the merits
and a conviction,'" illustrates the relentlessness with which the
government has pursued securities fraud cases, and will likely
pursue them in the future. This tenacity bears out Fedders'
admonition that deregulation should not be mistaken for weak
enforcement. 5
In pursuing a criminal prosecution of alleged stock parking by
Paul Bilzerian,4 6 many commentors noted that the government
broke new legal ground in its ongoing efforts in the Wall Street
indictment a 'piece of garbage.'"
450. See Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.CA § 78u(d) (1982 & West Supp. 1989).
451. See Exchange Act § 21A(a), 15 U.S.CA § 78u-1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
452. See Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.CA § 78ff(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1989); see
also Bilzerian Sentenced, Parole Called 'Unlikely', Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 6, col. I (Bilzerian
sentenced to six concurrent four-year jail terms and fined $1.5 million for stock parking);
Bad Week for Wealthy Fraud Suspects; Pressure Builds on Holdout Milken, supra note 449 (insider
trader Alfred Elliott sentenced to five years in prison); Key Dates in Wall Street Scandals of
Levine-Boesky Era, Assoc. Press, Aug. 17, 1989 (AM Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file)
(Dennis B. Levine sentenced to two years in prison and fined $362,000; Ivan F. Boesky
sentenced to three-year jail term); but see Court Gives Stock Firm Founder Jefferies Suspended
5-Year Sentence, $250,000 Fine, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 129 (July 7, 1989); Probation
and Fine for Jefferies, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at D1, col. 3 ("As he announced his
sentence, Judge Lasker said he believed that Mr. Jefferies was a good man who had made
serious mistakes, but that there was little reason to send him to prison. 'Mr. Jefferies has
by now earned his way, through agony and effort, to a suspended sentence.'").
453. For example, permitting a defendant to testify in his own behalf at trial incurs
the risk that the court will consider the credibility of that testimony at sentencing. See
Bilzerian Gets Four Years in Jail and is Fined $1.5 Million, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1989, at D1,
col. 1 (the sentencing judge observed that "I do believe that if Mr. Bilzerian had not
testified at all at the trial, his sentence would not be what it was." The judge further
explained that, while he did not take issue with Bilzerian's posture of maintaining his
innocence, he believed Bilzerian had perjured himself during his testimony).
454. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
455. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
456. The defendant in this case was convicted of seeking to avoid the reporting
requirement of Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1989), by placing in friendly hands
portions of his stock holdings in various public companies.
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insider trading scandal.4 57 While it is well-established that the
surreptitious accumulation of more than five percent of a public
company's stock, without the requisite disclosure, violates the law,45
the criminal prosecution of these cases departs from past practice,
and further underscores the heightened criminalization that should
be anticipated in the next decade.
2. Delinquent Filing Program
In 1983, the SEC briefly joined the ranks of much of corporate
America when it became the object of an attack by the country's
leading consumer advocate, Ralph Nader." Nader conducted a
survey of a number of major domestic corporations and concluded
that at least half of the officers and directors of those companies
were not reporting transactions in their company's stock, as required
by Section 16 of the Exchange Act." 0 In a letter to Fedders, Nader
charged that the Commission had failed "'to bring enforcement
actions to stem this tide of executive law breaking,"' and asserted
that the results of his study "reflect a dismal enforcement record
that will further breed disrespect for the laws governing corporations
and their executives." '' Pointing to the Commission's highly
publicized war on insider trading which, in his view, was waged at
the expense of the previous regime's corporate accountability
program, Nader charged that Fedders' efforts to enforce
Section 16(a) "[fell] far short of [his] words.""' 2 Reflecting the
agency's sensitivity to public criticism of this nature, yet another SEC
457. See, e.g., Financier Sentenced to Four Years'Jail for Fraud, Fin. Times (U.K.), Sept.
28, 1989. at 3, col. 7; Bilzerian Gets Four Years in Jail and is Fined $1.5 Million, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28, 1989, at D1, col. I; Crimes and Lying Get Bilzerian Four Years, Newsday, Sept. 28,
1989, at 53, col. 1.
458. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975); Wellman v.
Dickenson, 682 F.2d 355, 363-367 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); SEC
v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979);
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); SEC
v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1988), affid, 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
459. See Nader Charges Directors, Officers Not Reporting Stock Purchases to SEC, 15 Sec.
.Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2237 (Dec. 9, 1983).
460. Id. Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act requires that officers, directors, and 10%
beneficial owners of public companies report to the Commission and the exchange on which
the securities are traded (1) their ownership of the company's stock, and (2) for any month
in which their holdings of company stock changes, an updated statement of their holdings
plus the number of shares bought or sold and the price at which they were traded.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.103-04 (1989).
461. See Nader Charges Directors, supra note 459, at 2237-38.
462. Id. at 2238.
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enforcement effort of the 1980s, the delinquent filings program, was
created.'
Beyond the initial spurt of coverage that followed the public
release of the results of Nader's study, the Commission's delinquent
filings program did not attract the publicity surrounding its insider
trading cases."' Nevertheless, the delinquent filings program has
resulted in a fairly steady stream of successful cases.' And, for good
measure, the Commission's response to Nader's criticism has
included a proposal to give the agency authority administratively to
bar officers and directors who fail to file timely reports of their
securities trades from serving as officers or directors of any
publicly-held company."
3. Expanded Ancillary Relief
The Commission's success in extracting ancillary relief, such as
disgorgement, in insider trading cases broadened into a plan to
secure similar equitable relief in other contexts. In so doing, the
agency achieved an impressive victory in a type of case that
previously was not thought amenable to any remedies other than
curative disclosure and an injunction against future violations of the
same sort.
An alleged stock parking arrangement formed the basis for the
Commission's complaint in Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. First City
Financial Corp. (First City).4 7 While the Commission's theory of
463. In his letter, Nader observed that the Commission had discontinued its practice
of sending warning letters to delinquent filers. Moreover, Nader noted that an SEC staffer
had advised him that no activity in the delinquent filings area had been undertaken until
the agency received Nader's letter. Id. at 2237.
464. It is ironic that the delinquent filings program, which found its origin in
Exchange Act Section 16(a), the only statutory provision of the federal securities laws that
expressly addresses itself to insider trading, faded into relative obscurity in the presence of
the noteworthy allegations that surfaced in connection with the cases based upon the
prohibition against insider trading implied from Exchange Act Section 10(b).
465. See, e.g., SEC v. Palmer Fin. Corp., Civ. Action No. 88-305 (D.D.C. Aug. 18,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (holding individual in contempt for failure to file
accurate Forms 3 and 4); SEC v. Read, litigation Release No. 11,620, 39 SEC Docket 1001
(D.D.C. Dec. 10, 1987) (enjoining defendant, by consent, from failing, inter alia, timely to
file Forms 3 and 4); SEC v. Lee, litigation Release No. 11,191, 36 SEC Docket 371 (D.D.C.
Aug. 11, 1986); SEC v. Michael Indus., Litigation Release No. 11,191, 36 SEC Docket 371
(D.D.C. Aug. 11, 1986); SEC v. Ziegler, litigation Release No. 11,191, 36 SEC Docket 371
(D.D.C. Aug. 11, 1986); SEC v. Agron, Litigation Release No. 10,543, 31 SEC Docket 580
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1984).
466. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
467. 688 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1988). affd, 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Defendants First City Financial Corp. (First City) and Marc Belzberg, a principal of First
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liability in First City broke no new ground, the remedy requested
was novel under the circumstances. The Commission's prayer for
injunctive relief, which the court ultimately granted, generated no
controversy. Injunctive relief, in addition to corrective disclosure, is
a familiar remedy in Section 13(d) cases."
In requesting the court to order disgorgement of the illegal
profits defendants derived from concealing their accumulation of
greater than five percent of Ashland's stock, however, the
Commission sought to expand the limited universe of remedies
previously thought to be applicable to Section 13(d) violations."
The court ruled favorably upon the Commission's claim that the
defendants' concealment of their statutorily material ownership of
Ashland securities had enabled them to reap wrongful profits from
continued purchases of the stock in an uninformed market47 Thus,
by litigating what seemed to be a garden variety case involving an
untimely Schedule 13D filing, the Commission won an important
victory, extending the applicability of disgorgement beyond the
traditional boundary of insider trading cases to, perhaps, any
violation of the federal securities laws.
4 1
City, were accused of secretly accumulating shares in Ashland Oil Corporation (Ashland) by
means of an undisclosed arrangement with their broker, Bear Stearns, Inc. (Bear Stearns).
The Commission alleged, and the court found, that Belzberg entered into an unwritten
agreement by which Bear Steams would purchase shares of Ashland for the benefit of First
City and Belzberg. Although the shares were nominally held in a Bear Stearns account, the
court found that both Belzberg and the chairman of Bear Steams understood that any
profit or loss generated by the purchases would accrue to Belzberg and First City. Id. at
714-16.
468. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 913 (1979); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC
v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
469. If practitioners had ever been tempted to view Section 13(d) as a mere technical
reporting requirement, that inclination should be ignored, in view of the opinion of the
Court of Appeals in First City. See First City, 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 ("Section 13(d) ... is the
pivot of the entire Williams Act regulation of tender offers").
470. See First City, 688 F. Supp. at 726. The court applied to this case the measure
of calculating disgorgement in insider trading cases prescribed in SEC v. MacDonald, 699
F.2d 47 (Ist Cir. 1983). See First City, 688 F. Supp. at 727.
471. The District Court in First City offered expansive dicta on this issue, observing
that "MacDonald supports the Commission's theory of disgorgement. While the case involved
violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the Court's analysis of disgorgement is relevant to all
securities law violations." First City, 688 F. Supp. at 727 (emphasis supplied). The opinion of
the Court of Appeals offers an even more generous view of the applicability of the entire
array of equitable remedies to violations of the Exchange Act, proclaiming that "'[ulnless
otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are
available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.' We see no indication in
the language or the legislative histo of the 1934 Act that even implies a restriction on the equitable
remedies of the district courts." First City, 590 F.2d at 1230 (emphasis supplied) (citations
omitted). The Court of Appeals thus concluded that there was no basis for distinguishing
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The Commission has further demonstrated its desire for broader
and more flexible remedies, as noted earlier, in its consent decrees
472
and by its proposal of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies
Act. 471 This suggests that, by a variety of mechanisms, the
Commission will continue to seek to expand its enforcement arsenal.
4. Financial Fraud
Early in 1983, Fedders estimated that insider trading cases would
comprise no more than eight percent of enforcement actions that
year, with sixty to seventy percent of the Division's cases focusing on
financial fraud, or "cooked books."474 This new emphasis would be
supported by the Division's hiring of its first Chief Enforcement
Accountant, a highly experienced practitioner from the private
sector.4 75 Throughout 1983, the Commission continued to sound this
theme,471 as its Enforcement Staff labored over complex accounting
and financial issues to build its cases.477
between insider trading and Section 13(d) violations in applying the disgorgement remedy.
Id. at 1232.
472. See, e.g., In re M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., [Current Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,714, at 63,273 (Sept.
1, 1989) (M.D.C. to retain independent accountants to evaluate internal accounting controls,
comply with certain procedures for major corporate transactions and new corporate
governance procedures); SEC v. Florafax, Litigation Release No. 10,617, 31 SEC Docket
1038 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 27, 1984) (Florafax to recalculate compensation paid to corporate
officers involved in wrongdoing and seek repayment if appropriate); In re Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22,755, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,948, at 87,930 (Jan. 2, 1986) (Prudential-Bache required to retain outside
consultant to make recommendations regarding supervision of compliance and sales
personnel).
473. See supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text. Among other things, the
Commission has sought the authority to bar persons who have violated the securities laws
from serving as officers or directors of public companies. See supra note 410 and
accompanying text.
474. See NASAA Adopts Oil & Gas, Cheap Stock, Leasing Guidelines, Postpones ULOE, 15
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 844, 847 (Apr. 29, 1983).
475. Id.
476. See, e.g., SEC Should Consider Revised Policy on Modifying Injunctions, Fedders Says,
15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2143, 2145 (Nov. 25, 1983) [hereinafter Revised
Policy] (Fedders describes Enforcement Division's increased talent pool for carrying out
complicated financial fraud investigations); SEC Beefing Up Financial Fraud Work, Fedders Tells
Conference of Executives, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2234 (Dec. 9, 1983)
(Fedders advises the Second Annual Financial Executives Institute Conference on Current
Financial Issues that the Commission is establishing a greater presence with increase in
financial fraud cases).
477. See Revisa Policy, supra note 476, at 2145 (explaining that financial fraud cases
are more complex and take longer to complete than other types of cases). Indeed, Fedders
took great pride in the work of the Division in that area: "I think the 'cooked book' area
is one that we're going to prove ourselves in in the next six months. At the end of the next
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The Commission's financial fraud program uncovered a wide
variety of schemes to inflate the earnings disdosed by issuers
including, among other things: (1) juggling reserves to create the
appearance of steady growth;47 (2) failure to take appropriate
write-downs of corporate assets;479 (3) pre-recognition of income by
improper recordation of sales;.8 (4) improper accounting treatment
of research and development costs;48 (5) falsification of expenses and
inventory items; 48 2 and (6) window dressing, or the creation of
fictitious year-end transactions that were reversed at the opening of
the new reporting period, to create a better year-end snapshot of an
issuer's financial condition.4 '
5. Disclosure Issues-The MD&A Program
The debate over qualitative versus quantitative materiality
re-emerged as the Commission turned its attention to the quality of
corporate disclosures. As the agency backed away from qualitative
materiality issues,4" and placed greater emphasis on quantitative, or
six months, there will be a lot of people sitting back and saying: Whew, they did a hell
of a job.' " Id.
SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway also spoke out frequently on the need for
tighter standards and increased self-regulation. When he and Fedders addressed a securities
conference in the latter part of 1984, Treadway observed that it was the "rare week" when
an accounting matter was not brought before the Commission in an enforcement
proceeding. He noted that "[a]ccounting is under a microscopic examination with a
relatively critical focus." See Accounting Issues Addressed by Fedders, Treadway at Rocky Mountain
Conference, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1707, 1707 (Oct. 26, 1984).
478. See, e.g., SEC v. Oak Indus., Litigation Release No. 10,801, 33 SEC Docket 694
(S.D. Cal. June 25, 1985).
479. See, e.g., SEC v. The Charter Co., Litigation Release No. 11,135, 35 SEC Docket
1284 (July 9, 1986).
480. See, e.g., In re Stewart Parness, Exchange Act Release No. 23,507, [1982-1987
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,508 (Aug. 5, 1986).
481. See, e.g., SEC v. Savin Corp., litigation Release No. 10,928, 34 SEC Docket 706
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1985).
482. See, e.g., SEC v. PepsiCo, Inc., Litigation Release No. 10,807, 33 SEC Docket
861 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1985).
483. See SEC v. Schreiber, Litigation Release No. 12,170, 44 SEC Docket 518 (S.D.
Fla. July 20, 1989).
484. Early on in his tenure as Enforcement Director, Fedders made it clear that he
was not interested in qualitative materiality issues, such as management integrity, that had
captured the interest of his predecessor, admonishing that the Commission should not
employ "the antifraud provisions of the securities laws where there is a failure to disclose
conduct which may be considered qualitatively material." See Fedders Says Commission Less
Likely to Go After Some Corporate Misconduct, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2037,
2037 (Nov. 26, 1982) (speech before the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the
American Bar Association).
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so-called financial statement, materiality, there developed a
corresponding effort to improve the quality of the disclosures still
required. In 1981, for example, the Commission took the first of
several steps designed to guide public companies toward improved
disclosure, in its release captioned "Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (MD&A),
identifying performance information that would be meaningful to
shareholders.4
The Commission revisited the adequacy of MD&A disclosure in
1986 after leading members of the accounting and auditing
profession submitted a recommendation to the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA Paper),4 6 calling for increased
business risk disclosure to appear outside the MD&A portion of
periodic reports.4
7
After receiving responses to a concept release488 seeking comments
on the adequacy of current MD&A requirements,489 the Commission
launched what has become known as the MD&A Project, to review
the adequacy of MD&A disclosure by issuers in selected industries,
to determine whether revisions to the MD&A requirements were
necessary.4' The MD&A Project progressed in two phases: Phase
One involved the review of 218 issuers in twelve industries.49' The
review in Phase Two included 141 issuers in an additional twelve
485. MD&A disclosure calls for a discussion of liquidity, capital resources, results of
operations, and other current information necessary to an investor's understanding of a
registrant's financial condition and results of operations. See Securities Act Release No. 6349,
[1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,321
(Sept. 28, 1981). The MD&A requirement was instituted to provide investors "with a
realistic management assessment of corporate objectives and numerical results." Id. at
62,946.
486. See Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 38 SEC Docket 138 (Apr. 17,
1987) [hereinafter Concept Release].
487. The AICPA Paper, which had been prepared by the managing partners of seven
major accounting firms, followed by Coopers & Lybrand's to the Commission's Chief
Accountant, which recommended that issuers increase the business risk disclosure within the
MD&A and that auditors follow certain proposed procedures to test this new disclosure. Id.
at 141-42.
488. See Concept Release, supra note 486.
489. The Commission reported that "[v]irtually all the 196 commentators opposed
the proposals initiated by members of the accounting profession, and most took the position
that there was no need to change the MD&A requirements." Interpretive Release on
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations:
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket
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industries.49 Based on the results of this review, the Commission
determined that, while new MD&A requirements were not necessary,
further guidance should be given as to how public companies should
comply with existing disclosure obligations.49
The Commission issued a forty-five page release describing and
discussing the results of its progress to date in the MD&A Project."'
The thoroughness of the MD&A Project review process and the
resulting guidance published in the May 1989 release show that,
while perhaps having backed away from some of the more novel
disclosure theories pursued in the 1970s, the Commission remains
committed to fundamental principles of qualitative disclosure.
Whether by interpretive guidance, such as the MD&A Project, or
enforcement investigations and prosecutions in selected cases, the
SEC clearly will continue to promote a high quality of disclosure on
the part of issuers of securities. 95
6. Attorneys
It remains unclear whether the Commission's commencement of
administrative proceedings pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(c)(4)
in In the Matter of Allied Stores Corporation and George C. Kern (Kern),/
reflects the agency's readiness to litigate enforcement cases, or if it
portends a revitalized effort to pursue securities attorneys in
enforcement actions. In either case, the filing of the Kern Order
Instituting Proceedings sent shock waves through the securities
bar.4
9 7
492. Id. at 1332. Phase Three, looking at 12 additional industries, is currently under
way. Id.
493. Id. at 1331.
494. See Interpretive Release, supra note 489.
495. The Commission has brought two enforcement actions involving, among other
things, inadequate MD&A disclosure since the inception of its MD&A Project. While the
events forming the basis of these actions predated the MD&A Project, it is likely that the
MD&A-oriented allegations can be attributed to the Commission's heightened scrutiny of this
important disclosure device. See In re John M. Schulzetenberg, Exchange Act Release
No. 26,103, (Current Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,669 (Sept. 23, 1988); In re American Savings & Loan Assoc. of Fla.,
Exchange Act Release No. 25,788, 41 SEC Docket 78 (June 8, 1988).
496. Order Instituting Proceedings and Notice of Hearing, Exchange Act Release
No. 24,648, 138 SEC Docket 987 (June 29, 1987) [hereinafter Order Instituting
Proceedings].
497. See Securities Bar Frets Over SEC Sanctions; Suivan & Cromwell is Focus, Nat'l L.J.,
July 13, 1987, at 3, col. 1; SEC Accuses Leading Wall Street Lawyer Over Disclosure in Allied
Stores Takeover, Wall St. J., June 30, 1987, at 3, col 2.
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The Commission authorized the institution of this action to
determine (1) whether Allied Stores Corporation (Allied) violated
Exchange Act Section 14(d)(4),"'5 and Rule 14d-9 thereunder"' by
failing promptly to amend a Schedule 14D-9 00 previously filed with
the Commission; (2) whether Kern caused Allied's violation; and
(3) if so, whether prospective relief should be granted against Kern,
as the individual who allegedly caused the issuer's disclosure
violation. 50'
A proceeding charging a director of a public company with
causing the principal violation of an issuer would not, in itself,
necessarily command the attention of the securities bar. However,
the respondent director in this case, George C. Kern, was also the
issuer's counsel and the head of the Mergers and Acquisitions
Department of a major Wall Street law firm.5 02
498. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982).
499. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b) (1988). Rule 14d-9 provides, in pertinent part, that:
If any material change occurs in the information set forth in the Schedule 14D-9
required by this section, the person who filed such Schedule 14D-9 shall:
(1) File with the Commission eight copies of an amendment on Schedule
14D-9 disclosing such change promptly ...
... and
(3) Promptly disclose and disseminate such change in a manner
reasonably designed to inform security holders of such change.
Id. (citations omitted).
500. See Reproduction of Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1988).
501. Exchange Act Section 15(c)(4) provides, in pertinent part, that:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that any person
subject to the provisions of sections [12], [13], [14], . . . or subsection (d) of [section
15 of this title] or any rule or regulation thereunder has failed to comply with any
such provision, . . . the Commission may publish its findings and issue an order
requiring such person, and any person who was a cause of the failure to comply due to an
act or omission the person knew or should have known would contribute to the failure to
comply, to comply, or to take steps to effect compliance ... as the Commission may
specify in such order.
15 U.S.CA § 78o(c)(4) (1982 & West Supp. 1989) (emphasis supplied).
502. The Kern proceedings emerged from Allied's failure to amend its
Schedule 14D-9 to reflect developments at the Company while it was the subject of an
unsolicited takeover bid by Campeau Corporation (Campeau). In order to remain
independent from Campeau, Allied had begun negotiations with a potential white knight,
and had reached a preliminary merger agreement. Allied's board of directors had approved
the agreement. Kern, acting alone on behalf of Allied and its board, decided that these
developments did not call for an amendment to Allied's Schedule 14D-9, since Allied and
its white knight had not yet reached an agreement as to the price and terms of the
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The SEC Administrative Law Judge disagreed with Kern's analysis
of Allied's disclosure obligations.10 The Judge cited the Commission's
opinion issued in Revlon, Inc., a settled administrative proceeding
pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(c)(4),511 in support of the
proposition that Allied's negotiations with a white knight were more
than merely exploratory and would have been considered important
by a reasonable investor. °50 The Administrative Law Judge ruled that
Allied's failure to amend its Schedule 14D-9 violated Rule 14d-9 and
that Kern caused Allied's violation. Imposition of prospective relief
was denied since Kern was no longer able to cause further actions
by Allied (which had since been acquired in the transaction that
gave rise to the administrative proceedings).5°0
The Kern proceeding is significant for at least three reasons. First,
as noted, the Commission's zealous pursuit of a case against a
lawyer, based upon his legal advice to a client, raises the possibility
of continued SEC intrusion into the office practice of securities
counsel. Second, since a negotiated consent order is not subject to
the procedural rulemaking requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act," the Staff's use of an articulation of legal principles
set out in a negotiated consent order as precedent in a contested
transaction. See In re Allied Stores Corp. and George C. Kern, Jr., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988) [hereinafter Kern Initial
Decision].
503. Neither the Order Instituting Proceedings nor the Initial Decision specified
whether Kern was subjected to this action by virtue of his role as a director of Allied or
as its counsel. Rather, both documents focused on his acting alone to effect the
determinations concerning Allied's disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, as noted herein, the
commencement of such proceedings against a prominent securities lawyer, regardless of his
dual capacity in this matter, has caused great discomfort within the bar.
504. Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84,006 (June 16, 1986).
505. See Kern Initial Decision, supra note 502, at 89,582-83, 89,585. The
Administrative Law Judge emphasized that: "The Revlon decision, even though issued in a
consent matter, should have alerted Kern to the disclosure philosophy of the Commission
and to the need for securities practitioners to be aware that the Commission favors a liberal
interpretation of Rule 14d-9." Id. at 89,593.
506. Thus, Kern was not ordered to cause Allied to undertake corrective disclosure.
And, since this was an administrative, rather than civil, action, Kern did not face the
prospect of conducting a legal practice under the cloud of an injunction prohibiting further
violations. Had the Commission filed an action against Kern in the federal courts, which
one Commissioner believed to be the only appropriate forum for this matter, see Order
Instituting Proceedings, supra note 496 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner Edward
Fleischman), Kern could have been subject to an injunction pursuant to Exchange Act
Section 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). Although neither party appealed the Initial
Decision, the Commission, on its own motion, has taken up the matter for review. See In
re George C. Kern, Jr., SEC Admin. Proc. No. 3-6869 (Jan. 4, 1989) (order for review).
507. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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matter portends an aggressive agency posture as to what constitutes
a binding rule of law. Third, the utilization of the agency's relatively
new authority under Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Ace' to
pursue an attorney who allegedly caused a corporate issuer's
noncompliance with regulatory requirements, was reminiscent of the
"access" theory of enforcement employed during the 1970s009 These
issues are discussed below.
a. Attorneys' Ability to Counsel Clients
The Kern proceeding resurrected the spectre of an earlier
Commission administrative proceeding charging two prominent Wall
Street lawyers with improper professional conduct in connection with
their representation of National Telephone Company (National)
during the period leading to National's petition for reorganization
under the protection of the bankruptcy court. 1' Those proceedings
were commenced during the 1970s, pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice."' Consistent with the Commission's
"access" theory of enforcement,' the SEC staff charged, and the
Administrative Law Judge found, that, among other things, the two
attorneys had aided and abetted National's violations of the
Exchange Act's financial reporting requirements by failing to prevent
National's optimistic statements about its business prospects in its
public reports and press releases."'
508. 15 U.S.CA § 78o(c)(4) (1982 & West Supp. 1989). In 1984, with the passage
of ITSA, the Exchange Act was amended to give the SEC authority to bring administrative
proceedings under Section 15(c)(4) against persons who cause a corporate issuer to violate
various specified provisions of the federal securities laws.
509. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
510. During the year preceding National's petition, National's filings and press
releases emphasized the steady increase in National's new orders for telephone system
leases. None of these public statements, however, reflected the fact that, due to the nature
of National's business, each new order the company accepted required a considerable cash
outlay by National, while the resulting income stream trickled in over initial lease terms
from 60 to 125 months. Thus, the substantial increase in new orders in fact operated as
a negative financial indicator for a company in National's precarious financial condition. See
Report of Investigation In re National Telephone Co., Relating to Activities of the Outside
Directors of National Telephone Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,380, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,410 (Jan. 16, 1978).
511. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1988). Rule 2(e) provides, in pertinent part, that: "[tihe
Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing
before it in any way . . . ." Id.
512. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
513. See In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket
292 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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Amidst a storm of controversy from the bar, the two lawyers
appealed this decision to the Commission, which dismissed the
proceedings. The Commission determined that the attorneys'
conduct did not lie within dear, generally accepted standards of
conduct in the profession and, therefore, should not first be
sanctioned in an enforcement proceeding."'
In the wake of the Carter and Johnson matter, few actions were
brought against lawyers based upon the good faith rendering of
legal advice. 15 Thus, the Commission's Section 15(c)(4) action against
Kern rekindled great concern that the agency had once again
established the securities bar as the target of an enforcement
program. While the Commission's broader intentions in this regard
are, as yet, unknown, even the possibility of such a program could
chill attorneys' exercise of judgment in advising their clients.
b. Commission Bootstrapping of Consent Orders into Substantive Rules
of Law
The Division of Enforcement Staff supported its charges against
Kern with the assertion that he knowingly breached the standards
for disclosure in Schedule 14D-9 since he was familiar with the
Commission's interpretation of that obligation in the context of
control contests as set forth in the Revlon consent order."' Despite
a brief disclaimer of the precedential value of the Revlon order,"7
514. The Commission observed that: "elemental notions of fairness dictate that the
Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon
professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was
unethical or improper." Id. at 319.
515. Of course, periodically, persons accused of deliberate fraud may be attorneys.
See, e.g., SEC v. Elliott, Litigation Release No. 11,335, 37 SEC Docket 477 (Dec. 30, 1986)
(entry of injunction in consent proceedings). Such cases, however, do not raise the concerns
that stemmed from the Carter and Johnson case, as they involve principal liability for an
offense which requires proof of scienter. See also United States v. Elliott, No. 88 Cr. 645
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (conviction in related insider
trading criminal prosecution).
The Kern case, however, does not involve allegations of principal fraud by the
resondent. Rather, this use of the Commission's relatively new Section 15(c)(4) authority
to pursue an attorney who allegedly caused an issuer's noncompliance with regulatory
requirements is very reminiscent of the access" theory of enforcement employed during
the 1970s. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
516. See supra note 504 and accompanying text.
517. The Initial Decision accords recognition to the minimal weight that should be
ascri'bed to articulations of legal principles set forth in consent orders:
The consent orders are not considered to have precedential value in determining
the proper interpretation of the Section 15(c)(4) language in question since there
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the Administrative Law Judge nevertheless cited the order no less
than four times in support of various propositions of law, including
the materiality of the information that Allied did not disclose in an
updated Schedule 14D-9.1 8
The Commission's staff thus succeeded in "bootstrapping" a
negotiated articulation of an advocate's legal position into a
substantive rule of law. The application of such a negotiated position
as precedent in future proceedings effectively bypassed the notice
and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
for agency rulemaking.1t' The de facto elevation of the Commission's
position in Revlon to a substantive rule of law in Kern stands in
sharp contrast to the policies underlying the notice and public
comment requirements of the APA. Commission investigations are,
with very few exceptions, nonpublic. Thus, only the potential
respondent and the Commission, through its Enforcement Staff, have
any ability to influence the articulation of the legal principles
included in consent orders such as Revlon.
Clearly, the Commission's advocates enjoy the greater "bargaining
power" in conducting settlement negotiations. Once potential
respondents have decided to settle, rather than litigate, an SEC
administrative proceeding, they are likely to focus on only two
issues: (1) the remedy they will have to give up to the Commission,
that is, undertakings for corrective measures to prevent future
violations; and (2) the recitation of the facts that gave rise to the
is no indication in those cases whether the Commission considered if it had the
authority to impose a requirement of future compliance as a matter of law.
Kern Initial Decision, supra note 502, at 89,593 n.45.
518. See Kern Initial Decision, supra note 502, at 89,582-83, 89,585, 89,593.
519. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Section 553(c) of the APA provides that interested
parties may participate in agency rulemaking through a written submission. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (1982).
The notice and comment provisions of the APA were designed to assure the
participation of persons affected by rulemaking on the part of agencies that operate outside
of, and are thus unaccountable to, the electoral process. As one court observed: "when an
agency action has 'palpable effects' upon the regulated industry and the public in general,
it is necessary to expose that action to 'the test of prior examination and comment by the
affected parties.'" National Helium Corp. v. Federal Energy Admin., 569 F.2d 1137, 1146
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 90, 96 (D.D.C. 1976) (three judge court), afj'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968)).
Moreover, these procedures implement the determination by Congress that agency
rulemaking procedures should operate in a fully informed fashion, a function that is greatly
enhanced by broad exposure to public scrutiny and comment. See, e.g., Brown Express, Inc.
v. United States, 607 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1979).
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alleged violation)10 with a view to limiting the amount, and
characterization, of information made available to potential private
litigants. Consequently, the Commission's articulation of the rule of
law applied in consent orders may well go completely unchallenged
if the respondent has struck a good bargain in the remainder of the
order. This procedure is perfectly appropriate if a settlement is
nothing more than a contractual arrangement between consenting
adults. But, this process is entirely antithetical to the goals sought to
be advanced by the APA if consent decrees are anything more than
two-party agreements.
It should be noted that the Kern proceeding is not an isolated
example of SEC "bootstrap" rulemaking. The Commission has
carried out similar de facto rulemaking via consent orders in fatilure
to supervise cases against securities broker-dealer firms."' The Kern
case, however, differs significantly from these supervision cases, in
which one consent order was cited as precedent in a later consent
proceeding. The Commission's staff in the Kern matter has, with
apparent success, applied the purported rule from a consent order
in a contested proceeding, a case in which the application of the law
is the sum and substance of the dispute. The agency's stance in that
regard represents a significantly more aggressive legal posture than
has usually been seen in Commission actions.
In view of the Commission's recent successes, whether the Kern
proceeding stands for anything beyond the proposition that the
Commission will more readily litigate matters involving advice of
counsel in the future, remains to be seen. Clearly, one action against
one attorney, in which an aggressive legal position on the applicable
precedent was asserted, hardly constitutes conclusive evidence of new
substantive trends in the Commission's enforcement efforts.""
Nevertheless, these two areas are worth watching, to determine
whether further developments offer a dearer picture of the agency's
future direction.
520. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (1989) (providing that parties may settle enforcement
actions while neither admitting nor denying allegations therein).
521. See, e.g., In re Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22,755, 34
SEC Docket 1094 (Jan. 2, 1986), relying on the legal standard set forth in In re Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. and Loren Lyon, Exchange Act Release No. 19,725, 27 SEC
Docket 1049 (May 3. 1983).
522. As we noted at the outset, it is unclear whether the Commission pursued Kern
in the capacity of board member or legal counsel. One commentator observed that "[t]he
Order [for Proceedings] has led many to wonder whether Kern was named as a lawyer, or
as a director, or as both. The best guess is both." Klein, SEC Reopens Old Wounds With Its
Proceeding Against George C. Kern, Jr., INSIGHTS, Sept. 1987, at 32, 54 (emphasis supplied).
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7. Penny Stocks
Bucket shops, boiler rooms and the like formed the basis for one
of the more recent Commission enforcement initiatives of the 1980s.
In the securities arena, seemingly outmoded scams eventually have
a way of being recycled and sold to a new generation of consumers.
Penny stock operations, which had a boom in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, when investors snapped up shares in dubious uranium
and gold mines,"' reemerged with a vengeance in the 1980s."2'
While the sale of so called penny stocks-inexpensive high risk
securities that typically are neither traded on an exchange nor listed
with NASDAQ's--is not in itself illegal, the manner of their sale is
highly susceptible to fraud. According to the North American
Securities Administrators Association, fraudulent sales of penny stock
are "the biggest threat facing the average investor.
526
A typical penny stock scam might begin with the registration of
shares in a shell corporation for the stated purpose of making a
"blank check offering"--one in which the only disclosed business
purpose is to search for suitable investment opportunities. An
unscrupulous promoter may then tout the shell corporation as
having acquired the exclusive rights to a novel or revolutionary
property, such as the technology to extract gold from sand.27 In
order to create the illusion of a market and inflate the price of the
securities, the promoter will enlist the aid of brokers to trade the
shares among nominee accounts which they control. With the trap
thus baited, smooth talking brokers armed with sophisticated
telecommunications equipment engage in a high-pressured sales
campaign targeted at unwary investors who ultimately discover, to
523. See Sontag, SEC Targets Penny Stocks; Haven for Swindlen?, NA'L L. J., Apr. 3,
1989, at 1.
524. In the words of Joseph Goldstein, who heads a Commission task force on penny
stock fraud, "[t]he telecommunications revolution has made penny stock fraud easier and
it's becoming more and more profitable.... There are more penny stock broker dealers
than ever before." Penny Stock Fraud Costing Consumers Billions, Reuter Bus. Rep., May 9,
1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file). According to one estimate, with computerized
dialing a broker can place more than 200 telephone calls each day. See The War on Penny
Stocks, NEwswuiL, Apr. 10, 1989, at 52, col. 1.
525. The market for such securities is primarily quoted in the Pink Sheets,T the
daily listings of the National Daily Quotation Service.
526. Penny Stock Fraud: Battling the Boiler-Rooms, Assoc. Press, Aug. 20, 1989 (LEXIS,
NEXIS library, Wires file).
527. See, e.g., SEC v. Goldcor, Inc., Litigation Release No. 11,847, 41 SEC Docket
960 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1988) (extracting gold from Costa Rican beaches).
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their sorrow, that the market in their shares is virtually
nonexistent.2
In response to the high growth penny stock industry,52' the
Commission established a Penny Stock Task Force in October, 1988.
The goal of the task force was to coordinate Commission
enforcement, regulatory, and educational efforts aimed at the
problem of widespread misconduct by broker-dealers in connection
with low-priced securities.5'3 As a result of its efforts, the Commission
adopted a new rule on August 22, 1989, that imposes sales practice
requirements on broker-dealers who recommend purchases of certain
low-priced, non-NASDAQ, over-the-counter securities to persons who
528. Typically, potential purchasers are drawn from telephone lists and other
directories; consequently, many have little investment experience. Salespersons are trained
to close the sale before ending the conversation and usually are compensated solely from
any commissions they generate. See Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced
Securities, 54 Fed. Reg. 35,468 (1989) [hereinafter SEC Penny Stock Rule Release].
529. In 1988, the Commission initiated over 25 enforcement actions involving fraud
or abuse in connection with penny stock offerings; since 1986, the Denver Regional Office
alone had initiated over 30 such cases. By August 1989, the Commission had already
initiated 40 enforcement actions and was investigating many other cases involving penny
stock abuse. See 54 Fed. Reg. 6693, 6694 n.4 (1989) (proposed Feb. 14, 1989) (hereinafter
Penny Stock Comment Release].
Investor complaints are also on the rise. In fiscal year 1988, the Commission received
approximately 1500 complaints regarding broker-dealer misconduct in connection with the
sale of penny stocks. By mid-1989, it had logged approximately 2400 complaints. Id. See also
SEC v. Brownstone-Smith Sec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 12,126, 43 SEC Docket 1748
(S.D. Fla. June 12, 1989) (scheme involved manipulation of trading prices, sales of securities
at excessive mark-ups, and failure to disclose to customer broker-dealer's domination and
control of market for securities); In re The David-Maxwell Company, Inc., Exchaige Act
Release No. 26,823, 43 SEC Docket 1636 (May 15, 1989); In re The Stuart-James Co. Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,700, 43 SEC Docket 966 (Apr. 5, 1989) (excessive mark-ups
in connection with trading of new issues underwritten by broker-dealer); SEC v. Hughes
Capital Corp., Litigation Release No. 11,939, 42 SEC Docket 630 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1988)
(scheme to manipulate price of Hughes securities included dissemination of false and
misleading prospectus; charging of undisclosed excessive mark-ups, arbitrary price increases,
and dissemination of &lse and misleading newsletters and press releases); SEC v. Goldcor,
Inc., Litigation Release No. 11,847, 41 SEC Docket 960 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1988) (scheme
involving sale and distribution of shares in entity ostensibly engaged in business of refining
gold from black sand beaches in Costa Rica); In re Bradley E. Bohling, Exchange Act
Release No. 25,346, 40 SEC Docket 228 (Feb. 11, 1988) (sale of unregistered securities of
inactive shell corporation).
530. See SEC News Release, Remarks of David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Before the Twenty-First Annual Rocky Mountain
State-Federal-Provincial Securities Conference, Denver, Colorado (Oct. 21, 1988). Even prior
to the creation of the Penny Stock Task Force, the Commission had apparently anticipated
the need for a concerted effort to combat this particular variety of fraud. See NASAA Adopts
Oil & Gas, Cheap Stock, Leasing Guidelines, Postpones ULOE, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 15, at 844, 847 (Apr. 29. 1983) (Fedders tells NASAA gathering that the SEC and
NASD are coordinating efforts to be ready for next surge of activity in Denver penny stock
market).
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are not established customers."" New Rule 15c2-6111 requires
broker-dealers to make certain suitability determinations regarding
potential purchasers and to obtain certain written agreements from
new purchasers. ss
The new requirements attempt to implement these objectives by
establishing account opening procedures that must be followed by
broker-dealers in making suitability determinations regarding
prospective customers, and by requiring broker-dealers to obtain
confirmation of certain purchases in writing.3"
Rule 15c2-6 prohibits a broker-dealer from selling a "Designated
Security" 3' to, or to effect the purchase of a Designated Security by
any person, unless (a) the transaction falls within one of the Rule's
enumerated exemptions or (b) prior to the transaction, the
broker-dealer has approved the purchaser's account for transactions
in the Designated Security and has received written approval for the
transaction by the purchasersN
531. See SEC Penny Stock Rule Release, supra note 528. The effective date of the
Rule has been set fbr January 1, 1990, in order to allow broker-dealers time to implement
compliance procedures. Id.
532. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6 (1989).
533. The promulgating release accompanying Rule 15c2-6 states that the
Commission sought to deter high-pressured, unscrupulous sales methods by
imposing objective and readily reviewable requirements that condition the process
by which new customers are induced to purchase low-priced stocks. The
requirements are intended to assist investors in protecting themselves from
fraudulent sales practices, and also to reinforce a broker-dealer's suitability
obligations, which historically have been an important standard constraining
indiscriminate high pressure sales tactics by broker-dealers.
SEC Penny Stock Rule Release, supra note 528, at 35,740 (citations omitted).
534. Id. at 35,472.
535. See infra note 536 and accompanying text.
536. In promulgating the Rule, the Commission was concerned that it not adversely
affect legitimate small business capital formation. See SEC Penny Stock Rule Release, supra
note 528, at 35,471-72. To accommodate this concern, the Rule is limited to transactions
in Designated Securities, which are defined as securities other than those that are
(i) registered or approved for registration upon a stock exchange; (ii) authorized or
approved for authorization for quotation in the NASDAQ system; (iii) issued by a registered
investment company; (iv) options issued by The Options Clearing Corporation; or (v)
offered by an issuer with net tangible assets in excess of $2,000,000. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-6(d)(2) (1989). Exemptions are also provided for (i) transactions in which the
price of the security is five dollars or more; (ii) transactions in which the purchaser is an
accredited investor or an established customer of the broker-dealer; (iii) transactions that
are not recommended by the broker-dealer; and (iv) transactions by a broker-dealer who
is not a market maker in the Designated Security and whose sales-related revenue from
transactions in Designated Securities does not exceed five percent of its total sales-related
revenue from securities transactions. See 17 C.F.R. I 240.15c2-6(c) (1989).
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Prior to engaging in a transaction that falls within the scope of
the Rule, broker-dealers must (i) obtain, orally or in writing,
information from the customer concerning the customer's financial
situation, investment experience, and investment objectives; (ii)
reasonably determine the customer's suitability for, and capability of
evaluating the risks of, transactions in Designated Securities; (iii)
deliver to the customer a written agreement setting forth the basis
of the determination; and (iv) receive from the customer a manually
signed and dated copy of the suitability statement."' Thus, Rule
15c2-6 attacks the problem of fraudulent transactions by addressing
the sales practices of broker-dealers actively involved in selling
low-priced securities to new customers.
The Commission has recognized that only comprehensive action
will successfully reduce wide-spread fraud in the penny stock market.
Accordingly, in addition to adopting Rule 15c2-6, the Commission
has asserted its intention to continue ongoing efforts in enforcement,
public education, and regulatory initiatives."' In this regard, the
Commission has embarked on a public education campaign designed
to inform investors of the risks in the low-priced securities market5 9
The Commission also plans to propose an amendment to existing
Rule 15c-l1510 which will emphasize the responsibility of market
makers to review information concerning non-NASDAQ,
over-the-counter securities."' It has also encouraged self-regulatory
initiatives designed to curb fraud and market manipulation.' As
part of this effort, the NASD has implemented a program requiring
broker-dealers to report volume and price information concerning
transactions in non-NASDAQ, over-the-counter securities."'
Increased criminal actions and stiff prison sentences may also be
in store for broker-dealers caught in fraudulent penny stock scams.
Joseph Goldstein, chairman of the Commission's penny stock task
force, told the Hou~e Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance that the Commission will be referring an increasing number
537. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6(b) (1989).
538. SEC Penny Stock Rule Release, supr note 528, at 35,468.
539. See id. SEC Information for Investors, Penny Stock Telephone Fraud, SEC Press
Release No. 89-58 (Aug. 1989); SEC Information for Investors, Beware of Penny Stock
Fraudl (Nov. 1988) (cited in SEC Press Release No. 89-58).
540. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1989).
541. See SEC Penny Sto:k Rule Release, supra note 528, at 35,468.
542. See id.
543. See Schedules to the By-Laws, NASD Manual (CCH) 1932-33 (Oct. 1989)
(Schedule H).
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of penny stock cases to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution.' "
Whether Rule 15c2-6 will operate effectively to deter the free
wheeling fraud rampant in the low-priced securities market is still a
matter of conjecture. Adoption of the Rule, however, along with the
Commission's stepped up enforcement actions and cooperation with
other regulatory agencies and organizations, signifies a significant
new emphasis on an area that had received too little attention for
a number of years.
8. Corporate Governance Issues
Despite the Commission's determination to back away from the
1970s' enforcement actions directed at improving corporate
governance,m a number of enforcement initiatives during the 1980s
looked surprisingly similar to those very actions. Thus, for example,
during the 1980s, the Commission continued the practice of seeking
to extract, in appropriate settlements, corporate self-investigations
and the appointment of independent directors, special counsel, and
the like. " In addition, the Commission endeavored to influence
whether certain persons could continue to serve as officers and
544. Goldstein testified that
[t]oo often the Commission's experience is that the people responsible for
organizing, financing and executing stock manipulations in penny stocks are not
deterred by the civil remedies that are currently available to the Commission, ...
These civil remedies are viewed as part of the cost of doing business. Therefore,
to deter more effectively penny stock fraud, the Commission is actively seeking to
enlist the help of criminal prosecutors.
See States News Service, Aug. 21, 1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file). A number of
cases in which the Commission has cooperated with federal and state authorities and self-
regulatory organizations have already resulted in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United
States v. Kimmes, litigation Release No. 12,211, 44 SEC Docket 468 (D. Nev. Aug. 9,
1989); United States v. Hansen, Litigation Release No. 12,094, 43 SEC Docket 1692 (D.
Utah May 15, 1989); United States v. Gleave, Litigation Release No. 12,024, 43 SEC Docket
108 (D. Utah Mar. 8, 1989).
545. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
546. See, e.g., In re M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., [Current Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,714, at 63.264 (Sept.
1, 1989) (evaluation by independent accountants and institution of special procedures for
major corporate transactions required for a certain time period); SEC v. Florafax, litigation
Release No. 10617, 31 SEC Docket 1038 (Nov. 27, 1984) (Florafax required to (i) establish
an Audit Committee, (ii) restate prior financial statements, and (iii) submit restatements to
independent audit).
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directors of public companies, once they had been found, or had
consented to be branded as, violators of the federal securities laws.
47
9. Unconventional Securities
Similarly, during the 1980s, the Commission maintained a fairly
active vigil against promoters and issuers of novel securities.1s
Reminiscent of the agency's program of the 1970s, the SEC also was
required to confront the question whether it could and should
regulate hybrid and unusual securities. Since most of these new
instruments are derivative in nature, the Commission has been
compelled to consider whether it wants to compete for regulatory
venue: Both the Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) asserted that many of these instruments fel
within their respective jurisdictions."9 Having decided to enter the
fray, the Commission lost the two major litigations in which the
issue was raised, and the CFTC's position was vindicated."'
547. See, e.g., In re Michael R. Maury, Exchange Act Release No. 23,067, [1982-
1987 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 73,493 (Mar. 26, 1986) (in consent proceeding, Vice President/Corporate Controller
of Oak Industries barred from serving as officer or director of public company based on
carrying out "directions [of his superiors] which he knew or should have known were
improper . . . ."); In re Thomas C. Runge, Exchange Act Release No. 23,066, 35 SEC
Docket 432 (Mar. 26, 1986) (in consent proceeding, Treasurer of Oak Industries barred
from serving as officer or director of public company for failure to prevent Oak's violation
of reporting provisions); SEC v. Florafax, litigation Release No. 10,617, [1982-1987
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 73,444, at 63,161 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 27, 1984) (former officer barred from servicing
directly or through a nominee as officer of the company for three years).
548. See, e.g., SEC v. Enerdine Int'l Corp., litigation Release No. 9775, 26 SEC
Docket 439 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1982) (resort condominiums); United States v. Griggs, litigation
Release No. 11,215, 36 SEC Docket 737 (W.D. Va. Sept. 15, 1986) (limited partnership
interests in government subsidized housing projects); SEC v. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d
349 (6th Cir. 1984) (joint venture interests with passive investors); SEC v. Crowder,
litigation Release No. 11,575, 39 SEC Docket 553 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1987) (real estate
limited partnerships); SEC v. Schreiber, litigation Release No. 12,170, 44 SEC Docket 47
(S.D. Fla. July 20, 1989) (real estate limited partnerships); SEC v. McGuire, litigation
Release No. 11,753, 41 SEC Docket 62 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 1988) (limited partnerships in
oil and gas interests); cf. United States v. Center Art Galleries, Inc., 89 Cr. No. 00125 (D.
Haw. Jan. 26, 1989) (U.S. Attorney brought criminal indictment for securities laws violations
regarding fraudulent misrepresentations of investment potential of Salvador Dali
lithographs).
549. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,709 (Apr. 11, 1989) (LEXIS, Securities library,
Releases file) (SEC granting request of exchange to begin trading in index participation
contracts).
550. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) (index
participation held to be futures contract under exclusive jurisdiction of CFTC); Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982) (GNMA options held not to be securities).
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Ultimately, the two agencies resolved one impasse with an agreement
for new legislation that was promptly adopted.5 '
F Overview
The Commission's enforcement program in the 1970s was
controversial but quite successful. Tackling a variety of establishment
targets, the Commission expanded its jurisdiction by relying on
creative, and sometimes unsupported, statutory interpretations and
practices. The Commission's enforcement program of the 1980s,
under Shad and Fedders, promised to be different. And, it was. But
it was not different in concept. The 1980s saw the agency
prosecuting insider trading cases without explicit statutory authority
for all its theories, or direct support for many of its prayers for
relief. In addition, questions of qualitative materiality continued to
surface during the course of the 1980s, particularly as the agency
aggressively reviewed management's discussion and analysis of soft,
or qualitative, and forward-looking information. Topics like novel
securities and corporate governance remained equally high on the
Commission's enforcement priority list.
In sum, the Commission did articulate a different direction in the
1980s, and it did pursue different types of cases from those pursued
in the 1970s. But the more the Commission's enforcement program
purported to change, the more it resembled the program put
together by the predecessors of Shad and Fedders.
III. Expectations for the SEC's Enforcement Program in the 1990s
A. Preliminary Issues
1. Inherent Limitations Affecting the Predictability of the Commission's
Future Enforcement Initiatives
As we noted at the outset,52 it is difficult for anyone to attempt
to predict what thefuture configuration of the SEC's law enforce-
ment activities will/be. Nonetheless, we set forth below some of the
logical extensions of the enforcement program crafted by the
551. See S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24 (1982), cited in Chicago Mercantile,
883 F.2d at 544.
552. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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Commission during the 1980s. In doing so, however, certain caveats
are in order.
First, any projection of future SEC enforcement trends is highly
dependent upon the accuracy of prognostications about the
prevailing political climate. Through at least the first two years of
the next decade, a moderately conservative Republican Admini-
stration will influence the direction of governmental policy in
general, and the Commission in particular."' As far as law
enforcement is concerned, the Bush Administration has made it
abundantly dear that the premises of the Reagan Administration are
not necessarily the same premises that will govern the Bush agenda."
It is, of course, not possible to predict whether the current
Administration will be renewed for a second four-year term,
although based solely on historical precedents that is likely to be the
case. Should history's precedents be confirmed, that would take the
SEC to 1996, at which time the same issues regarding a possible
change in Administration would once again arise. Accordingly, any
projections about likely SEC enforcement initiatives are apt to be
valid for about five years, under the best of circumstances.
Second, and as a corollary of the first caveat, the 1990s will more
than likely see at least one, and possibly several, changes in the
SEC's chairman. This is likely to occur for several reasons, not the
least of which is that, historically, the average tenure of SEC
chairmen has been relatively brief.5 Moreover, if the current
Administration continues in office, it is more than likely that the
current SEC Chairman, Richard Breeden, will be considered for
other government positions as time passes.""6 Finally, if the current
553. Although, as a general proposition, the Commission is oblivious to political
pressures, fbr the first time in its history the Commission's Chairman is a confidante of the
incumbent President. See supra note 81. As a result, he is likely to channel the Commission's
agenda in a direction or directions that are compatible with those of the President, either
intuitively, or with the assistance of relatively frequent communications.
554. See, e.g., Nash, Stronger U.S. Antitrust Action Vowed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1989,
at A33, col. 5 ("The [Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the head of the
Justice Department's antitrust division, [both Bush appointees] who took office last summer,
indicated ... that the antitrust enforcement policies of the Reagan administration would
be changed").
555. The average tenure for the 21 past SEC Chairmen (not including acting
chairmen or Messrs. Shad and Ruder) has been approximately 26 months. See Longstreth,
Book Review, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of its Past and Future, 83 COLUM. L.
Riv. 1593, 1607 (1983) (reviewing J. SELIGMAN, THE TRA4NSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
(1982)). With Mr. Shad's unusual six-year service, and Mr. Ruder's two year stint, the
average for 23 chairmen is approximately 28 months. If Mr. Shad's tenure is excluded, the
average drops to under 26 months.
556. The SEC has been a springboard for other high-level government offices. For
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Administration is not re-elected in 1992, the incumbent Chairman
almost certainly would depart from the agency. 57
Third, the future of the SEC's enforcement program will be
influenced to a very meaningful extent by the agency's Director of
Enforcement,5 8 and some of the Director's immediate subordinates."
As of this writing, there is little discernible indication precisely how
new Director of Enforcement McLucas will react to a number of the
issues likely to confront the Enforcement Division over the next few
example, William Casey left the SEC after approximately two years as its Chairman, and
became Undersecretary of State, and thereafter President of the Export-Import Bank.
Similarly, John S.R. Shad was appointed Ambassador to Norway after he served nearly six
years as the SEC's Chairman.
557. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1982),
each member of the Commission is nominated for a five-year term; once confirmed, a
member of the Commission cannot be removed without cause. See Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The authority of Congress, in creating
[independent] agencies ... includes, as an appropriate incident, power to ... forbid
[members'] removal except for cause. For it is quite evident that one who holds his office only
during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence
against the latter's will") (emphasis supplied).
Pursuant to Section 3 of Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, however, the President
has the exclusive authority to designate one of the Commissioners to serve as the agency's
Chairman. See 15 Fed. Reg. 3175, 64 Stat. 1265. The Chairman of the SEC serves as such
solely at the pleasure of the President. As a practical matter, no Chairman of the SEC has
ever continued to serve as Chairman after a change in the political composition of the
incumbent Administration.
558. There are some limitations on precisely how much influence the SEC's Director
of Enforcement can exert on the contours of an ongoing enforcement program. Among
other things, many of the cases the Commission pursues are mainstream fraud cases which
a government official would be hard-pressed to justify quashing. Moreover, as noted earlier,
see supra note 24, much of the enforcement work of the agency is serendipitous; the
Commission is essentially a partial captive of the prevailing business environment.
It is, however, undoubtedly the case that the Director of Enforcement at the
Commission can, and will, have far more influence over the Commission's enforcement
program than any member of the Commission, or the five Commissioners as a body. This
is so because the Commission has delegated vast discretion and authority to its Director of
Enforcement. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4 (1989) (delegating powers of the Commission to the
Director of Enforcement). In brief, the Director of Enforcement controls work assignments,
and determines which cases should be pursued and which cases should be halted
mid-stream (or earlier). Most of the judgmental factors relevant to an ongoing enforcement
program never reach the Commission, and are largely incapable of review by the
Commissioners. In essence, the role of a Chairman (or the Commission as a body) is limited
to (i) delineation of policies of cases to be pursued; (ii) establishment of enforcement policies
and priorities (for example, vis-a-vis the types of cases that will be brought, the types of
defendants who will be pursued, the types of relief that may be sought, and the types of
settlements that will be acceptable); and (iii) review of concrete enforcement
recommendations brought to the Commissioners for approval.
559. The Director of Enforcement is the chief enforcement officer for the
Commission, but certainly has little of the day-to-day responsibility for the management of
the Division's caseload. That function falls to four Associate Directors (including one for
International Enforcement Matters) and the Division's Chief Counsel and Chief Trial
Attorney.
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years. Moreover, there is apt to be some turnover in the Director's
position during the coming decade as well, regardless of whether the
Administration changes at some point during that time.60
Fourth, any enforcement program must be flexible enough to
respond to changes in economic and other ambient circumstances.
The Commission has shown the capacity, the flexibility and the
creativity to respond to a variety of developments outside the normal
ambit of securities law enforcement in the past,5"' and is likely to do
so through the coming decade. The difficulty for prognosticators is
that it is not possible to determine in advance of some of these
scandals and other developments precisely what ambient
circumstances the Commission may be called upon to address.
Fifth, the Commission's enforcement program will be influenced,
to a large extent, by the effects of the ongoing Congressional
oversight to which the agency routinely is subject. It is not now
possible to predict precisely what the effects of that oversight will be,
but it can be foreseen that those effects will be a significant factor in
shaping the future directions of the agency's enforcement program.
In particular, for every Congressional prod of the Commission (or
vice-versa) for more far-reaching enforcement powers and remedies,
there will be a direct effect on the Commission's enforcement
program. 6
2. Administrative Considerations
Two misperceptions, somewhat contradictory in nature, confront
those who attempt to assess or evaluate enforcement programs.
These are (i) the tendency to view such programs as solely the
product of one or two individuals; and (ii) the inability to view such
programs as more than the product of a monolithic entity devoid of
human qualities and frailties. It is important to avoid both
misperceptions.
First, while it is true that the Commission's enforcement program
is guided by a limited number of individuals,"' it is implemented by
560. The position of Enforcement Division Director is a highly visible one, and is not
likely to serve as the final professional stopping point for any incumbent.
561. The Commission's responses to the Watergate scandal and the deluge of
improper foreign corporate payments during the 1970s, see supra note 157 and
accompanying text, and the defense contractors' scandal of the 1980s, see supra note 5 and
accompanying text, typify this flexibility.
562. See infra notes 652-53 and accompanying text.
563. See supra notes 558-59 and accompanying text.
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a much wider circle of persons.5" The enforcement process carries
with it more than just the establishment of broad policies. It also
necessitates difficult judgments about the weight of evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, the need for certain forms of relief in precise
factual contexts, and similar judgments.5 " These judgments are the
product of the field work done by the SEC Enforcement Division
Staff, and it is that work on which the senior officials of the Division
of Enforcement, and ultimately the members of the Commission,
heavily rely.
To the extent that the agency succeeds in attracting qualified
individuals, and furnishes them with the necessary resources to do
their jobs well, the judgments ultimately made by the agency will be
sharper and withstand inevitable judicial and congressional
scrutiny.5" To the extent the agency is unsuccessful in attracting
bright young attorneys, and experienced lateral attorneys seeking to
acquire some experience in government, the agency's enforcement
program will suffer materially. There are several components of this
equation.
The Commission has always been a young agency, populated by
youthful and sometimes inexperienced lawyers in many of its offices
and divisions.167 This is a function of
564. See supra note 559 and accompanying text.
565. Indeed, the overarching principle that must be remembered in this highly
judgmental aspect of the Commission's mandate is that "[t]he power to investigate carries
with it the power to defame and destroy." Canons of Ethics for Members of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 200.66 (1989).
566. See Hearing Before the Securities Subcomm. of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Comm. Regarding the Securities and Exchange Commission, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-20
(1987) (written statement of Harvey L. Pitt) [hereinafter Pitt Testimony].
567. Youth and inexperience are not the same, however, and do not always go
hand-in-hand. From the earliest days of the agency, many of its leaders were relatively
young, although extremely accomplished, a trend that seems to be continuing today.
William 0. Douglas, who was later to become a Justice of the Supreme Court, was
considered a leading authority on corporate finance as a young Yale law professor before
accepting a top staff position at the SEC. See TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra
note 28, at 110-111. Mr. Douglas also served as a Commissioner, and from March 1938 to
April 1939, was Chairman of the SEC. Id. at 155. Almost fifty years later, Richard Breeden,
the current SEC Chairman, is only 39 years of age and already has spent several years in
private law practice in between stints of government service as an executive assistant to the
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor, deputy counsel to then Vice-President George
Bush, and a number of troubleshooting roles, most notably regarding the Administration's
position regarding the thrift crisis, as assistant for issues analysis to President Bush. Singer,
Richard Breeden. True But Not Tried, AM. LAW. at 50, 52-53 (Nov. 1989).
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(i) lower, and often inadequate, compensation for
professionals;s
(ii) rapid turnover of professionals;? 9
(iii) an inability, at times, to "sell" the nature of the
Commission's workproduct to the brightest attorneys
graduating from law schools; °
(iv) the difficult working conditions to which young
attorneys in the government often must acclimate
themselves;"7 ' and
568. The Commission has compensated its personnel on the Civil Service scale since
its inception. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b) (1982). These salaries are far lower than competing
salaries offered to professionals in the private sector. See 1989 16th Annual AICPA National
Conference on Securities and Exchange Commission Developments [hereinafter SEC Developments],
Federal News Service, Jan. 10, 1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file) (remarks of then
SEC Chairman David S. Ruder). No matter how committed an individual may be to the
ideal of public service, it is very difficult to compare a $27,172 starting salary for SEC
attorneys with an $80,000 starting salary for starting attorneys in the private sector,
particularly in cities such as Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. It
becomes even more difficult to make such comparisons when many young lawyers emerge
from law schools burdened with the debt of an expensive law school education.
The problem is less acute at senior levels of the government, where the high visibility,
and the promise, ultimately, of a prominent private sector position serve to encourage some
individuals to sacrifice short-term compensation for long-term rewards. See Breeden Cites
Competitive Challenge of Growing International Marketplace, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) Nov. 21,
1989 (Breeden stated that "the pay of the Commission and the Chairman is not as critical
[as the pay at the staff level] because people are always willing to fill these positions for a
limited time"). It is ironic, but revealing, to compare the Commission's Fiscal 1989 Budget
of $142.6 million to the $167.5 million allocated that year to military bands. See Drexel Will
Be Fined $650 Million, But SEC Won't Get a Cent, Assoc. Press, Feb. 2, 1989 (PM Cycle)
(LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
569. Most staff attorneys stay an average of two to three years at the SEC. That
number is even smaller when looked at solely from the perspective of the Enforcement
Division. See SEC Developments, supra note 568.
570. "Selling" the agency is not difficult when the agency's work is well understood
by law students. In earlier times, securities laws were thought of as relatively arcane;
indeed, until fairly recently, many law schools did not offer a formal course on securities
regulation. Today, it is the rare exception if a law school does not offer several securities
law courses, and many schools have developed graduate programs in the specialty of
securities law.
571. It is not possible in this article to catalogue all of these problems, but they
include the following: (i) lack of adequate training; (ii) inadequate per diem and travel
allowances; (iii) inadequate office space (both in terms of the cramped quarters the
Commission historically has had to endure, and the lack of adequate facilities to house the
lawyers the agency is able to hire); (iv) inadequate paralegal and non-professional help; and
(v) inadequate resources, in the form of computers and other facilities that enable lawyers
to focus on professional issues rather than function at both the professional and
non-professional levels. See Pitt Testimony, supra note 566.
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(v) the fact that many young lawyers interested in
some exposure to government service choose to
start with the government and then rotate into the
private sector, rather than starting in the private
sector, and rotating into the government.7
Heading into the 1990s, the SEC is well-positioned to attract
bright lawyers to government service. Its enforcement program has
been highly visible and many young lawyers are interested in
participating in a law enforcement program upon graduating from
law school, particularly a program that promises the opportunity to
confront successful and famous individuals in a variety of public and
private preoccupations. No longer an arcane subject on a crowded
law school agenda, securities law has become a prominent feature of
the law school curriculum, and the SEC's ability to recruit able
lawyers should improve by virtue of the success of its enforcement
program during the past decade.
73
Beyond the visibility and relevance of the agency and its work is
its current campaign to remove the restrictions of the Civil Service
salary cap.574 Unlike certain of the banking agencies, which long ago
were relieved of the necessity of conforming attorney salaries to civil
service salary limitations, 575 the SEC has been saddled with an
outmoded system of compensation, predicated upon different
572. Needless to state, there is no one "right" approach to government service. But
the realities of the private sector may promote the choice referred to in the text. Most
attorneys interested in government service see it as a vehicle for earlier and better
responsibility for matters than they may receive in private practice, and believe that
government service may afford them an opportunity to develop a specialty in the law before
it would be possible to accomplish the same result at most law firms. Those intent on
partnership at a law firm are aware that most firms make their judgments about
partnership in a lawyer's fifth through eighth years out of law school. That suggests for
many attorneys that a two or three year apprenticeship at a government agency will not
unduly restrict their chances for a partnership with a private law firm. Those who start at
a private law firm usually decide to seek out government service in their second through
fourth years, enabling them to return to the private sector and permit their law firms an
opportunity to evaluate their partnership qualifications.
573. The SEC's other divisions and offices are highly attractive as well. Moreover,
the shock of several market crashes, and the lure of international securities regulation,
should make the SEC an exciting agency for many law students.
574. Unless otherwise specified in another statute, all federal employees must be
classified according to a class and grade, for purposes of applying uniform levels of
compensation. See 5 U.S.C. § 5107 (1982).
575. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Act of 1913, § 11(1), 38 Stat. 251, 262-63 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 248(1) (1982)).
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considerations for vastly different agencies. 7 6 The current SEC
Chairman has advocated removing the Commission from the Civil
Service salary limitation system, and putting the agency on an equal
footing with its sister agencies in the banking field. 7 The prospects
for such a change in SEC compensation levels appear positive and,
coupled with proposals to make the agency a self-funding
operation,"' suggest that the agency may subsequently acquire more
latitude in the direction of its program. 79 But, even if there is little
prospect of removing the existing Civil Service salary cap, the broad
publicity given to the mere possibility of more money may, itself, do
wonders for the SEC's recruitment program, at least in the short
term.
The factors identified above, combined with a broadly anticipated
malaise in private sector law practice, suggest that the caliber of SEC
professionals should rise markedly during the 1990s. This should
576. The Civil Service salary cap is a function of comparing government service with
the private sector. This approach is meaningful when the positions and duties being
compared bear some relevance to each other. For example, it is logical and relevant to
compare the salary of a government secretary with that of a private sector secretary. The
figures used to evaluate government salaries, however, do not adequately take account of
specialized professional training such as in law, science, and the like. See COMMISSION ON
ExEcUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES, FAIRNESS FOR OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS 11-
12 (1989). A recent Presidential review panel found that the current Civil Service salary
scale is detrimentally behind the levels applicable in the private sector, and recommended
a substantial pay raise for all government employees. Id. Notwithstanding that finding,
amply supported by a detailed analysis, Congress has refused to raise government salaries
because the current Civil Service pay scale statutorily ties the pay for government civil
servants and federal judges with the salary received by Congress. Since the Congress has
been unable, politically, to justify to itself raising salaries for future Congresses (by
Constitutional limitation, the Congress cannot raise its own salary, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6,
l. 2), there is great pessimism whether the salaries of government employees will be raised
meaningfully under the current system.
577. See generally Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 47.
578. The SEC historically has taken in more funds each year, generated by its fee
structure for processing registration statements, etc., than it has expended in its annual
budget. The Commission's operation as a so-called profit center has led some commentators
to suggest that the agency's budget should be funded by the profits it generates. See Drexel
Will Be Fined $650 Million, But SEC Won't Get a Cent, Assoc. Press, Feb. 2, 1989 (PM Cycle)
(LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file) (former SEC Chairman David Ruder and Rep. John
Dingell propose SEC self-funding, based on the agency's fee generation of approximately
twice its annual budget); see also Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 46-47.
579. An agency that is not funded through the appropriations process must, by
definition, have greater control over its own programs. When an agency is dependent upon
the normal budget processes for its funding, it must justify its programs first to the
Administration and then to the Congress, and it is likely to be affected by general
budgetary trends and deficits. While the SEC has often fared better than many of its sister
agencies because of its mission and performance, it has nevertheless felt the sting of
government budget cuts. Needless to state, of course, although putting the SEC on a
self-funding basis would not relieve the agency of justifying its programs or its expenditures,
the process would be less onerous, and the agency would derive greater autonomy.
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have a decidedly positive effect on the quality and creativity of the
agency's enforcement program."'
B. General Attributes of the SEC's Enforcement Program that can be
Anticipated in the 1990s
1. Modifying the Rend Toward Deregulation
Although the Bush Administration see ns less militant about
proving its commitment to deregulation/ than did the Reagan
Administration at a comparable period in the life of the first Reagan
Term, there is no doubt that the current Administration does favor
rational deregulatory initiatives.58" ' The SEC can be expected to
embrace the general principle that deregulation should be pursued
wherever possible. 82 Nevertheless, early indicia suggest that the
Breeden Commission may be more receptive to some forms of
regulation than the Shad Commission, particularly in such areas as
the financial soundness of broker-dealers,"' penny stock market
practices,'" disdosures related to LBO practices,"5 private placement
580. See Business and the Law: Downturn Crimps Large Law Firms, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2,
1990, at D2, col. 1. The private bar has long supported efforts to improve the caliber of
the SEC's professional staff, through more generous budgets, higher salaries, and
self-funding. See, e.g., Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities
Industy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1987) (statement of Milton H. Cohen) ("the
adequacy of the Commission's resources to carry out its responsibilities... are inadequate,
and seriously so"); id. at 102 (statement of Harvey L. Pitt) ("the political and public
concerns about increasing the size of the agency's budget and the take-home pay of its
employees can be allayed by a simple expedient-placing the Commission on a
self-sustaining basis, and relieving the Commission of the constraints that presently limit the
salary scale to Civil Service-prescribed amounts"); id. at 119 (statement of James C.
Treadway) ("I can think of no reason why the SEC's fee schedule... should not make the
SEC self-supporting in virtually all years"). The reason for this support is simple: Private
practitioners are apt to be more successful in their representation of clients before the SEC,
both in the enforcement context and in the regulatory and disclosure contexts, if they are
facing capable attorneys who have developed a certain amount of job maturity. Heavy
turnover and poor recruitment are thus detrimental to the interests of the private sector.
The Commission's new Chairman has also taken up the cause for self-funding as a
means to obtain higher salaries for the Commission's Staff. See Breeden, Cites Competitive
Challenge of Growing International Marketplace, Daily Rep. for Execs., Nov. 21, 1989, at 223
("'Many people are willing to engage in public service,' Breeden stated, but we don't need
to ask them to commit financial suicide'").
581. See, e.g., Bush May Tty to Revive Some Industry Controls, LA Times, Feb. 5, 1989,
§ 1, at 1, col. 3 ("the new [Bush) Administration, less ideological than the old, will probably
seek to reinstate federal controls in some areas even as it relaxes regulations elsewhere").
582. See, e.g., Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 93-94, 101, 104.
583. Id. at 16-17, 37-38.
584. Id. at 13, 99-100.
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abuses,'M and the regulation of multiservice financial institutions if
the Glass-Steagall Act is repealed."7
As we have seen, to the extent the Commission continues to
pursue deregulation as an operating philosophy, the likelihood will
increase that the Commission will be required,"' and in any event
will opt,"' to step up the pace of its enforcement efforts. Moreover,
the Commission's enforcement program almost certainly will become
more aggressive than it has been in the past. These conclusions stem
from several considerations.
First, deregulation generates pressure to step up enforcement:
absent sufficient regulatory controls, the government will not be
available to screen potential violations of the law before they occur.
Moreover, individuals are more likely to run afoul of broad, generic
legal standards than detailed regulatory requirements. In addition,
the competition facing this country's securities markets itself
demands an improved enforcement presence and aggressiveness. As
competition between marketplaces increases, market share will likely
be determined by the most efficient marketplaces and those that are
deemed to be the fairest and best policed. Chairman Breeden has
confirmed the essential accuracy of these conclusions at an early
stage in his tenure. Drawing analogies to the thrift crisis, Breeden
585. Id. at 5-7. 63, 70-71, 84-85, 94-96, 103-04, 108-09.
586. Id. at 21-22.
587. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 42. The Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 162,
is codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) and scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
588. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
589. That certainly is the flavor of new SEC Chairman Breeden's comments to the
Congress. For example, Chairman Breeden advised the Senate that he
would support efforts to reduce U.S. regulatory disincentives to extending offers to
U.S. holders on equal terms with those of other shareholders, where the home
country's regulatory scheme is adequate to protect investors and the percentage of
shares held by U.S. persons is not significant. However, in any such system
jurisdiction over fraudulent conduct that has an effect on U.S. persons should be
retained.
Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 68. See also id. at 13 (emphasizing need for continued
vigorous insider trading enforcement program, international law enforcement cooperation,
and increased criminal referrals, inter ala); id. at 49 ("[a]n effective and aggressive
enforcement program will continue to be essential to deter wrongdoers, preserve the
integrity of the securities markets and thereby maintain the investor confidence that is vital
for capital formation"); id. at 86 ("[o]ne of the most effective means to increase individual
investor confidence ... is for the Commission ... to enforce aggressively rules against
insider trading, front-running, and other manipulative practices that compromise the
integrity and fairness of the markets").
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has indicated that an effective enforcement program must be
aggressive, assured, non-tentative, and expeditious."'
2. Using Enforcement Proceedings as a Substitute for Regulation
Because of the prominence of enforcement programs in a
deregulatory environment, there remains a possibility that
enforcement proceedings will become a substitute for formal
regulation. This presents an omnipresent problem with respect to
fraud prosecutions, and there even exists a danger in connection
with proceedings designed to improve the quality and caliber of
corporate disclosures by publicly-owned companies. Despite
safeguards designed to prevent the misuse (or abuse) of enforcement
proceedings from substituting for regulation, the agency's emphasis
on high profile enforcement makes regulation through enforcement
a continuing possibility.
3. Increased Publicity for the Enforcement Program
Particularly during the past two decades, the SEC incorporated
publicity into the agency's enforcement strategy.5"' This trend is
likely to continue in the decade ahead: the Commission almost
certainly perceives publicity as an important component of the
deterrent effect of its enforcement program, and that deterrence is
a major policy goal of the program.5  As a result, the agency can be
expected to emphasize its enforcement initiatives, and continue the
trend toward greater publicity of the agency's activities. Moreover,
as a result of the high visibility of the Commission's program over
the past decade, the Commission could not decrease the publicity
given to SEC cases even if it desired to do so. Most of the financial
media have increased their coverage of the SEC, and in particular
its enforcement program; even publications that ordinarily would
not be covering the Commission have followed its exploits.593
The financial and news media, however, are not the only sources
of publicity regarding the efforts of the SEC's enforcement program.
Congress has increased its oversight of the Commission's activities,
which is a direct product both of the high visibility of the
590. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 86.
591. See supra notes 133-60 and accompanying text.
592. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
593. See, e.g., SEC Probe of Farley Recalls a Charge Raised in WPP Suit, Women's Wear
Daily, Feb. 10, 1989, at 8; Those Wild Stock Swings, 11 WOW.ING WOMAN 50 (1986).
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Commission's enforcement activities during the past decade,4 and
the Commission's decision to seek additional powers from
Congress.59 5 Given the Commission's continued requests of Congress
for additional legislative powers, this trend of Congressional
involvement in, and publicity for, the SEC's enforcement program
is sure to continue.
Finally, it should not be overlooked that the increasing
internationalization and interdependence of securities markets makes
the Commission's enforcement program a likely candidate for
increased publicity, not just in the United States, but throughout the
capital markets of the world. The Commission's program is already
perceived as a model for other countries that aspire to develop
sophisticated capital markets.5 6 Moreover, as more and more
international offerings, takeovers, and other activities occur over the
next decade, the SEC's enforcement efforts will extend well beyond
United States nationals to implicate important individuals and
entities overseas as well.
4. Increased Enforcement Authority
The success of the Commission's insider trading enforcement
program, combined with the agency's flourishing efforts to increase
the penalties for illegal insider trading, have encouraged the agency
to seek additional remedies and enforcement tools for use outside
the area of insider trading.5" Thus, even prior to the recent change
in the leadership of the Commission, the agency had submitted to
Congress far-reaching, and somewhat controversial, proposals to
increase the Commission's authority to assist foreign governments
and entities in their enforcement activities."' Additionally, pursuant
to the directive contained in ITSFEA,599 the Commission had
proposed significant additional enforcement powers.6
594. When the Commission's enforcement program became a public preoccupation,
Congress became more active in reviewing the agency's efforts, evaluating them, and
deciding what role properly should be played by the legislature in this context.
595. See supra notes 408-22 and accompanying text.
596. See, e.g., Behr, Trade Link Promises Regulatory Headaches, Wash. Post, Oct. 26,
1986 at DI, col. 3 ("In Tokyo, where a market for U.S. stocks is expanding, trading is
governed by securities law patterned after American statutes").
597. See supra notes 408-22 and accompanying text.
598. See supra note 378 and accompanying text,
599. See ITSFEA § 3(c), H.R. 5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(c) (1988).
600. See supra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
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The SEC's new Chairman has made manifest his support for the
grant of additional authority to the Commission in this regard,
including the power to impose fines in a wide variety of cases
(including the imposition of such fines directly by the agency in
administrative proceedings), and, perhaps, the power to seek cease
and desist orders when someone has violated the federal securities
laws.""' Although the new Chairman has recently expressed the view
that the Commission may in fact not need the administrative power
to bar certain persons from serving as officers or directors of
publicly-held companies,"' the legislative proposal to that effect
submitted by the Commission to Congress remains pending."°
Given the current climate surrounding the Commission's
enforcement program, one may reasonably predict that, in the
absence of a change in Commission philosophy, and perhaps even
in spite of such a change,' the Commission will receive new powers
to sanction violations of the federal securities laws. If this new
authority and power is granted to the Commission, its enforcement
program could change dramatically.
5. Increased Development of Aggressive Enforcement Remedies
A major tenet of the Commission's enforcement program
throughout the past decade has been an insistence on greater
deterrence. 5 This emphasis on deterrence explains why the agency
has frequently sought from Congress during the past decade
additional grants of enforcement authority and stiffer sanctions: the
601. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 13-14.
602. See SEC For First Time Asks Congress To Grant It Cease-and-Desist Powers, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 155 (Feb. 2, 1990) ("[The SEC] has decided to drop a
controversial request for authority to bar officers and directors through administrative
proceedings, SEC Chairman Breeden told the Senate Banking Securities Subcommittee");
see also supra notes 408-22 and accompanying text.
603. Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, H.R. 975, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H270 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989).
604. ITSFEA was not a Commission creation. It emanated from the oversight
function performed by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance. Nevertheless, after the legislation developed its own momentum, and
eliminated some of its more objectionable features (such as a proposed Qui Tam provision),
the Commission enthusiastically supported the legislation. See Insider Trading: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
H.R. REP. No. 225, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1988) (remarks of SEC Chairman David
S. Ruder).
605. See, e.g., Grundfest Calls for Enhanced Detection in Deterring Securities Law Violations,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 204 (Feb. 3, 1989).
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essential theory is that heavier sanctions will deter more violations
of the federal securties laws.6"
By the same token, ever since the 1970s, the Commission has
been consistently aggressive in its pursuit of ancillary remedies once
it detects a violation of the federal securities laws. Despite the
agency's efforts to effect helpful legislation, it has never been
reluctant to assert the authority to seek and obtain from some courts
a broad range of ancillary remedies, including some of the specific
remedies the agency is currently seeking from Congress. °7 Because
of the agency's conviction that increased penalties effectively deter
potential violators of the federal securities laws, the SEC can be
expected to continue, and perhaps increase, its efforts to expand the
range of implied sanctions it can seek in courts or negotiate in
settlements.6
Finally, as a corollary to these propositions, the SEC can be
expected to seek harsher sanctions in connection with its
enforcement program. To tle extent that the agency continues to
606. The logic of this rationale is not subject to empirical testing. One could compare
the number of insider trading cases detected and pursued prior to 1984, before sanctions
for insider trading increased dramatically, as against the number of similar cases detected
and brought after 1984. The fact is that there were more prosecutions for insider trading
after Congress provided for increased penalties than before. A review of selected SEC
Annual Reports through 1987 shows that the Commission brought 121 insider trading cases
prior to 1984, see 52 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1986); 48 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1982); 49 SEC ANN.
REP. 3 (1983), while the number of SEC cases brought since then is only slightly smaller,
or 105. See 50 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1984); 51 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1985); 53 SEC ANN. REP.
10 (1987). Thus, in the three years following the enactment of ITSA. the Commission had
approached the number of insider trading cases brought in the previous fifty years; when
the numerous other insider trading cases brought by the Commission in 1988 and 1989 are
added, see cases cited supra at notes 327-28, there is no doubt that more insider trading
cases have been brought after the sanctions for insider trading were substantially increased.
That does not mean, however, that the adoption of heavier penalties did not serve as
a deterrent. All that can be said is that the opportunities and motivation for illegal insider
trading increased after 1984, see Problems with the SEC's Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws in
Cases Involing Suspiious Trades Originating from Abroad. Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 83 (1988) (testimony of Harvey
L. Pitt), and the Commission's ability to detect and pursue illegal insider trading also
improved during that time. Id. at 75, 86-87.
607. See supra notes 408-10 and accompanying text.
608. This has already been demonstrated to some extent. The agency developed the
notion of disgorgement, as an equitable remedy for insider trading violations, during the
1960s. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)
(disgorgement and recission consistent with underlying policies of federal securities laws),
cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Commission's theory was that
a court of equity could deprive an adjudicated wrongdoer of the ill-gotten gains derived
from his or her illegal conduct. By the end of the 1980s, this theory, which has a logical
nexus to insider trading violations, also had been applied, successfully, to violations of the
reporting requirements of the Williams Act. See First City, discussed supra at note 470-73 and
accompanying text.
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find widespread illegality in various aspects of the domestic securities
markets, the internal and external pressure to raise the stakes for
securities violators will increase. Given the SEC's historical
predilection towards increasing sanctions when the standard of the
law becomes better established and more widely recognized, the next
decade should witness a concerted effort by the agency to increase
the level of penalties imposed for various violations of the federal
securities laws.
6. Increased Criminalization of the Federal Securities Laws Enforcement
Process
As noted previously,0 the 1980s ushered in an era of increased
criminalization of the federal securities laws enforcement prucess.
This trend is demonstrated by the increased number of highly-visible
criminal prosecutions emanating from SEC enforcement cases.
However, it would be misleading not to point out that this supposed
increased criminalization of the federal securities laws was not a
wholly independent phenomenon.
For one thing, these highly visible SEC enforcement cases of the
1980s were of a sufficient magnitude to have warranted criminal
prosecution under any set of circumstances.610 Beyond that, counsel
for the defendants involved in such cases recognized the inherent
criminality of the conduct involved, and decided with their clients to
pursue criminal resolutions of these cases on their own initiative.
Perhaps most importantly, however, is the invalidity of the concern
expressed by some attorneys that trivial securities law violations are
now becoming the targets of criminal prosecutions.6 ' One must keep
in mind exactly how the SEC enforcement process works. If the SEC
is interested in counsel's client, counsel must assess whether the case
609. See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
610. From the outset, it is dear that Congress intended truly egregious violations of
the Exchange Act to be criminally prosecuted. See Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139 (1934), in which it was opined that
Congress apparently expected that "reliance will be placed chiefly upon administrative and
injunction proceedings for enforcing the statute; and that ...only viciously fraudulent cases
wil draw the fire of federal prosecutos." Id. at 196-97 (emphasis supplied).
611. See generally Coffee, The 'Tip' of the Bunny's Nose: Sniffing Out Crime Where None
Exists, Legal Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at 34, col. I ("The problem of redefining the
boundaries of criminal law in ways that make it virtually coextensive with civil regulatory
law is that it ignores the advantages of having a gray penumbra of civil violations
surrounding an inner core of more egregious criminal violations").
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carries with it a criminal component."2 Once a judgment is made
that the case will not likely escape the attention of criminal
prosecuting authorities, judgments must be made whether to settle
or litigate the anticipated proceedings.
Where a decision is made to settle an anticipated criminal
proceeding, counsel often finds it wise to bargain for a variety of
benefits on behalf of his or her client in return for settling the
action. Two major components of any criminal settlement are the
number of charges to which a plea of some kind will be requiredt
6 1
and the nature of the charge (or charges) to which a guilty plea will
be entered.1 4 It is not surprising, therefore, to find a variety of
esoteric charges suddenly surfacing as violations of the federal
securities laws.13 Such an occurrence is not an indication that
prosecutors have elevated those esoteric charges to the level of
commonplace criminal conduct; rather, it is a pragmatic reflection of
the settlement process.
Nevertheless, the high-profile securities law enforcement program
of the 1980s has kept securities violations very much on the minds
of criminal prosecuting authorities around the country. Accordingly,
one may anticipate that, during the next decade, more securities law
cases that are being pursued by the SEC also will be referred, or
selected, for criminal prosecution.
7. Increase in Private Rights of Action
Private rights of action have always served as a necessary
supplement to the Commission's own enforcement program.6 In
connection with Congress' prior consideration of legislation to define
the crime of insider trading617  and its self-initiated, but
612. That is, counsel must determine whether, in his or her judgment, a given set
of facts implicates not only civil violations of the federal securities laws, but also a possible
interest by criminal prosecuting authorities. Once that judgment is made, counsel must
determine how to approach the case so as to maximize the client's chances either of
litigating the cases successfully, settling the SEC action without arousing the interest of
criminal authorities, or attempting to settle both the SEC and criminal proceedings likely
to arise, without undue prejudice to client's interests.
613. The pleas that are acceptable depend on the magnitude of the conduct
involved. Pleas of nolo contendere, however, are becoming more difficult to achieve, as
prosecutors insist upon, and obtain, guilty pleas to felony allegations.
614. See Practical Perpectives, supra note 121, at 380-81.
615. This presumably explains settlements in which defendants have consented to
plead guilty to violations of the SEC's net capital rules. See, e.g., United States v. Davidoff,
No. 87 Cr. 78 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1987).
616. See .1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); see supra notes 358-59.
617. See supra notes 330-33 and accompanying text.
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SEC-supported, effort to increase the sanctions for insider trading in
1988,"18 the Commission formally embraced the concept that the
theretofore implied right of action for insider trading under the
federal securities laws should be made express. Congress accepted the
Commission's view in this regard, and added both an express
remedy for insider trading and potential additional implied remedies
as well."'9
One may reasonably expect, then, that the next decade will see
an increase in private enforcement actions, particularly for insider
trading. Congress' handiwork may reflect a determination that, in
the absence of an express statement to that effect, no private right
of action should be implied. By the same token, it may also reflect
the view that Congress has endorsed private remedies and wishes to
see them fostered.
8. Decreased Flexibility in the Implementation of the Commission's
Enforcement Program
For the reasons discussed below, the SEC's enforcement program
in the 1990s is not likely to allow staff members as much flexibility
in the implementation of the program as in prior years.
First, as noted previously,"'0 the SEC's enforcement program has
become far more visible. As a result, the Commission's enforcement
decisions tend to be analyzed, reviewed, dissected, and criticized by
more people than ever before, particularly by those in the press and
in Congress. This phenomenon is the natural outgrowth of the
SEC's decision to use the press to publicize its enforcement efforts
(as part of its deterrent program),' and to seek increased
enforcement powers from Congress. 22 Because the SEC has shown
a sensitivity to criticism,62 it is likely to permit less flexibility in the
618. See ITSFFEA, supra note 371.
619. See Exchange Act §20A(a), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(a) (West Supp. 1989) (express
private remedy) and § 20A(d), 15 U.S.CA § 78t-l(d) (West Supp. 1989) (authority not to
restrict other express or implied rights of action).
620. See supra notes 133-61 and accompanying text.
621. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
622. See supra notes 408-10 and accompanying text.
623. See Hill Hears from SEC Tomorrow on Int'l Enforcement, Wall St. Letter, Mar. 20.
1989, at 6 ("SEC officials said the agency has become more sensitive to criticism that it has
fallen down on the job concerning oversight of foreign-oriented trading . . ."); SEC, Stung
by Criticism, Seeks Stiffer Insider Penalties, LA. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 2 ("sleuths
at the Securities and Exchange Commission were still smarting from accusations that they
had been too lenient in penalizing [Martin] Siegel's co-conspirator, confessed inside trader
Ivan F. Boesky").
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exercise of its prosecutorial discretion than might otherwise have
been the case.
Second, once the SEC succeeds in obtaining new enforcement
powers and remedies, either by virtue of new legislation, or
favorable judicial decisions, the agency will be expected to use them
(and likely will be taken to task for any failures in that regard).
Rather than willingly confront that type of scrutiny, the agency will
likely develop programs to use more effectively any new powers or
remedies it is granted.
Third, the Commission's ability to settle cases in the future may
diminish markedly as a result of a number of the factors described
below:
(i) Settlement is a function of pragmatics and leverage. Under the
Commission's old enforcement program, which emphasized injunctive
relief, and permitted defendants to walk away from litigation by
promising to do what the law already required those defendants to
do (namely, to obey the law), without any acknowledgement of
wrongdoing, the prospects of settlement were quite high.
But, while defendants may not care excessively about the adverse
publicity that normally accompanies a court order requiring them to
obey the law, they normally do, and will, care about serving time in
jail, or about paying substantial monetary fines. By definition, early
settlements may be discouraged by excessive governmental demands
for monetary or ancillary relief,"4 and increased pressure for
criminal sanctions.625
In this sense, the SEC's greatest successes over the past
decade-in the arena of insider trading-may have significantly
adverse consequences for its future law enforcement efficiency. As
more and more insider trading cases arose, and as Congress was
persuaded to adopt the Sanctions Act, and its provision for treble
624. See generally Andre, Jr., The Collateral Consequences of SEC Injunctive Relief. Mild
Prophylactic or Perpetual Hazard? 1981 U. ILL L. REv. 625 (1981). The Commission's
insistence upon injunctive relief usually is not an obstacle to the settlement of most
enforcement cases. To be certain, there are some significant collateral consequences that can
attend the entry of an injunction against an individual or an entity, not to mention the
adverse publicity that flows from the settlement. Nevertheless, most prospective defendants
see the entry of an injunction as merely a command that the defendant do what he, she
or it already was required to do-that is, obey the law. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
82 F.R.D. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). It is only when the government ventures beyond the
arena of simple injunctive relief that most defendants feel compelled to think carefully about
settlement.
625. See, e.g., Bad Week for Wealthy Fraud Suspects; Pressure Builds on Holdout Milken,
Assoc. Press, Sept. 1, 1989 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
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civil penalties in SEC insider trading actions, the SEC's demands for
higher monetary penalties also increased.62
This is particularly likely to be the case as the civil and criminal
enforcement processes become more and more entwined. Law
enforcement officials are not normally oblivious to the activities of
one another. If the SEC presses a proposed defendant for an
excessive or harsh settlement, involving components other than
injunctive relief, the mere fact of settlement may whet the appetite
of criminal prosecutors to pursue the same case. Given the different
standards that prevail in criminal and civil cases,'" however, criminal
prosecutors can be expected to exercise greater discretion in the
selection of criminal prosecution targets.68
(ii) The SEC's ability to settle its cases is also a function of its
flexibility. As noted above, the greater the SEC's flexibility, the more
likely it will be able to settle its matters and avoid the burdens of
litigation. 62 '9 During the 1980s, the enormous visibility of the SEC's
enforcement program persuaded Congressional oversight committees
to explore the wisdom of individual SEC settlements, producing
unusually harsh criticism of certain settlements."
626. See, e.g., SEC Nails Drexel Dealmaker, DUN'S BUS. MONTH, June 1986, at 19 ("The
SEC is seeking treble penalties against (Dennis B.] Levine for alleged profits earned after
August 10, 1984, the effective date of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984").
627. See supra note 295.
628. The burden of proof in a given case is one of the many factors weighed in the
determination whether to commence a criminal prosecution. Courts have demonstrated
great reluctance in interfering with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Inmates
of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1973) ("we
believe that substitution of a court's decision to compel prosecution for the U.S. Attorney's
decision not to prosecute, even upon an abuse of discretion standard of review and even
if limited to directing that a prosecution be undertaken in good faith, ... would be
unwise") (citation omitted).
629. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
630. A case in point occurred in connection with the Thomas Reed case during the
early part of the past decade. There, the SEC settled civil injunctive insider trading charges
against Reed, a member of the President's National Security Agency, and obtained over
$400,000 in disgorgement of allegedly ill-gotten gains. See SEC v. Reed, Litigation Release
No. 9537, 24 SEC Docket 442 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1981). Members of a congressional
oversight committee immediately criticized the SEC for a settlement that was too lax, see
Commission Denies Special Treatment in Settling Thomas Reed Insider Case, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 12, at 602 (Mar. 25, 1983), even though the disgorgement largely recouped the
monies allegedly gained improperlyby Reed. It should be noted in this context that, at the
time of the violative activities, Congress had not, as yet, passed the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act. Although SEC officials defended themselves vigorously, the oversight
committee was skeptical. Thereafter, the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York commenced a criminal prosecution of Reed for precisely the same conduct
that formed the predicate for the SEC's charges and ultimate settlement. Reed was
acquitted. See Juiy Clears Reed in Amax Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, at DI, col. 6.
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Congressional criticism is nothing new for the Commission; it has
followed the agency throughout most of its existence."' Nevertheless,
this criticism appears to have achieved its intended effect, at least to
the extent that the Commission often seems to consider whether its
proposed activities will generate criticism for having acted too weakly
in the face of egregious violations of law.S Moreover, during the
1980s, it became fairly dear that the Commissioners themselves were
reviewing with uncharacteristic detail staff-negotiated settlements
presented to the Commission for approval.as
631. For a sampling of such criticisms in recent years, see Regional Exchanges Urge
Delay in Expanded Multiple Options Trading, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1534,
1534 (Oct. 13, 1989) ("The [C]ommission's handling of the multiple trading issue has drawn
sharp criticism from some congressmen, including Rep. John Dingell .. ."); Ruder Says
Dreel Case Does Not Imply that Entire Securities Industry has Problems, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 36, at 1394, 1394 (Sept. 16, 1988) ("[t]he SEC came under criticism from Rep.
Howard Nielson (R-Utah), who contended the Commission should have brought the charges
against Drexel sooner . . ."); SEC Could Adopt Audit Committee Rule with Small Firm Exception,
Ruder Says, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 672, 672 (May 6, 1988) ("the SEC was
criticized sharply by Subcommittee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.) for not fully
supporting an antifraud Commission's recommendation . . ."); Dingell Warns SEC to Take
Action Soon On Curbing Program Trading Volatility, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at
221 (Feb. 13, 1987); SEC Efforts to Uncover Levine Scheme Hurt by Perjured Testimony, Lynch
Says, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1769 (Dec. 12, 1986) (Congressmen accuse
SEC of failing to pursue leads from New York Stock Exchange that later were attributable
to illegal trading by Dennis B. Levine); Troubled Banks Still Must Report on Collectibility of
Loans, FASB Says, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 648, 649 (May 2, 1986)
("Subcommittee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.) chastised the SEC for not investigating
the financial statements of Columbia First after the March 28 letter from the FASB staff");
House Members Split with SEC, Treasuy Over U.S. Securities Dealers Regulation, 17 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1098, 1100 (June 21, 1985) ("SEC recommendations came under
sharp attack by Wirth and Rinaldo, who were especially critical of the idea of granting
Treasury rulemaking authority over government securities dealers"); FASB Conceptual
Framework Criticized, Dingell Discusses Accounting Hearings, 17 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA)
No. 22, at 973, 973 (May 31, 1985) ("Dingell chastised the Securities and Exchange
Commission for its reluctance to use its considerable authority over accountants . . .").
632. The authors are not aware of any instance in recent times where the
Commission was criticized by Congress for extracting too harsh a settlement.
633. In response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the authors, the
Commission produced a 578-page printout of a computerized database maintained by a
former Commissioner for purposes of comparing proposed sanctions to prior similar
matters. (A copy of the request, and the authors' appeal from a partial redaction to the
database, are on file with authors). This database, entitled "Sanctions Project" includes the
following categories of information: Name of Settlors; Date Decided; Case Name; File;
Related Settlor; Sections Violated; Rules Violated; Nature of Case; Party; Recidivist; Prior
Sanctions; Litigation or Settled; Customer Losses; Relief Obtained; Notes. (A copy of the
Sanctions Project materials released to the authors by the SEC is on file with authors).
The Commission's current processes are not overly conducive to the flexible resolution
of nascent enforcement proceedings. Prior to the late 1960s, the Commission's enforcement
staff was authorized to alert potential defendants of the staffs likely recommendation that
enforcement proceedings be instituted, and to solicit any interest in settling the action prior
to presentation to the Commission. During the tenure of Chairman Hamer Budge, however,
a certain amount of mistrust of the enforcement staff prevailed, and the staff was instructed
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Because different Commissioners may have different ideas about
the settlement process, this effective second-guessing by individual
Commission members tends to make the staff somewhat more
cautious about approaching the settlement process with flexibility,
imagination and, on occasion, compassion.
(iii) As the SEC expands its arsenal of securities enforcement weapons,
it also potentially increases the rights of defendants who choose to litigate with
the agency. For example, it is now well-accepted that the agency's
decision to seek civil monetary penalties carries with it the
defendant's right to try the case to a jury of his or her peers." This
may not work to the defendant's advantage in some cases, but the
Commission's experience in litigating jury trial cases is limited.
65
(iv) The SEC's willingnes's to develop new legal theories in response
to the exigencies of particular cases may promote less receptivity to settlement.
The more aggressively the SEC pursues novel legal theories, the
more likely it is that settlements will be more difficult to achieve.
New legal theories create new avenues for defense, and defendants
who perceive themselves as beneficiaries of additional legal
argumentation are apt to seize the opportunity.636
that it could not thereafter solicit indications of interest in settlement prior to the
presentation to, and approval of, enforcement recommendation to the Commission. See SEC,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTCES 34-35
(1972) [hereinafter WELLS REPORT]. This restriction tends to work against defendants who
are represented by attorneys not familiar with the SEC's enforcement processes, since those
persons do not know that, under the current enforcement policy (which has not formally
changed since the Chairmanship of Hamer Budge), the staff will ordinarily not initiate
settlement discussions until it has obtained approval from the Commission to do so, but will
respond to such discussions if initiated by counsel for a prospective defendant.
This restriction also has the capacity to affect adversely the SEC staffs ability to
continue its heavy reliance on settlements. At a minimum, it means that the Commission's
decision to pursue a case will be predicated largely upon the staffs analysis and any
countervailing arguments submitted by the proposed defendants in the form of a so-called
"Wells Submission." See Procedures Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement
Proceedings and Termination of Staff Investigations, Securities Act Release No. 5310, [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,010 (Sept. 27, 1972). That analysis
tends to take on the trappings of an adversarial presentation 'by the time the staff has
determined to recommend formal enforcement proceedings. As a result, the staff often finds
that the Commissioners, if they have approved a recommendation for enforcement action,
are not receptive to later importunings to accept settlements that do not comport with the
staffs original description of its proposed enforcement action.
634. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); supra note 323 and
accompanying text.
635. Nevertheless, the Commission's victory in litigating its first ITSA jury trial, see
SEC v. Clark, Litigation Release No. 12,111, 43 SEC Docket 1574 (W.D. Wash. May 31,
1989), demonstrated the agency's readiness to take appropriate cases to trial.
636. Chairman Breeden may already be leading the Commission in that direction,
as he seeks to extract pre-judgment interest from settling (or non-settling) defendants in
insider trading cases. See supra note 318.
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C. Specific SEC Enforcement Initiatives Likely to Surface in the 1990s
1. Insider Trading
Given the high visibility of the Commission's insider trading
enforcement program in the past decade and the popular attention
it garnered, as well as the likelihood that increased sanctions will not
deter a significant amount of insider trading,67 one may logically
assume that a renewed, increased emphasis on insider trading will
mark the Commission's enforcement program over the coming
decade."' In addition, it can be anticipated that the Commission will
resume its aggressive enforcement of related violations, such as stock
parking"9 and similar misdeeds.
2. Penny Stock Abuses
The Commission's Task Force on Penny Stock Abuses is of
relatively recent vintage. Chairman Breeden has recently reaffirmed
his intention to continue the program and enforce it vigilandy."O
Having publicized the program and having witnessed extensive
637. See, e.g., SEC v. Wang, Litigation Release No. 11,780, 41 SEC Docket 384
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1988) discussed at supra note 156.
638. The process already has started. See SEC v. Lynch, Litigation Release
No. 12,311, 44 SEC Docket 1768 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1989) (SEC filed motion seeking
temporary restraining order to freeze defendant's assets based on allegations of insider
trading); SEC v. Finacor Anstalt and Certain Purchasers of Call Options Contracts for the
Common Stock of Combustion Engineering, Inc., Litigation Release No. 12,296, 44 SEC
Docket 1686 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1989) (court entered order freezing assets of foreign entity
based on allegations of insider trading).
639. One court has described stock parking as the practice in which "shares of stock
are held by someone other than the true owner for the purpose of lowering the apparent
amount of stock owned by that person ... " Champion Parts v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878
F.2d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1989).
640. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 13.
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publicity for it, " ' combined with an active state enforcement
program,' " the Commission will not let this program falter.
3. Market Manipulation Cases
Toward the end of the past decade, the Commission began
pursuing market manipulation cases with greater frequency.60 In
light of the greater volatility of the markets since the 1987 Crash,
the Commission can be expected to seek to regulate market
phenomena with which it disagrees through the vehicle of
enforcement.6"
4. Disclosures in Change of Control Contexts
In view of the Commission's reluctance to regulate further in the
takeover or leveraged buyout arena, and given the agency's concerns
about precluding foreign issuers from making bids within this
country, the Commission is likely to promote a hospitable
environment for change of control transactions, but police vigorously
failures to comply with disclosure requirements. Indeed, it is even
conceivable that this is one area in which the Commission may,
advertently or inadvertently, entirely substitute the enforcement
process for regulation.
641. See, e.g.. The Penny Stock Scandal, Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1989, at 74, col. 1.
642. New Jersey, Florida, Utah, and Georgia are increasing their supervision and
enforcement efforts. See id. at 77, 79-80. See, also Sartore v. Buder. 759 P.2d 785 (trustee
liable to beneficiary fbr improperly investing in penny stocks), affd en bane, 774 P.2d 1383
(Colo. 1989).
643. As early as 1982, the Commission had proclaimed its intention to pursue market
manipulation cases. See SEC's Shad, Fedders Deny Commission is Overemphasizing Insider Trading,
14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1785, 1785 (Oct. 22, 1982) ("Fedders said he was
'surprised' by the low number of market manipulation cases initiated during fiscal 1982...
but Fedders predicted that the figure is likely to go up during the next fiscal year"). This
proclamation was brought to its most dramatic fruition with the government's market
manipulation charges against Drexel. See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,999 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1988) (civil
charges); United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 89 Cr. 41 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24.
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (criminal charges).
644. Indeed, based upon the emphasis placed on market volatility in the questions
posed by members of the Senate Banking Committee to Chairman Breeden during his
confirmation process, it is evident that Congress will be watching closely the Commission's
response in future episodes of market volatility. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at
10-12, 17-20, 36, 50-51, 67.
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5. International Enforcement Activities
The agency's commitment to cooperation with foreign regulators,
and its avowed concern with the prospect of fraudulent international
schemes, strongly suggests that the Commission will increase its
campaign against internationally-based fraudulent schemes.
6. Stock Loan Activities
Chairman Breeden has already subscribed to the notion that
stock-loan abuses are extremely serious and should be a high
priority for the Commission during his tenure.6
.7. Thrift and Depository Institution Securities Law Violations
Chairman Breeden's familiarity with the difficulties of the thrift
industry, and the enormous range of violative conduct that is
presently being pursued by federal banking and criminal authorities,
made it inevitable that the SEC would pursue disclosure and trading
related claims against various thrift holding companies within the
SEC's jurisdiction. To that end, Breeden and Enforcement Division
Director McLucas are currently establishing a new financial
institution task force in the Division to focus on such mattters14
8. Financial Accounting Cases
The Commission's campaign against faulty application of
accounting techniques" 7 will undoubtedly continue during the next
decade. The utilization of questionable accounting principles to
overstate income or understate liabilities is a subject of great concern
to the agency. Particularly in light of the Commission's reluctance to
establish generally accepted accounting principles," it is logical to
assume that vigorous enforcement against faulty accounting
techniques will continue.
645. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 14-15.
646. See McLucas Is Named Enforcement Director of SEC, Its Second-Most Influential Post,
supra note 26.
647. See supra notes 478-83 and accompanying text.
648. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26, at 22-23.
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9. Disclosure of Adverse Information and Adverse Rends
The Commission has recently completed an analysis of, and
issued a release reminding issuers of their obligations regarding, the
disclosures provided in response to the SEC's MD&A requirements."9
In light of this heightened attention to issuers' disclosure, combined
with other adverse events affecting various industries,6  the
Commission can be expected to pursue instances of faulty disclosures
of adverse trends and other negative information.
10. Failure to Supervise Cases
Throughout its history, the Commission has placed great
emphasis on vicarious liability as a vehicle for maximizing its capacity
to police the securities markets. The Commission has recently
reaffirmed its intention to pursue such cases vigorously in the
coming years, a natural outgrowth of the recent ITSFEA legis-
lation."'
Conclusion
The Commission's reputation as an effective law enforcement
agency is well-established, rightfully earned, and borders on the
legendary. During the past decade, the agency made enormous
strides in improving the visibility, popularity, and effectiveness of its
enforcement program. The ingredients for the Commission's success
are many. They include an outstanding staff, an intensely dedicated
and aggressive spirit, and a desire for excellence that has been
maintained through nearly six decades of existence. The agency's
freedom from political influence, responsiveness to new trends, and
flexibility in promoting prompt and effective settlements with the
649. See supra notes 484-95 and accompanying text.
650. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Companies
Affected by the Government's Defense Contract Procurement Inquiry and Related Issues,
Securities Act Release No. 6791, 41 SEC Docket 720 (Aug. 1, 1988).
651. See Breeden Responses, supra note 26. at 16, 37-38. And, as noted earlier, ITSFE.A
puts into place onerous new supervisory obligations and increased penalties for lapses in
that regard. See supra notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recently put out for public comment
preliminary guidelines for sanctioning criminal wrongdoing by corporations. The proposed
guidelines would increase substantially the potential fines, probationary terms, and other
applicable sanctions. See Commission Would Up Punishment, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 3,
col. 1. Thus, if heightened SEC enforcement activities continue to generate resulting
criminal prosecutions, the stakes in certain supervision cases will increase dramatically.
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targets of its enforcement attentions have produced an efficient and
successful enforcement program.
And yet, part of the process by which this enforcement program
continues to grow has been an effort-both within and without the
agency-to build greater rigidity into the agency's past practices.
This is evidenced by, among other things, the effort of the media
and Congress to assume an unduly critical stance towards the
agency's enforcement judgments, often taking the agency to task for
settling too cheaply or too quickly.52 The SEC is sensitive to such
criticism, and seeks to deflect it as best it can. Recognizing the
greater visibility of its enforcement program, one can expect the
agency to impose upon its Enforcement Division the responsibility
for producing harsher and more publicly-acceptable settlements. This
process is comparable to the internal process by which members of
the Commission, commencing in the early 1980s, questioned the
judgments of the Enforcement Division Staff in settling cases too
"cheaply" or prematurely. Again, the response has been to increase
the price of settlements the SEC's staff is even willing to present to
the Commission.
Similarly, the SEC has succeeded in increasing the level of
penalties it can seek in connection with various illegal activities. This
effort, accomplished through the efforts of Congress, has produced
a greater risk for certain types of activities. There is no way to
measure whether the increase in sanctions has had a proportionally
increased deterrent effect, since one can never measure the
violations of law that are contemplated but do not take place. But
the bidding for increased sanctions continues, with proposals
pending in Congress as of this writing, authored by the SEC, that,
if adopted, would give the Commission inappropriate powers to
determine who may, and who may not, serve as a corporate officer
and director, despite (or even in the face of) conflicting judgments
made by corporate shareholders. As with the review of settlements,
the increase in SEC powers produces a concomitant scrutiny to
ascertain whether, and how well, the Commission is making use of
its new powers.
All of these efforts have the effect of making it more difficult for
the SEC to pursue violators on the assumption that a large
percentage of its cases will be settled. To the extent that the stakes
have risen, the SEC may find itself confronted with the need to
engage in more litigation. While a certain amount of litigation is
652. See supra notes 440-43.
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healthy for the agency, and for the system, the greater the SEC's
litigation burdens, the less will be its ability to undertake additional
investigations of other activities. The agency will find itself devoting
its resources to litigation rather than to investigation and consensual
resolutions.
In sum, about the only threat to the Commission's continued
success is its past success. Those who seek to make a good program
perfect may be casting the seeds of a weakening of the agency's
future effectiveness. In particular, efforts to saddle the agency with
authority it does not need, or at least does not want, 53 and
procedures that may encumber its ability to move rapidly, should be
rethought. Stagnation of enforcement initiatives is not in the public
interest; saddling an effective agency with more administrative
burdens than it reasonably should be expected to handle is similarly
not within the public interest.
The future for the SEC's enforcement program is bright,
particularly if the agency and those who support it do not succumb
to the temptation to overload the agency with responsibilities that
will erode its principal strengths--efficiency and flexibility.
653. The phenomenon of empowering the Commission with authority (and the
concomitant responsibility) it neither needs nor desires was recently played, out in the
Congressional debate over whether to vest in the SEC Chairman the power to halt trading
in the securities markets during periods of extreme volatility. Chairman Breeden resisted
such authority, which is presently vested in the President. See Brady Wants SEC to Be Able
to Close Markets During an Emergency, LA Times, Oct. 27, 1989, at D3, col. 4, in which it
was reported that:
Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, taking issue with newly installed Securities
and Exchange Commission Chairman Richard C. Breeden, endorsed a proposal
Thursday that would give the SEC the right to shut down the stock market in an
emergency.
Breeden told lawmakers Wednesday that he did not want the authority to dose
securities markets, arguing that uncertainty over whether the SEC might halt
trading could worsen market volatility.
See also Panel Votes to Give SEC Powers Over Programs; House Bill Would Ban 'Abusive' Practices,
Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1989, at F3, col. 1; Heat Is on Again for Programme Traders, Fin. Times
(U.K.), Nov. 2. 1989, at 24, col. 1.
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